The first colonists in America might be divided roughly into two streams. Those that went to the North were of the Puritan stripe; those that went to the South were, so far as the ruling class is concerned, Englishmen quite in sympathy with existing affairs, who went only to better themselves. The middle colonies, between New England and Pennsylvania, were not first settled by Englishmen; they require different consideration. The people, then, who settled New England, and to a considerable extent the people who settled Pennsylvania, were not in sympathy with existing conditions in England; and they had as a result of their experience a certain antipathy to the English law as it had been administered. In Massachusetts Bay this antipathy was carried to the extent of forbidding any English lawyer to live in the colony; and they abolished the English law by ordinance, and provided that all matters should be settled by appeal to the Bible, which nreant, to them, the Old Testament. That continued for a while, but, of course, it was absolutely an unworkable condition. Men trained in the thoughts of Englishmen could not think like the ancient Jews, and could not really be governed by the law of Moses; and the ordinance rather passed out of their recollection. It was still true, however, that lawyers did not plead in their Courts. The Courts were magistrate Courts, presided over in the highest Court by the persons elected as governor and assistants, in the lower Courts by the lesser magistrates. The law administered—if one can call it law—was simply the whim or the good sense of the magistrate, along with such ordinances as had been passed. The same thing was true of the other New England colonies and—as time passed—was equally true in Pennsylvania.

This article seeks to uphold the Interest Theory of legal rights by arguing that such a theory can withstand objections and handle difficulties that are often posed against it. Building on the author’s previous defences of the Interest Theory, the present article also seeks to expose some serious shortcomings in competing theories. Among the topics covered are the role of legal powers of enforcing or waiving legal rights; the possibility of rights to be mistreated; and the status of inoperative rights. In each case, so the article argues, the complexities of the issues involved can best be handled by a theory which maintains that the essential function of legal rights is the protection of various aspects of people’s well-being.

The Law Commission is currently scrutinising the legal liability of manufacturers and sellers of consumer goods under the English law of sale, and it may possibly recommend reform of the existing law to provide greater protection for consumers. A convenient means of assessing the effect and scope of such proposals will be to compare them with the doctrines of current American “products liability law.” These doctrines have subjected sellers of consumer products in America to a strict liability towards their consumers in respect of defective products. This article is intended to be a survey and analysis of the different causes of action provided by American law. It will be necessary to distinguish the different features and origins of each doctrine since the principles of products liability law have been evolved from case to case by the American state courts in a manner which calls to mind the remark of Holmes that “it is the merit of the common law that it decides the cases first and determines the principle afterwards.”

In 1958 there were three houses for sale in Coronation Mews. The first was bought by Mr. and Mrs. A, each providing one-half of the purchase money but the house being conveyed into the name of Mrs. A. The house cost £5,000.

A Couple of thugs entered the Burger King near King’s Cross and beat up the manager. They not only beat and kicked him, but also struck him in the eye with a gold knuckle-duster. The eye needed to be operated on, but the operation went wrong, and he can no longer see out of it. In consequence of these experiences he is now a total psychological wreck, unable to work for the foreseeable future. His employer, the first defendant, was held liable for failing to protect him from attack, and the hospital, the second defendant, admitted liability for the negligent operation: Rahman v. Arearose Ltd. [2000] 3 W.L.R. 1184 (C.A.). Quid iuris?

This article considers the enforceability of arbitration clauses which are included in trust documentation. It focuses on two main questions. The first is whether internal trust disputes are capable of being settled by arbitration. The article offers arguments in favour of the arbitrability of such disputes. It then addresses the question of whether parties to an internal trust dispute can be forced to arbitrate, rather than litigate, where the trust documentation contains an arbitration clause. It is argued that there are real difficulties in the argument that such clauses can be enforced as arbitration agreements, under the ordinary arbitration statutes, but that the court could potentially enforce such a clause under its inherent jurisdiction to control its proceedings.

A Question which is increasingly asked is whether there is a right to be a parent. The recent decision of the House of Lords in Re B (Adoption: Natural Parent) [2002] 1 F.L.R. 196 may provoke some debate about whether there is a right not to be one.

Both interpretation and rectification continue to pose problems. Difficulties are compounded by blurring the boundary between the two. In Simic v New South Wales Land and Housing Corporation [2016] HCA 47, the High Court of Australia overturned the decisions of the lower courts which had held that performance bonds could be interpreted in a “loose” manner in order to correct a mistake. However, the documents could be rectified in order to reflect the actual intentions of the parties. This decision should be welcomed: the mistake was more appropriately corrected through the equitable jurisdiction than at common law. Significantly, the concurring judgments of French C.J. and Kiefel J. highlight that the law of rectification now seems to be different in Australia from the law in England. It is to be hoped that the English approach will soon be revisited (see further P. Davies, “Rectification versus Interpretation” [2016] C.L.J. 62).

Michael Douglas and Catherine Zeta-Jones, the first and second claimants, sold the exclusive rights to publish their wedding photographs to OK! magazine, the third claimant; however, in spite of elaborate security arrangements, Hello! magazine obtained unofficial photographs, publication of which the claimants sought to restrain in the present proceedings. Although an injunction was granted at first instance, it was discharged by the Court of Appeal which held that, on the facts, damages would constitute an adequate remedy should the claimants succeed at trial. Given the interlocutory nature of the proceedings, Douglas v. Hello! Ltd. [2001] 2 W.L.R. 992 does not provide determinative answers to the substantive questions raised by the facts. Nevertheless, it supplies useful guidance as to the role of privacy in English law and tentatively addresses the “horizontal effect” of the Human Rights Act 1998 by considering whether that legislation may found claims against private parties as well as public authorities.

Mr. Farley’s action for breach of contract against his surveyor gave the House of Lords an opportunity to consider the recovery of damages for non-pecuniary loss (Farley v. Skinner [2001] UKHL 49, [2001] 3 W.L.R. 899). Mr. Farley had been considering buying a house and instructed Mr. Skinner to survey the property. In particular, Mr. Farley asked Mr. Skinner to investigate whether the property was affected by aircraft noise, saying he did not want a property on a flight-path. Mr. Skinner subsequently reported that he thought it unlikely that the property would be so affected. Mr. Farley, having acquired and spent significant sums refurbishing the house, was therefore disappointed to discover that his enjoyment of the property was significantly impaired by the sound of aircraft waiting to land at nearby Gatwick airport.