It has been argued that moral bioenhancement is desirable even if it would make it impossible for us to do what is morally required. Others find this apparent loss of freedom deplorable. However, it is difficult to see how a world in which there is no moral evil can plausibly be regarded as worse than a world in which people are not only free to do evil, but also where they actually do it, which would commit us to the seemingly paradoxical view that, under certain circumstances, the bad can be better than the good. Notwithstanding, this view is defended here.

There are several reasons for accommodating health professionals’ conscientious objections. However, several authors have argued that among the most important and compelling reasons is to enable health professionals to maintain their moral integrity. Accommodation is said to provide “moral space” in which health professionals can practice without compromising their moral integrity. There are, however, alternative conceptions of moral integrity and corresponding different criteria for moral-integrity-based claims. It is argued that one conception of moral integrity, the identity conception, is sound and suitable in the specific context of responding to health professionals’ conscientious objections and their requests for accommodation. According to the identity conception, one maintains one’s moral integrity if and only if one’s actions are consistent with one’s core moral convictions. The identity conception has been subject to a number of criticisms that might call into question its suitability as a standard for determining whether health professionals have genuine moral-integrity-based accommodation claims. The following five objections to the identity conception are critically examined: (1) it does not include a social component, (2) it is a conception of subjective rather than objective integrity, (3) it does not include a reasonableness condition, (4) it does not include any substantive moral constraints, and (5) it does not include any intellectual integrity requirement. In response to these objections, it is argued that none establishes the unsuitability of the identity conception in the specific context of responding to health professionals’ conscientious objections and their requests for accommodation.

This article explores the ethical issues that have been identified in emerging technologies, from early genetic engineering to synthetic biology. The scientific advances in the field form a continuum, and some ethical considerations can be raised time and again when new developments occur. An underlying concern is the cumulative effect of scientific advances and ensuing technological innovation that can change our understanding of life and humanity.

Currently, many scientific fields such as psychology or biomedicine face a methodological crisis concerning the reproducibility, replicability, and validity of their research. In neuroimaging, similar methodological concerns have taken hold of the field, and researchers are working frantically toward finding solutions for the methodological problems specific to neuroimaging. This article examines some ethical and legal implications of this methodological crisis in neuroimaging. With respect to ethical challenges, the article discusses the impact of flawed methods in neuroimaging research in cognitive and clinical neuroscience, particularly with respect to faulty brain-based models of human cognition, behavior, and personality. Specifically examined is whether such faulty models, when they are applied to neurological or psychiatric diseases, could put patients at risk, and whether this places special obligations on researchers using neuroimaging. In the legal domain, the actual use of neuroimaging as evidence in United States courtrooms is surveyed, followed by an examination of ways that the methodological problems may create challenges for the criminal justice system. Finally, the article reviews and promotes some promising ideas and initiatives from within the neuroimaging community for addressing the methodological problems.

Arguments against physicians’ claims of a right to refuse to provide tests or treatments to patients based on conscientious objection often depend on two premises that are rarely made explicit. The first is that the protection of religious liberty (broadly construed) should be limited to freedom of worship, assembly, and belief. The second is that because professions are licensed by the state, any citizen who practices a licensed profession is required to provide all the goods and services determined by the profession to fall within the scope of practice of that professional specialty and permitted by the state, regardless of any personal religious, philosophical, or moral objection. In this article, I argue that these premises ought to be rejected, and therefore the arguments that depend on them ought also to be rejected. The first premise is incompatible with Locke’s conception of tolerance, which recognizes that fundamental, self-identifying beliefs affect public as well as private acts and deserve a broad measure of tolerance. The second premise unduly (and unrealistically) narrows the discretionary space of professional practice to an extent that undermines the contributions professions ought to be permitted to make to the common good. Tolerance for conscientious objection in the public sphere of professional practice should not be unlimited, however, and the article proposes several commonsense, Lockean limits to tolerance for physician claims of conscientious objection.

This article analyzes the ethics of synthetic biology (synbio) from a consequentialist perspective, examining potential effects on food and agriculture, and on medicine, fuel, and the advancement of science. The issues of biosafety and biosecurity are also examined. A consequentialist analysis offers an essential road map to policymakers and regulators as to how to deal with synbio. Additionally, the article discusses the limitations of consequentialism as a tool for analysing synbioethics. Is it possible to predict, with any degree of plausibility, what the consequences of synthetic biology will be in 50 years, or in 100, or in 500? Synbio may take humanity to a place of radical departure from what is known or knowable.

Brain–computer interfaces (BCIs) can enable communication for persons in severe paralysis including locked-in syndrome (LIS); that is, being unable to move or speak while aware. In cases of complete loss of muscle control, termed “complete locked-in syndrome,” a BCI may be the only viable solution to restore communication. However, a widespread ignorance regarding quality of life in LIS, current BCIs, and their potential as an assistive technology for persons in LIS, needlessly causes a harmful situation for this cohort. In addition to their medical condition, these persons also face social barriers often perceived as more impairing than their physical condition. Through social exclusion, stigmatization, and frequently being underestimated in their abilities, these persons are being locked out in addition to being locked-in. In this article, we (1) show how persons in LIS are being locked out, including how key issues addressed in the existing literature on ethics, LIS, and BCIs for communication, such as autonomy, quality of life, and advance directives, may reinforce these confinements; (2) show how these practices violate the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and suggest that we have a moral responsibility to prevent and stop this exclusion; and (3) discuss the role of BCIs for communication as one means to this end and suggest that a novel approach to BCI research is necessary to acknowledge the moral responsibility toward the end users and avoid violating the human rights of persons in LIS.

Complicity in an immoral, and even criminal, activity, such as robbery or murder, is itself regarded as involving responsibility for those acts. What should the position be of health professionals who are expected to participate in actions that they believe are morally wrong? Professional responsibilities may clash with private conscience. Even referring a patient to someone else, when what is in question may be assisted suicide, or euthanasia, seems to involve some complicity. This is a live issue in Canada, but similar dilemmas occur elsewhere. Physicians and others should not be coerced into involvement of any kind in what they regard as wrong. Such coercion goes against the very principles of liberal democracy. Conscience matters. Reasonable accommodation should be given to those whose moral judgment may be at variance with prevailing professional norms. Moral questions should still be given weight within medicine, and disagreements respected. Dedication to the promotion of human welfare should be paramount, but it should be recognized that there may be different visions of what such welfare consists of.

This article continues and expands differences I have with Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu concerning issues of moral bioenhancement and free will. They have criticized my conception of voluntary moral bioenhancement, claiming that it ignores the extent to which freedom is a matter of degree. Here, I argue that freedom as a political concept (or as one that is analogous to a political concept) is indeed scalar in nature, but that freedom of the will is to be understood as a threshold concept and therefore not as subject to degree. Consequently, I contend, by asserting that freedom is a matter of degree, that Persson and Savulescu have not undermined my arguments favoring voluntary moral enhancement. In addition, I add three further arguments against compulsory moral bioenhancement.

This article analyzes a specter that has haunted bioethics almost since its inception, namely the specter of the misuse of biotechnology by maleficent agents bent on mass destruction, or the complete eradication of human kind and life as we know it. The article provides a general account of why bioethicists cry “catastrophic bioterrorism potential” when new biotechnologies emerge, and an analysis of the arguments that flow from the prediction, especially in relation to synthetic biology.