This article argues that, in the mid-nineteenth century, the American merchant community created local commercial organizations to propagate a vision of economic development based on republican ideals. As part of a “business revolution,” these organizations attempted to balance competition and cooperation in order to promote and direct the expansion of national markets and commercial activity throughout the country. Faced with the crisis of divergent sectional political economies and committed to the belief that businessmen needed a stronger political voice, merchant groups banded together to form the National Board of Trade, an association devoted to creating a unified commercial interest and shaping national economic policies.

Lax regulation enabled trust companies to take excessive risks, according to previous studies of the Panic of 1907, leading to a loss of confidence and massive runs. These studies have, however, given relatively little attention to the historical development of trust companies. This article argues that a more historical perspective can lead to a better understanding of the institutional framework and the actions of trust companies. Depositors did not lose confidence because of inadequate regulation; depositors lost confidence in specific trust companies because of false rumors, and diversity among trust companies hindered cooperation to halt the Panic.

This article recounts the story of the Bombay Plan of 1944, a bold vision of economic transformation for postwar India put forth by business leaders. The Plan represented a turning point in the history of Indian business. It marked the institutionalization of a long relationship between business and nationalist leadership as well as a historic moment when business groups, for the first time, unhesitatingly aligned themselves with nationalist aspirations. Underlying the Bombay Plan was the idea of a close partnership between business and the state. Yet, within a decade, this optimism died out as the autarchic features of economic policy became increasingly pronounced in independent India. The story of the Bombay Plan provides an insight into the relations between business and state in the context of development planning in India.

In this Research Note, Pierre de Longuemar, founder of the Paribas Historical Archives Department, describes the building of their oral history program. Shortly after the Historical Archives Department was begun in 1990, Paribas decided to publish a book on its European roots. Interviews were conducted that proved an effective way of identifying Paribas's main strategic thrust during its postwar modernization. Oral histories were also collected to provide source material on the context of the merger between BNP and Paribas in 2000.

In this article, we provide a synthesizing framework that we call the “dynamic trajectories” framework to study the evolution of multinational enterprises (MNEs) in host countries over time. We argue that a change in the policy environment in a host country presents an MNE with two sets of interrelated decisions. First, the MNE has to decide whether to enter, exit, or stay in the host country at the onset of each policy epoch; second, conditional on the first choice, it has to decide on its local responsiveness strategy at the onset of each policy epoch. India, which experienced two policy shocks—shutting down to MNEs in 1970 and then opening up again in 1991—offers an interesting laboratory to explore the “dynamic trajectories” perspective. We collect and analyze a unique dataset of all entry and exit events for Fortune 50 and FTSE 50 firms (as of 1991) in India in the period from 1858 to 2013 and, additionally, we document detailed case studies of four MNEs (that arguably represent outliers in our sample).

Arthur L. Honiker, from “Brooklyn, New York,” reviewed American Business Abroad: Ford on Six Continents, first published in 1964, in the Autumn 1966 issue of the Business History Review. His review was sober, yet quite positive: “This is a thoroughly researched, straightforward account of the overseas expansion of the Ford Motor Company during the sixty years from its founding in 1903.” He praised the book's contextualization of “the vast economic and political changes in the world during that period” and “its objective evaluation of the consequences to the corporation, to the United States, and to the host nations from Ford's activities abroad” (Business History Review 40, no. 3 [1966]: 395).

The noted British historian G. M. Trevelyan observed that “without social history, economic history is barren and political history is unintelligible.” The autobiographical volumes of Prakash Tandon, one of twentieth-century India's great business leaders, have been hailed as extremely important works of social history. The Times Literary Supplement had this to say about Tandon's Beyond Punjab (1971): “Everyone who is interested in factors which have shaped India today should read this book.” But business historians have rarely cited Tandon's work. This is not entirely surprising, given the state of business history in India. Apart from a few scholars, including Dwijendra Tripathi and the authors in this special issue of Business History Review, research on business history has been limited. To some extent, politics has been the all-consuming passion in India. Yet Tandon's work contains remarkable insights into important aspects of business history, both in India and globally.

Rarely does a relatively unknown professor of economics publish a book that sells more than 200,000 copies in a few months. When critics accuse the same economist of being normative, political, of manipulating data, of misunderstanding basic economic theory, and of wanting to impoverish everyone, surely it must be because he is on to something. Other commentators, perhaps a bit prematurely, are claiming that his book is the economics book that will define twenty-first-century debate.

When business historians discarded the melodramatic mode of analysis more than a half century ago, transcending a stale debate over whether business leaders were “heroes” or “villains,” they also shifted emphatically away from finance as a topic of inquiry. A generation of muckraking accounts, culminating in Matthew Josephson's The Robber Barons, had dramatized American industrialization as a story of stock market manipulation and abuse of power. These narratives featured financiers, not as full participants in the formation of the new industrial system, but as an external and almost entirely disruptive force. They attached a stigma to finance that prompted scholars, inspired by the work of Alfred Chandler, to turn elsewhere for insights about the rise of modern business. More recently, a new cohort of historians—Stephen Mihm, Julia Ott, Jonathan Levy, Louis Hyman, and Richard White, to name a few of the more prominent names—has rediscovered finance as an analytical perspective and subject of immense significance. With a more subtle and nuanced approach than their Progressive-era forebears, they have moved bankers, investors, and stockbrokers from the margins and positioned them at the very core of American capitalism.