The notion of representation figures centrally both in Descartes’ scientific theorizing about sense in humans and in his conceptual speculations about the nature of human cognition.

Descartes’ philosophical innovation in the Dioptrics is the claim that sensing in humans is a kind of representing rather than a kind of resembling. This provides the cornerstone for his attack on traditional theories of sense, and it underwrites his own position that sensing (in humans) is a kind of thinking, ascribable to the rational soul rather than to any Aristotelean sensitive soul.

How many emotions are there? Should we accept as overwhelming the evidence in favour of regarding emotions as emanating from a relatively small number of modules evolved efficiently to serve us in common life situations? Or can emotions, like colour, be organized in a space of two, three, or more dimensions defining a vast number of discriminable emotions, arranged on a continuum, on the model of the colour cone?

There is some evidence that certain emotions are specialized to facilitate certain response sequences, relatively encapsulated in their neurophysiological organization. These are natural facts. But nature, as Katherine Hepburn remarked to Humphrey Bogart, is what we were put in the world to rise above. I shall suggest that we can consider the question not merely from a scientific point of view, but from a political point of view. And so I will try to explain how to reconcile the evidence of emotional modularity - which, as some of the contributions to the present volume illustrate, is not devoid of a certain ambiguity - with a reasonable plea for an attitude of disapproval towards the rigidities of our taxonomy.

It is well known that there are large differences in the per capita income levels of the world's states. While a few poor countries are catching up with the rich world, for some countries, the gaps are growing wider. Most of this global inequality is between countries, not within them. In other words, even if income were equalized within countries, a large part of the gap in average income levels between countries would remain.

At the same time, the majority of movements in the wealthier countries for greater distributive equality have tended to focus on inequalities within their own borders: on issues such as raising minimum wages, changing the domestic tax rate, and ending national health disparities. This state-centric focus is frequently justified in moral terms. It is a familiar claim, for example, that we have special obligations to our own citizens and that these obligations are both weightier and more extensive than our obligations to strangers outside our borders.

The contemporary Women’s Movement has generated major new theories of the social construction of gender and male power. The feminist attack on the masculinist assumptions of cognitive psychology, psychoanalysis and most of the other academic disciplines has raised questions about some basic assumptions of those fields. For example, feminist economists have questioned the public/private split of much of mainstream economics, that ignores the social necessity of women’s unpaid housework and childcare. Feminist psychologists have challenged cognitive and psychoanalytic categories of human moral and gender development arguing that they are biased toward the development of male children rather than female children. Feminist anthropologists have argued that sex/gender systems, based on the male exchange of women in marriage, have socially produced gender differences in sexuality and parenting skills which have perpetuated different historical and cultural forms of male dominance. Feminist philosophers and theorists have suggested that we must reject the idea of a gender-free epistemological standpoint from which to understand the world. Finally radical feminists have argued that the liberal state permits a pornography industry that sexually objectifies women, thus legitimizing male violence against women.

A recent resurgence of interest within analytical political philosophy in the status of ethnic and national minorities coincides with the re-emergence of national identity as a primary organizing principle of political conflict, and with an increasing attentiveness to identity and recognition as organizing principles of political struggle. The recent theoretical literature within political philosophy has focused very much on recognizing the importance of national identity, and allowing attention to national sentiment to inform the design of social institutions.

In this paper I shall state the case for a version of the position which Will Kymlicka has dubbed ‘benign neglect’ toward cultural identities. Benign neglect is the position that the state should, as far as possible, be neutral among the cultural (and hence national) sentiments of its citizens. The position is, I think, implicit in the theoretical work of many contemporary liberals, and also in much socialist theory and some socialist practice. But it is rarely defended explicitly. Liberal theory is generally developed on the unrealistic assumptions that the society to be regulated is closed and coincides with the membership of a single nation.

This paper is concerned with the roles played by emotions in rationality, a topic which has been generally, but unjustifiably, ignored by epistemologists. Silence on this matter is, we believe, indicative of the overly narrow view that epistemologists have had of their field. Whatever else we might accomplish by considering the rational role of emotions, we hope to motivate a number of questions and philosophical contexts not commonly considered by epistemologists.

Everyone knows that rationality depends on the doxastic state of the individual. Thus, whether an action, decision, inference, or belief is rational depends on what other things the individual believes, or is justified in believing in the given situation. This holds not just for rationality, but for epistemic norms in general. Many such normative statuses apply directly to beliefs, and all depend at least indirectly on the background doxastic status of the agent. In this paper, it is our purpose to argue that rationality, and epistemic norms more generally, depend as well on the emotional states of the agent.

Marxism has probably been the most influential philosophy of this century. Until recently, however, it was either ignored or dismissed without serious consideration by the great majority of English-speaking philosophers. If the situation is now changing, that is thanks in good measure to the development of analytical Marxism.

This paper attempts to evaluate two arguments dealing with the nature and form of global political institutions. In each case I assume the general plausibility of moral cosmopolitanism, the view that every person in the world is entitled to equal moral consideration regardless of their various memberships in states, classes, nations, religious groups, and the like. The first argument is designed to show that moral cosmopolitans should be committed to the idea that core justice-promoting social, political, and economic institutions must have global scope. It purports to show this by appealing to both the universality constitutive of moral cosmopolitanism and the prima facieplausibility of uniform protections for the basic rights of persons everywhere. These premises are subjected to critical scrutiny, and a qualified version of institutional cosmopolitanism is defended. The second argument considers the case for requiring institutions with global scope to be democratic.

When soldiers find it morally comfortable to kill civilians and the public accepts such actions easily, philosophers are inclined to ask whether their comfort and acceptance rests on a misunderstanding. If it does, then philosophy could save lives by clearing up the problem. But most recent discussion has been about the wrong issue — whether killing non-combatants is wrong, and if so, why. That is all beside the point. Soldiers who kill civilians, in my experience, believe already that it is a bad thing to do. That they consider their actions at least prima facie wrong is evident from their readiness with excuses and justifications. Indeed, many of them take care to silence their consciences in advance with arguments of self-exoneration for the wrongs they are about to commit. We may reasonably hope that these soldiers would find it harder to kill civilians without those arguments to relieve their anticipated guilt.

The history of Western liberal capitalist society, viewed from the perspective of the growth of democracy, is contradictory. Although the idea of negative liberty at the basis of democracies of the liberal type secured citizens against arbitrary encroachments from the state, at the same time, by securing the rights of property first and foremost, it exposed those same citizens to the more insidious and all-determining undemocratic forces of the capitalist market. The history of liberal democracy thus created the conditions for the flourishing of genuine individuality in a democratic polity at the same time as it undermined those conditions by subjecting all need fulfillment (through which individuality is developed) to market forces. Until the fragmentation of radical movements occasioned by the upheavals of the 1960s, radical theory and practice was minimally unified around the critique of the contradiction between democracy and market forces at the core of liberal society. The fundamental principle of this critique stated that democratic society could flourish if and only if need satisfaction was freed from its subordination to money demand.

In Insensitive Semantics (2005), we argue for two theses: Semantic Minimalism and Speech Act Pluralism. In this paper, we outline our defense against two objections often raised against Semantic Minimalism. We begin with five stage-setting sections. These lead to the first objection, viz., that it might follow from our view that comparative adjectives are context insensitive. We defend our view against that objection (not, as you might expect, by denying that implication, but by endorsing it). Having done so, we address a second objection, viz., that Semantic Minimalism makes it difficult to see what role semantic content plays in communicative exchanges. We respond and end with a reversal, i.e., we argue that even though the second objection fails against us, it works against those who raise the objection. In particular, we show that our critics, in particular, Carston (2002) and Recanati (2004), end up with a notion of communicated content that fails various tests for psychological reality.

‘It is to be observed, in the second place, that the obligation, as a general rule, to respect possession and promises, admits of being clearly shewn by reference to the consequences of actions taken as species and classes.’ Alexander Smith: The Philosophy of Morals.

Once upon a time I wrote a paper in which I defended a version of utilitarianism. This paper has received a certain amount of attention, but, I think, not as much individual attention as it might have done, had it not been confused with another version of utilitarianism, which became prevalent at about that time. This second version of utilitarianism came quite quickly to be known as rule utilitarianism. It has engendered a considerable amount of interest, so much so that it seems to me to be very likely that philosophers, who are utilitarians at all, are nowadays more likely to be rule utilitarians than they are to be ordinary act utilitarians.

In the past three decades scholars in virtually every humanistic and social scientific research discipline, and in some natural sciences (especially the life sciences), have drawn attention to quite striking instances of gender bias in the modes of practice and theorizing typical of traditional fields of research. They generally begin by identifying explicit androcentric biases in definitions of the subject domains appropriate to specific scientific fields. Their primary targets, in this connection, have been research that leaves women out altogether (e.g., anthropological research that has arbitrarily and, as it turns out, falsely characterized subsistence systems and political structures exclusively in terms of male activities; [see Slocum 1975]), research that ignores women’s contributions or victimization (e.g., in the definition of literary or artistic canons and historical traditions), and research that conceptualizes its subject, male or female, human or non-human, in explicitly gender biased terms (e.g., models of animal behaviour that project onto it the gender-specific attributes of particular human societies and models of human psychological development that take exclusively male patterns of development as the norm and characterize distinctive female patterns as ‘deviant’; see Harraway 1978 and Gilligan 1982, respectively).

G. A. Cohen and John Roemer, two of the most influential of the ‘Analytic Marxists,’ have argued convincingly that the Marxian concept of exploitation must include injustice as part of its definition. ‘Exploitation’ is more like ‘murder’ which includes injustice in its very meaning, than like ‘killing’ which describes a fact which is often unjust but need not be. ‘Forced extraction of unpaid or surplus labor,’ then, is not sufficient for exploitation. The extraction must be unjust to be exploitative. Otherwise we would have to call it exploitation if people were forced to labor without pay as just punishment, or if people-selected by lottery-were drafted to fight a defensive war and provided no more than subsistence for their trouble, or if initiators of an unjust war were forced to labor to repair the damages they had caused.

Historical materialism tenders a sociological theory of morality. According to it, different types of society are characterized by different and distinctive moral codes, values, and norms, and these moral systems change as the societies with which they are linked evolve. Morality is not something immutable and eternal; rather, it is part of ‘the general process of social, political and intellectual life’ - part of the social consicousness - which is conditioned by the general mode of production of material life. It is no accident, but rather a functional requirement, that different forms of moral consciousness accompany different modes of production. Moreover, since all existing societies have been class societies, their moralities have been class moralities in the sense that they sustain and reflect the material relations that constitute the basis of the different forms of class rule.

The idea that we have special access to our own mental states has a distinguished philosophical history. Philosophers as different as Descartes and Locke agreed that we know our own minds in a way that is quite different from the way in which we know other minds. In the latter half of the twentieth century, however, this idea carne under serious attack, first from philosophy (Sellars 1956) and more recently from developmental psychology. The attack from developmental psychology arises from the growing body of work on “mindreading,” the process of attributing mental states to people (and other organisms). During the last fifteen years, the processes underlying rnindreading have been a major focus of attention in cognitive and developmental psychology. Most of this work has been concerned with the processes underlying the attribution of mental states to other people. However, a number of psychologists and philosophers have also proposed accounts of the mechanisms underlying the attribution of mental states to oneself. This process of reading one's own mind or becoming self-aware will be our primary concern in this paper.

This paper is part of an extended program of research with two aims: to understand Mill's moral and political philosophy, and to develop a utilitarian doctrine in its most plausible or least vulnerable form, in order to identify what, if anything, may reasonably be said for or against utilitarianism as a general type of doctrine. These aims fit together because I have found when trying to interpret Mill that he suggests lines of development somewhat different and in some ways more promising than the usual versions of utilitarianism.

The Principle of liberty is not a simple corollary of utilitarianism, and Mill argues for it. I am not concerned with his arguments for it, however, so much as I am with his applications of it, since they tell us how it is to be understood.