In an article in the Canadian Bar Review on the recent case of Bourhill v. Young Dr. Cecil Wright says that this is ‘one of the most important decisions in the law of tort which has appeared since Donoghue v. Stevenson.’ But, as he points out thereafter, it is difficult to determine from the speeches of the law lords exactly what principles it has established concerning the ‘ambit of risk’ or the extent of liability for nervous shock. That this doubt is fully justified is shown by the fact that Professor Winfield in his Text-book of the Law of Tort deals with the case in the section entitled ‘Remoteness of consequence (or damage)’ while Dr. Stallybrass suggests that it is primarily authority on the problem of negligence. Perhaps this difference of opinion reflects a certain degree of uncertainty in the judgments themselves, for their Lordships, although reaching the same conclusion, do not seem to have been in complete agreement concerning the grounds on which they did so.

The following judgment was delivered:—

The facts of the cases now before us, which have been consolidated for the purpose of this hearing, fall within a narrow, perhaps too narrow, compass.

The series to which the four volumes that are the subject of this article belong began in 1928, and appeared regularly until their production was held up by the recent war. The publication of the 1940 volume was delayed until 1943. Within the last year, activities have been renewed with such success that the volumes for 1942, 1943, 1944 and 1945 have been forwarded to us. The Foreword of Dean Arthur T. Vanderbilt gives impressive imformation about the magnitude of the task. He tells us that in 1942 American reported decisions filled seventy-four books totalling 76,362 pages, and that, although the sittings of most of the legislatures were suspended in that year, enactments nevertheless occupied 8,939 pages. Thus, great as is the burden on the editors of our Annual Survey of English Law (which Dean Vanderbilt courteously mentions as the source of inspiration of the American Annual Survey), it is light compared with that upon the shoulders of those who have to deal with legislation and judicial decisions in over fifty jurisdictions. The aim of each volume of the American Survey is modestly described as merely to present in orderly fashion the significant trends in the more important branches of the law through the year.' This underrates the scope of the work, for it is gratifying to both practitioners and teachers of law to find included in it chapters on ‘Jurisprudence,’ ‘Legal Education, Bar Organization and Economics,’ and ‘Administration of Justice—The Courts and Law Reform.’ Moreover, account is also taken of outstanding literature in the shape of textbooks and articles in law journals.

The concern of this article is twofold. In the first place it seeks to question the weight and value of the authority upon which the House of Lords in Selvey v. Director of Public Prosecutions purported to found the existence of a judicial discretion to exclude, in a criminal trial, evidence which is both relevant and admissible, on the ground that it is prejudicial to the accused. Secondly, it seeks to evaluate the contribution which such a discretion has made and is likely to make to the theory and practice of the law of evidence.

The Law Commission is currently scrutinising the legal liability of manufacturers and sellers of consumer goods under the English law of sale, and it may possibly recommend reform of the existing law to provide greater protection for consumers. A convenient means of assessing the effect and scope of such proposals will be to compare them with the doctrines of current American “products liability law.” These doctrines have subjected sellers of consumer products in America to a strict liability towards their consumers in respect of defective products. This article is intended to be a survey and analysis of the different causes of action provided by American law. It will be necessary to distinguish the different features and origins of each doctrine since the principles of products liability law have been evolved from case to case by the American state courts in a manner which calls to mind the remark of Holmes that “it is the merit of the common law that it decides the cases first and determines the principle afterwards.”