Changes in international competitiveness since the Second World War have favoured Germany and Japan over France, the United States and Britain. This applies to competitiveness in general, but is examined here in three specific industries: steel, motor vehicles and semiconductors. Explanations of changes in competitiveness often focus on economic and cultural variables, but an examination of the three industries shows that a better explanation can be found in the way in which each country organizes its state and its society. State-societal arrangements influence competitiveness mainly through their impact on the speed of diffusion of new technologies. The disparate cases of Germany (strong business and labour, weak government) and Japan (strong business and government, weak labour) suggest that there is more than one path to competitiveness. The literature on competitiveness has focused too much on Japan, and therefore on state industrial policies, as the key to increasing competitiveness. The German case shows that increased competitiveness is possible with a relatively weak state, but only if there is a major commitment to upgrading the skill levels of the work force.

Public choice and critical theory constitute two very different and often mutually hostile research traditions. An opportunity for conversation across the two traditions arises inasmuch as public choice has itself demonstrated the incoherence of a politics – in particular, a democratic politics – of unconstrained rational egoism. By deploying an expanded, communicative conception of rationality, critical theory can help move public choice beyond several related impasses. Critical theory benefits from this encounter by gaining content for its currently rather abstract critiques of politics and rationality, and additional insight into the forces conducive to different kinds of rationality. More importantly, political science stands to gain an account of politics more powerful than either tradition can muster by itself.

This article examines citizens' attitudes towards the two major parties in the United States since 1952 and in West Germany since 1969 employing open-ended data from each country's National Election Study time series. Despite similar declining trends in party identification in the two countries, it is found that the patterns of change in party images are markedly different. In the United States it is shown that voters have become increasingly neutral towards the two parties as the focus has turned more and more towards the candidates. In contrast, in West Germany voters have come to have a more balanced view of the parties, seeing both positive and negative features of both. Thus in both cases there has been a decline in polarized strong partisanship (‘my party right or wrong’), but for different reasons. In the United States this decline can be seen as a sign of the decay of an ageing and outdated party system; in West Germany it can be seen as the development of realistic and balanced views of a party system which is just reaching full maturity. The implications for analysing party system development in Eastern Europe are discussed.

Six different notions of ‘political’ are commonly used in discussions of the US Supreme Court. All six are familiar, but the distinctions among them are seldom carefully drawn. The six are: (1) purely definitional, in the sense that the Supreme Court, as an appellate court of last resort inevitably authoritatively allocates values; (2) empirical, in the sense that litigants use the Court to try to achieve their political purposes; (3) influence seeking, in the sense that the justices have a natural desire to prevail in arguments within the court; (4) prudential, in the sense that the justices frequently consider the probable consequences of their decisions; (5) policy-oriented, in the – usually pejorative – sense that justices are said to use the Court and the law as a cover for pursuing their own policy and other goals; and (6) systemic, in the sense that the Court's decisions frequently, as a matter of fact, have consequences for other parts of the American political system. These six notions are considered in the context of recent abortion decisions.

Do party manifestos matter to government policy? Does a genuine party mandate operate within the British political process? These questions are generally neglected in analyses of British politics, but they are crucial in assessing how far political parties transmit electoral preferences into government action. We try to answer them through a novel use of available data, using content analysis to code and classify policy emphases within the post-war election programmes of the Conservative, Labour and Liberal parties. Statistical analysis reveals that government party programmes are remarkably well reflected in post-election policy priorities, measured as percentages of central government spending in major policy areas. This gives strong support to traditional mandate theory within the context of the ‘Westminster model’ of party government. Anomalies, such as a strong relationship between Liberal emphases and expenditures in three key areas, and the more consistent relationship of expenditures with Conservative rather than Labour priorities, are also considered.

Nearly two decades ago researchers pointed out the sharp decline in marginal districts in elections for the US House of Representatives. That observation led to an outpouring of research describing the electoral changes, explaining their bases and speculating about their consequences for the larger political system. Recently Gary Jacobson has offered a major corrective to that line of research, arguing that ‘House incumbents are no safer now than they were in the 1950s; the marginals, properly defined, have not vanished; the swing ratio has diminished little, if at all; and competition for House seats held by incumbents has not declined’. While Jacobson advances an extremely provocative argument, there are complicating patterns in his evidence that support additional and/or different interpretations. We argue that the marginals, ‘properly defined’ have diminished, the swing ratio has declined, and party competition for House seats held by incumbents has lessened. While fears that the vanishing marginals phenomenon would lead to lower responsiveness on the part of ‘safe’ House incumbents have proved groundless, the collective composition of Congress does appear to be less responsive to changes in popular sentiments. Thus, the vanishing marginals have contributed to the occurrence of divided government in the United States and in all likelihood do have the effects on congressional leadership and policy-making that many analysts have claimed.

Analysis of the British Election Studies suggests that migration between the north and south of Britain does have political effects, southerly migration leading voters away from Labour and northerly migration towards Labour. This pattern persists even after controls for prior social and political characteristics, experience of social mobility, and changes in local political environment. It does, however, appear to be a new phenomenon, not apparent in the earlier election studies. The results support the hypothesis that the north-south divide constitutes a distinct new political cleavage distinct from social class and the other more familiar social bases of voting behaviour.

Much has been made in recent years of increasing the choice of the citizen-consumer. This article argues that the concept of ‘increasing choice’ is far more problematic than at first appears and has little intrinsic value in itself. Choice is only to be valued in itself in the sense that the process of choice or decision-making plays a part in our discovery of our own preferences. To justify the introduction of the market process on the grounds of increasing choice is doubly wrong; first, increasing choice is not in itself valuable and, secondly, what is valuable about the market has little to do with choice.

This article analyses candidates' strategies in leadership debates and voters' responses to those strategies. Based on an examination of German election campaign debates since 1972, we specify a number of different debating strategies available to the candidates. The strategic choices made by each party leader are then identified through content analysis. Finally, employing aggregate-level data, regression models are used to determine whether or not the debaters' strategies influenced voters' evaluations of who won and who lost each encounter. We report three major findings: (I) ‘positive’, non-attacking debating styles generate the most favourable public evaluations; (2) voters are most attentive to candidates' discussions of the parties' and government's record rather than their discussions of individual personalities; and (3), in some cases, these effects exceed those of party identification.

This paper utilizes recent Marxist cultural theory to theorize about the cultural dynamics of racial group conflict in the United States. After laying out a typology of cultural relations between dominant and subordinate groups, the article examines data on African-American cultural penetration of American public culture. The data indicate that since the late 1960s ‘imagerial hegemony’ has yielded to ‘imagerial projection’ for African-Americans. The article concludes by speculating about some interpretations and consequences of this phenomenon.

Surveys sponsored by the Commission of the European Communities are employed to study value change in West Germany, Britain, the Netherlands, France, Belgium and Italy between 1970–71 and 1990 and in Denmark and Ireland between 1973 and 1990. During these years generational replacement had a major impact on value trends in all eight societies. In Germany, Britain, the Netherlands and Denmark generational replacement contributed to the growth of Postmaterialism, and in France, Italy and Ireland replacement was the major force creating the trend towards Postmaterialism. Even in Belgium, where there was only a slight move towards Postmaterialism, replacement may have prevented a movement towards Materialism. For the European public as a whole, replacement contributed to the growth of Postmaterialism. However, the impact of replacement is likely to be smaller in the coming two decades because relatively low birth rates during the late 1970s and the 1980s will contribute to lower rates of generational replacement.

Doctrines have been a prevalent form of foreign policy in American history. What explains their origins? This study addresses this question by examining the Reagan Doctrine, a declared policy which pledged aid to anti-communist guerrillas in the Third World. This case study examines the utility of the ‘structural realist’ theory, focusing on the international level of analysis.

Structural realism stresses the international balance of power, international conditions, limits on the government's freedom to make policy and the national interest. Sources of the Reagan Doctrine are found both in the international environment as a whole and in the individual countries where the Reagan Administration openly aided insurgents: Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola and Cambodia.

The findings indicate that the structural realist perspective is necessary to explain the Reagan Doctrine, but not sufficient. In particular, it fails to account for the role of political elites and their beliefs in foreign-policy making.

The relationship between electoral systems can be examined on a number of dimensions. Seat allocation methods are conveniently divided into two groups: those based on largest remainders and those based on highest averages. The single transferable vote has its own distinct characteristics. Focusing on certain elements – the quota, thresholds, paradoxes and the conditions under which a majority of seats can be won – enables comparisons to be drawn between seat allocation methods. Certain seat allocation methods conventionally seen as variants of proportional representation (PR) cannot be regarded as such. PR methods can be rank ordered according to whether, when complete proportionality is not attainable, they display electoral bias towards larger or smaller parties. However, a definitive ordering is elusive, since some methods that are generally more favourable to larger parties can in some circumstances set lower thresholds of representation than methods generally favourable to smaller parties.

In Britain in recent years the study of tactical voting has become something of a growth industry. Unresolved, however, is a key question: the number of tactical voters. Despite an election-night estimate of 17 per cent, a variety of later analysts have estimated that little more than one in twenty voters behaved tactically in 1987, a surprisingly low figure in the light of the efforts of various groups to encourage tactical voting in order to avoid fragmentation of the anti-Thatcher vote. Most recently, Heath, Curtice and Jowell, in their analysis of the British Election Study survey, report that ‘just 6.5% of major party voters indicated in their replies a tactical motivation for their vote’.

This article examines how party organization affects, and is itself affected by, the objectives pursued by parties in liberal democracies; it focuses on vote-seeking behaviour by parties. It argues that it is a mistake to model activist–leader relations in the past as having been primarily the product of particular kinds of ‘exchanges’ between leaders and activists in a party. Such models limit our understanding of intra-party relations in four important respects – by focusing exclusively on the idea of ‘exchange’ and not examining the role of ‘gifts’; by not considering the role of solidary incentives; by omitting an analysis of loyalty; and by not taking account of the role of habit. However, the article also argues that ‘exchange’ is becoming now a far more significant element in intra-party relations and that this development will constrain party leaders and influence the goals pursued by parties. Greater reliance on exchange between leaders and activists may lead to parties becoming generally more policy-seeking in their behaviour and also to their becoming less manageable than in the past.

There has been considerable recent debate about the importance of local context as an influence on political attitudes and voting behaviour in Great Britain. Resolution of that debate has been difficult, because analytical methods have not been available with which to evaluate the relative importance of both individual voter characteristics and the characteristics of their milieux as independent correlates of attitudes and behaviour. The technique of multi-level modelling has been developed by educational researchers to do just that. It is introduced here and illustrated using data for the 1987 British general election. The preliminary results suggest that place clearly does matter as a component of the processes that influence voters' choices.

Movements of the heavenly bodies are not affected in any discernible way by the fact that there are people on earth recording the apparent movement. Similarly it is almost inconceivable that the planets would alter their orbits because of Kepler's discovery and publication of the laws of planetary motion. The social and behavioural sciences are different in that the objects under investigation may behave differently as a result of the research process. This is particularly true when the method involves naturalistic observation, surveys or experiments. When people behave differently because of being research subjects, this is called a Hawthorne effect.

Converse's ‘Of Time and Partisan Stability’ presents one of the most elegant theories in political science. Analysing the surveys collected in Almond and Verba's five-nation study, Converse explains the micro-level processes that can contribute to partisan stability among mass electorates. If, as Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes argue, partisan loyalties contribute to electoral stability, Converse's theory has important implications, not only for electoral behaviour, but for democratic political stability as well.

This article lays out the elementary logic of age structures in party preference data and proposes a simple estimation model with demographic and historical elements. As voters age their preferences intensify. But they do not intensify much and generational differences in the direction of party preferences are correspondingly weak. The Canadian electorate does not seem all that strongly anchored by the accumulated experience of the individuals that make it up. The major source of long-term electoral change, therefore, is conversion in the existing electorate. Consideration is given to how distinctive the Canadian pattern is.