The isomorphism between relational structures advocated by Palmer corresponds quite closely to Paul Churchland's theory of “state-space semantics,” so much so that one can be used to elucidate problematic areas in the other. The resulting hybrid shows eliminative materialism to be superior to functionalism as a theory of mental phenomena and seems to provide the best ontology for cognitive science.

Lexemes supposedly represent phonological but not grammatical information. Phonological word substitutions pose problems for this account because the target and error almost always come from the same grammatical class. This grammatical congruency effect can be explained within the Levelt et al. lexicon given that (1) lexemes are organized according to phonological similarity and (2) lexemes from the same grammatical category share phonological properties.

Gesture does not have a fixed position in the Dienes & Perner framework. Its status depends on the way knowledge is expressed. Knowledge reflected in gesture can be fully implicit (neither factuality nor predication is explicit) if the goal is simply to move a pointing hand to a target. Knowledge reflected in gesture can be explicit (both factuality and predication are explicit) if the goal is to indicate an object. However, gesture is not restricted to these two extreme positions. When gestures are unconscious accompaniments to speech and represent information that is distinct from speech, the knowledge they convey is factuality-implicit but predication-explicit.

A metaphor can often create novel features in an object or a situation. This phenomenon has been particularly hard to account for using amodal symbol systems: although highlighting and downplaying can explain the shift of focus, it cannot explain how entirely new features can come about. We suggest here that the dynamism of perceptual symbol systems, particularly the notion of simulator, provides an elegant account of the creativity of metaphor. The elegance lies in the idea that the creation of new features by a metaphor proceeds in the same way as the creation of regular features in a perceptual symbol.

Although the author's critical view of functionalism has a considerable intuitive pull, his argument based on the color room scenario does not work. Functionalism and other relational views of the mind are capable of providing coherent accounts of conscious experience that meet the challenge set up by the “color room argument.” A simple example of such an account is presented.

Dienes & Perner's theoretical framework should be applicable to two related areas: technological innovation and the psychology of scientific reasoning. For the former, this commentary focuses on the example of nuclear weapon design, and on the decision to launch the space shuttle Challenger. For the latter, this commentary focuses on Klayman and Ha's positive test heuristic and the invention of the telephone.

Perception and cognition can be understood either as conscious experience, thought, and behaviour or as bodily functions executed at the level of information processing. Whether or not they are cognitively penetrable depends on the level referred to. Selective attention is the mechanism by which cognition affects perception, theory influences observation and observational reports, culture biases experience, and current knowledge determines what inferences are made. Seeing must be distinguished from seeing as.

In their quality as acoustic or visual percepts, words are linked to the emotional values of the state-of-affairs they evoke. This allows them to engender meanings capable of operating nearly entirely detached from percepts. Such a laying flat of meanings permits deliberation to take place within the window of consciousness. In such a theatre of the imagination, linguistically triggered, resides the originality of the human psyche.

(1) Reaction time (RT) studies give only a partial picture of language processing, hence it may be risky to use the output of the computational model to inspire neurophysiological investigations instead of seeking further neurophysiological data to adjust the RT based theory. (2) There is neurophysiological evidence for differences in the cortical representation of different word categories; this could be integrated into a future version of the Levelt model. (3) EEG/MEG coherence analysis allows the monitoring of synchronous electrical activity in large groups of neurons in the cortex; this is especially interesting for activation based network models.

Campbell's ambitious target article attempts to explain gender differences in both aggressive behavior and cultural representations of aggressive behavior. I comment on some of the specific arguments that require further clarification, some areas that merit expanded discussion, some topics which should be mentioned, and some research and theoretical questions raised by the article.

We discuss the difficulty of measuring the perceptual experience of colour, supporting Palmer's assertion that neuropsychological disorders of colour processing can be informative in this respect. We point out that some disorders seem to affect the perceptual experience of colour over and above the perceptual processing of colour, providing direct insights into the neural mechanisms supporting perceptual experience.

The insistence on strict seriality and the proscription of feedback in phonological encoding place counterproductive limitations on the theory and weaver++ model. Parsimony cannot be stipulated as a property of the language system itself. Lifting the methodological prohibition on feedback would allow free exploration of its functionality in relation to the substantial content of this major research program.

Why is female violence a taboo? We suggest that both men and women actively contribute to the creation of this stigma. Men may benefit because nonaggressive women may make better mothers and be more faithful and fertile. Females may benefit by downplaying their aggressive nature because they will be perceived as more valuable mates and because they will be more accepted within female social groups.

A further step in Pylyshyn's discontinuity thesis is to examine the penetrability of haptic (tactual-kinesthetic) perception. The study of the perception of orientation and the “oblique effect” (lower performance in oblique orientations than in vertical–horizontal orientations) in the visual and haptic modalities allows this question to be discussed. We suggest that part of the visual process generating the visual oblique effect is cognitively impenetrable, whereas all haptic processes generating the haptic oblique effect are cognitively penetrable.

The propositional account of explicit and implicit knowledge interprets cognitive differences between direct and indirect test performance as emerging from the elements in different hierarchical levels of the propositional representation that have been made explicit. The hierarchical nature of explicitness is challenged, however, on the basis of neuropsychological dissociations between direct and indirect tests of memory, as well as the stochastic independence that has been observed between these two types of tests. Furthermore, format specificity on indirect test of memory challenges the basic notion of a propositional theory of implicit and explicit knowledge.

Barsalou is right in arguing that perception has been unduly neglected in theories of concept formation. However, the theory he proposes is a weaker version of the classical empirical hypothesis about the relationship between sensation, perception, and concepts. It is weaker because it provides no principled basis for choosing the elementary components of perception. Furthermore, the proposed mechanism of concept formation, growth and development – simulation – is essentially equivalent to the notion of a concept, frame, or theory, and therefore inherits all the well-known problems inherent in these constructs. The theory of simulation does not provide a clearly better alternative to existing notions.

The hypothesis that perceptual mechanisms could have more representational and logical power than usually assumed is interesting and provocative, especially with regard to brain evolution. However, the importance of embodiment and grounding is exaggerated, and the implication that there is no highly abstract representation at all, and that human-like knowledge cannot be learned or represented without human bodies, is very doubtful. A machine-learning model, Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) that closely mimics human word and passage meaning relations is offered as a counterexample.

Short-term memory, nonattentional task effects and nonspatial extraretinal representations in the visual system are signs of cognitive penetration. All of these have been found physiologically, arguing against the cognitive impenetrability of vision as a whole. Instead, parallel subcircuits in the brain, each subserving a different competency including sensory and cognitive (and in some cases motor) aspects, may have cognitively impenetrable components.

The following questions are addressed concerning how a theory of lexical access can be realized in the brain: (1) Can a brainlike device function without inhibitory mechanisms? (2) Where in the brain can one expect to find processes underlying access to word semantics, syntactic word properties, phonological word forms, and their phonetic gestures? (3) If large neuron ensembles are the basis of such processes, how can one expect these populations to be connected? (4) In particular, how could one-way, reciprocal, and numbered connections be realized? and, (5) How can a neuroscientific approach for multiple access to the same word in the course of the production of a sentence?

PURPLE (RED-and-BLUE) is the most frequently occurring derived (binary) basic color term (BCT), but there is never a named composite BCT meaning RED-or-BLUE. GREEN-or-BLUE is the most frequently named composite color category, but there is never a BCT for the corresponding derived (binary) category CYAN (BLUE-and-GREEN). Why?