In his new commentary, Damper re-emphasises his claim that parity is not a generalisation problem. But when proper account is taken of the arguments he puts forward, we find that the proposed conclusion is not the only one that can be drawn.

This Response addresses eight issues raised in the commentaries: (1) the question of how innate talents should be defined; (2) relationships between the talent account and broader views concerning genetic variability; (3) the quality of the empirical evidence for and against the talent account; (4) the possible involvement of innate influences on specific abilities; (5) the possibility of talent-like phenomena in autistic savants; (6) alternative explanations of exceptional expertise at skills; (7) practical and educational implications of the talent account and alternative positions. Finally, (8), we conclude by discussing the impact of the commentaries on our own views.

The target article contains a number of distinct but interrelated claims about the cognitive nature of folk biology based in part on cross-cultural work with urbanized Americans and forest-dwelling Maya Indians. Folk biology consists universally of a ranked taxonomy centered on essence-based generic species. This taxonomy is domain-specific, perhaps an innately determined evolutionary adaptation. Folk biology also plays a special role in cultural evolution in general, and in the development of Western biological science in particular. Even in our culture, however, it retains an autonomy from other domains of thought and from science. These claims are questioned and clarified.

Heyes is right that behavioural tests able to distinguish mentalistic from nonmentalistic alternatives should be sought, but the theoretical issue is less about the passing of behavioural tests than it is about the internal mechanisms which allow the passing of the tests. It may be helpful to try to assess the internal mechanisms directly by measuring brain activities.

I focus on the logic of the goggles experiment, which if it as watertight as Heyes argues, should clearly support ape theory of mind if positive, and clearly reject it if negative. This is not the case, since the experiment tests for only one kind of mindreading, “experience projection”: but it is an excellent test for this, given adequate controls.

Polygyny does not necessarily entail sexual selection of men. All factors that affect the operational sex ratio must be considered. Data from contemporary hunter-gatherers indicate higher mortality rates in men than in women, and lost female reproductive time. If sexual selection did occur in ancestral hunter-gatherers, it was probably men selecting women and not women selecting men.

Differences of opinion between Epstein, Flynn & Martohardjono (1996) and some commentators can be traced to different interpretations of Universal Grammar (UG) form or strategy. Potential full access to the form of linguistic universals in second language acquisition may be distinguished from access to UG strategy, but Epstein et al.'s dismissal of the Critical Age Hypothesis clouds their central argument.

Sexual selection traditionally involves male-male competition and female choice, but in some species, including humans, sexual selection can also involve female-female competition and male choice. The degree to which one aspect of sexual selection or another is manifest in human populations will be influenced by a host of social and ecological variables, including the operational sex ratio. These variables are discussed in connection with the relative contribution of sexual selection and the division of labor to the evolution of human sex differences.

Heyes discounts findings of imitation and self recognition in nonhuman primates based on flimsy speculation and then indicates that even positive findings would not provide evidence of theory of mind. Her proposed experiment is unlikely to work, however, because, even if the animals have a theory of mind, a number of assumptions, not directly related to theory of mind, must be made about their reasoning ability.

Universal Grammar (UG) can be interpreted as a constraint on the form of possible grammars (hypothesis space) or as a constraint on acquisition strategies (selection procedures). In this response to Herschensohn we reiterate the position outlined in Epstein et al. (1996a, r), that in the evaluation of L2 acquisition as a UG- constrained process the former (possible grammars/ knowledge states) is critical, not the latter. Selection procedures, on the other hand, are important in that they may have a bearing on development in language acquisition. We raise the possibility that differences in first and second language acquisition pertaining to both attainment of the end-state and course of development may derive from differences in selection procedures. We further suggest that for these reasons age effects in the attainment of nativelike proficiency must necessarily be separated from UG effects.

The target article argued that there is currently no reliable evidence of theory of mind in nonhuman primates and proposed research methods for future use in this field. Some commentators judged the research proposals to be too chauvinist (in danger of falsely denying that primates attribute mental states), but a majority judged them to be too liberal (in danger of falsely affirming theory of mind in primates). The most valuable comments from both camps exemplified “experimental thought,” the obverse of “thought experiments,” and recommended specific alterations and alternatives to the studies I proposed. This Response evaluates these recommendations and presents a revised version of the proposals that appear in the target article. Other valuable commentary cast doubt on the assumption that people have a theory of mind, aired the possibility that language may be a prerequisite for either possession or detection of a theory of mind, questioned the notion of critical experiments, and emphasized the distinction between attribution of sight and belief. In addition to commenting on these issues, I respond to objections to my interpretation of existing research on self-recognition, imitation, and deception.

We argue that probability effects on P300 amplitude are the product of an automatic frequency detector not subject to voluntary control and relatively inaccessible to consciousness. “Expectancies” related to P300 therefore appear to be passive, perceptual ones. If probability-based expectancies do become conscious, they are inversely related to P300, supporting the view of Donchin & Coles (1988).

In this response, I will first summarize my 1988 argument on the issue of expectancy. Second, I will re-evaluate that argument in the light of the findings made by Sommer et al. and by others. Third, I will describe some other problems with the 1988 views. Fourth, I will outline the direction in which I feel that a hypothesis on the P3 complex should be pursued further.

We concur with Sommer et al. that the processing manifested by P300 is not necessarily conscious. We also note that Verleger is yet again adducing evidence that contradicts an assertion we never made.

This commentary makes a case for a connection between the hierarchically organized skills emphasized in Greenfield's (1991t) target article and rhythmic skills utilized in music. It also links hierarchical organization with automated processing. Implicit is the notion that lower levels of a hierarchy become automatic, as they go under control of higher levels of organization.

Greenfield (1991t) fails in an attempt to defend her own original synthesis of cognitivist and nativist accounts of language development. The proposed synchronous stages of object and phoneme combination are not supported by the empirical data she presents. The functional specification of hypothetical neural circuits is almost entirely speculative. Nor is it likely that new data could save her model, since it is formulated in a simplistic information processing framework that is now of little more than historical interest.

The target article presented a model to stimulate further research and ultimately, a more definitive theory of the ontogeny and phylogeny of hierarchically organized sequential activity. Methodologically, it was intended to stimulate methods for integrating data from different neuropsychological techniques. This response to Givon and Swann focuses on several substantive areas: (1) the role of automaticity in hierarchically organized activity and its neural substrate, (2) the neural ontogeny of planning, (3) cognitive and neural architecture for language functions, and (4) the role of environmental input and interaction in the ontogeny and phylogeny of language, tools, and brain.

The basic issue is the measurement of memory accuracy and how correspondence should be assessed. Problems of completeness and variations in the degree and type of inaccuracy make measurement intractably difficult. This difficulty places severe limitations on generalizing across tasks, domains, and individuals and, consequently, on theory construction.

Koriat & Goldsmith (1996t) present two different programs for memory research. Different though they are on the methodological level, on the substantive level the two programs are based on the same view, according to which memory consists of represented information that is permanently stored in the mind (or brain). This view is, I think, wrong. One can support the methodological pluralism Koriat & Goldsmith advocate, but on the substantive level pluralism is not admissible.

In response to Cohen, we point out that many of the assessment difficulties raised by the correspondence metaphor stem from the assessment of memory in meaningful, real-life contexts rather than from the assessment of memory accuracy per se; these difficulties are equally troublesome for the assessment of memory quantity in such contexts. Moreover, the need to focus on particular aspects of memory performance – correspondence-oriented or quantity-oriented – does not preclude the development of useful and general theoretical models. In response to Shanon, we argue that (1) the distinction between the correspondence and storehouse metaphors of memory is metatheoretical, not substantive or methodological, (2) the correspondence metaphor is compatible with both a “representationalist” view of memory and a more “direct” view, and (3) as an epistemological strategy, metaphorical pluralism is both acceptable and desirable.