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A Tall Tale: In Defense of Semantic Minimalism and Speech Act Pluralism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Herman Cappelen  and
Ernest Lepore
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Extract

In Insensitive Semantics (2005), we argue for two theses: Semantic Minimalism and Speech Act Pluralism. In this paper, we outline our defense against two objections often raised against Semantic Minimalism. We begin with five stage-setting sections. These lead to the first objection, viz., that it might follow from our view that comparative adjectives are context insensitive. We defend our view against that objection (not, as you might expect, by denying that implication, but by endorsing it). Having done so, we address a second objection, viz., that Semantic Minimalism makes it difficult to see what role semantic content plays in communicative exchanges. We respond and end with a reversal, i.e., we argue that even though the second objection fails against us, it works against those who raise the objection. In particular, we show that our critics, in particular, Carston (2002) and Recanati (2004), end up with a notion of communicated content that fails various tests for psychological reality.

Type
Part A: Language
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume , Volume 30: New Essays in The Philosophy of Language and Mind , 2004 , pp. 2 - 28
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2004

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