Dissecting Bioethics, edited by Tuija Takala and Matti Hayry, welcomes contributions on the conceptual and theoretical dimensions of bioethics. The department is dedicated to the idea that words defined by bioethicists and others should not be allowed to imprison people’s actual concerns, emotions, and thoughts. Papers that expose the many meanings of a concept, describe the different readings of a moral doctrine, or provide an alternative angle to seemingly self-evident issues are particularly appreciated. To submit a paper or to discuss a suitable topic, contact Tuija Takala at [email protected].

This article attempts to tackle the ethically and morally troubling issue of emigration of physicians from the United Kingdom, and whether it can be justified. Unlike most research that has already been undertaken in this field, which looks at migration from developing countries to developed countries, this article takes an in-depth look at the migration of physicians between developed countries, in particular from the United Kingdom (UK) to other developed countries such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States (US). This examination was written in response to a current and critical crisis in the National Health Service (NHS), where impending contract changes may bring about a potential exodus of junior doctors.

This article aims to explore the idea that enhancement technologies have been and will continue to be an essential element of what we might call the “human continuum,” and are indeed key to our existence and evolution into persons. Whereas conservative commentators argue that enhancement is likely to cause us to lose our humanity and become something other, it is argued here that the very opposite is true: that enhancement is the core of what and who we are. Using evidence from paleoanthropology to examine the nature of our predecessor species, and their proclivities for tool use, we can see that there is good reason to assume that the development of Homo sapiens is a direct result of the use of enhancement technologies. A case is also made for broad understandings of the scope of enhancement, based on the significant evolutionary results of acts that are usually dismissed as “unremarkable.” Furthermore, the use of enhancement by modern humans is no different than these prehistoric applications, and is likely to ultimately have similar results. There is no good reason to assume that whatever we may become will not also consider itself human.

Moral enhancement has been accused of curtailing human freedoms. In this article, I suggest the opposite: moral enhancement and individual freedom can go hand in hand. The first section defines freedom, enhancement, and morality and argues that only a naturalistic account of morality allows for the concept of enhancement. The second section looks at ways that freedom may be threatened by moral enhancement, especially by the method of implementation, the creation of new externalities, or the limitation of volitional options. I argue that virtue ethics offers the safest model for moral enhancement. The third section describes ways in which moral enhancement can be achieved while maintaining, or even increasing, individual freedom. Such methods include shifting of the moral axis, replacing vicious options with virtuous ones, and increasing the number of volitional options available. The article concludes in the fourth section by arguing that the technology and techniques that allow us moral enhancement are likely to be the same ones that allow greater freedom than we already enjoy.

Neuroethics Now welcomes articles addressing the ethical application of neuroscience in research and patient care, as well as its impact on society.

Patients with repeated minor head injury are a challenge to our clinical skills of neurodiagnosis because the relevant evidence objectively demonstrating their impairment was collected in New Zealand (although published in the BMJ and Lancet) and, at the time, was mired in controversy. The effects of repeated closed diffuse head injury are increasingly recognized worldwide, but now suffer from the relentless advance of imaging technology as the dominant form of neurodiagnosis and the considerable financial interests that underpin the refusal to recognize that acute accelerational injury is the most subtle and insidiously damaging (especially when seen in the light of biopsychosocial medicine), and potentially one of the most financially momentous (given the large incomes impacted and needing compensation) phenomena in modern sports medicine. The vested interests in downplaying this phenomenon are considerable and concentrated in North America where diffuse head injury is a widespread feature of the dominant winter sports code: Gridiron or American Rules football. The relationship of this to shattered lives among the brightest and best of young men and the relatively dated objective evidence are a toxic mix in terms of ethical analysis and, therefore, there is a malignant confluence of social forces that tends toward minimizing the injury.

This section features original work on pathographies—i.e., (auto)biographical accounts of disease, illness, and disability—that provide narrative inquiry relating to the personal, existential, psychological, social, cultural, spiritual, political, and moral meanings of individual experience. Editors are: Nathan Carlin and Therese Jones. For submissions, contact Nathan Carlin at: [email protected].

Humans is a science fiction television series set in what appears to be present-day London. What makes it science fiction is that in London and worldwide, there are robots that look like humans and can mimic human behavior. The series raises several important ethical and philosophical questions about artificial intelligence and robotics, which should be of interest to bioethicists.

In this article, we begin by identifying three main neuroethical approaches: neurobioethics, empirical neuroethics, and conceptual neuroethics. Our focus is on conceptual approaches that generally emphasize the need to develop and use a methodological modus operandi for effectively linking scientific (i.e., neuroscience) and philosophical (i.e., ethics) interpretations. We explain and assess the value of conceptual neuroethics approaches and explain and defend one such approach that we propose as being particularly fruitful for addressing the various issues raised by neuroscience: fundamental neuroethics.

The body-to-head transplant (BHT) planned to be undertaken later this year at China’s Harbin Medical University by neurosurgeons Sergio Canavero and Xiaoping Ren has attracted considerable attention and criticism. The intended operation gives rise to philosophical queries about the body–brain–mind relationship and nature of the subjective self; technical and ethical issues regarding the scientific soundness, safety, and futility of the procedure; the adequacy of prior research; and the relative merit, folly, and/or danger of forging new boundaries of what is biomedically possible. Moreover, that this procedure, which has been prohibited from being undertaken in other countries, has been sanctioned in China brings into stark relief ways that differing social and political values, philosophies, ethics, and laws can affect the scope and conduct of research. Irrespective of whether the BHT actually occurs, the debate it has generated reveals and reflects both the evermore international enterprise of brain science, and the need for neuroethical discourse to include and appreciate multicultural views, values, and voices.

A common goal of ethics education is to equip students who later become health practitioners to not only know about the ethical principles guiding their practice, but to also autonomously recognize when and how these principles might apply and assist these future practitioners in providing care for patients and families. This article aims to contribute to discussions about ethics education pedagogy and teaching, by presenting and evaluating the use of the visual arts as an educational approach designed to facilitate students’ moral imagination and independent critical thinking about ethics in clinical practice. We describe a sequence of ethics education strategies over a 3 year Doctor of Physiotherapy program, focusing on the final year professional ethics assessment task, which involved the use of visual arts to stimulate the exploration of ethics in healthcare. The data (in the form of student essays about their chosen artwork) were analyzed using both thematic and content analysis. Two key themes centered on emotional responses and lateral thinking. The use of artwork appeared to facilitate imaginative, emotional, and conceptual thinking about ethics and clinical experience (both past and future). This study provides some evidence to support the effectiveness of the use of the visual arts in promoting students’ recognition of ethical dimensions within their clinical experience and reflection on their emerging professional identity. As one student noted, she left the museum “somewhat changed.”

Corruption is a word used loosely to describe many kinds of action that people find distasteful. We prefer to reserve it for the intentional misuse of the good offices of an established social entity for private benefit, posing as fair trading. The currency of corruption is not always material or financial. Moral corruption is all too familiar within churches and other ostensibly beneficent institutions, and it happens within medicine and the pharmaceutical industries. Corrupt behavior reduces trust, costs money, causes injustice, and arouses anger. Yet it persists, despite all efforts since the beginnings of societies. People who act corruptly may lack conscience and empathy in the same way as those with some personality disorders. Finding ways to prevent corruption from contaminating beneficent organizations is therefore likely to be frustratingly difficult. Transparency and accountability may go some way, but the determined corruptor is unlikely to feel constrained by moral and reporting requirements of this kind. Punishment and redress are complicated issues, unlikely to satisfy victims and society at large. Both perhaps should deal in the same currency—material or social—in which the corrupt dealing took place.