The target article falls short of explaining the phenomena, including motivational conflict, that it sets out to. The two main reasons for this are: (1) It is unclear in what sense goals are “selfish”; (2) We need an account of how selfish goals motivate people. If selfish goals are not in the replication business, then what is in it for them? And if they do not offer people something that they want, how do they ever influence what people do?

Although religions, as Smaldino demonstrates, provide informative examples of culturally evolved group-level traits, they are more accurately analyzed as complex adaptive systems than as norm-enforcing institutions. An adaptive systems approach to religion not only avoids various shortcomings of institutional approaches, but also offers additional explanatory advantages regarding the cultural evolution of group-level traits that emerge from religion.

We sympathize with the project of a synthetic approach for devising a “theory of intentional change” and agree that Darwinism should be central in such a theory. But Darwinism is not the only process of evolution that needs to be included. Evolutionary biology itself has taken such a turn recently, with the emergence of developmental evolutionary approaches.

While showing unconscious influences on complex decisions is indeed difficult, relevant awareness in relatively simpler subliminal paradigms is more easily assessed. Utilizing objective detection (vs. more typical identification or classification) tasks to assess awareness overcomes longstanding residual methodological problems, and prior work using such methods (e.g., Snodgrass & Shevrin 2006) clearly shows unconscious influences on simple decisions.

We argue that the authors ignore a broad range of possible means of changing behaviour: unintentional change. Most of the behaviours that people seek to change – either in themselves or that are the subject of public health campaigns–are habitual, and hence not necessarily responsive to intentions. An evolutionary approach should take into account all kinds of evolved behavioural responses.

The Selfish Goal model challenges traditional agentic models that place conscious systems at the helm of motivation. We highlight the need for ongoing supervision and intervention of automatic goals by higher-order conscious systems with examples from social cognitive affective neuroscience. We contend that interplay between automatic and supervisory systems is required for adaptive human behavior.

In this commentary, we focus on the role of attentional mechanisms in unconscious thought. We argue that even distracted or unconscious thought is capacity limited and differences in scope of attention influence processing during unconscious thought. Attention also would influence processes at different stages in the proposed lens model. We conclude that there is a clear need to understand the role of attention to better understand conscious or unconscious thought.

Speech is a complex skill to master. In addition to sophisticated phono-articulatory abilities, speech acquisition requires neuronal systems configured for vocal learning, with adaptable sensorimotor maps that couple heard speech sounds with motor programs for speech production; imitation and self-imitation mechanisms that can train the sensorimotor maps to reproduce heard speech sounds; and a “pedagogical” learning environment that supports tutor learning.

Cimpian & Salomon (C&S) present promising steps towards understanding the cognitive underpinnings of adult essentialism. However, their approach is less convincing regarding ontogenetic and evolutionary aspects. In contrast to C&S's claim, the so-called inherence heuristic, though perhaps vital in adult reasoning, seems an implausible candidate for the developmental and evolutionary foundations of psychological essentialism. A more plausible candidate is kind-based object individuation that already embodies essentialist modes of thinking and that is present in infants and nonhuman primates.

The target article argues that whole groups can act as interactors in an evolutionary process. We believe that Smaldino's discussion would be advanced by a more thorough analysis of the appropriate replicators and lineages for this model. We show that cultural evolution is necessarily a separate process from cultural group selection, and we also illustrate that the two processes may influence each other as demonstrated by an agent-based model of communicating food-processing skills.

Newell & Shanks (N&S) conclude that healthy participants learn to differentiate between the good and bad decks of the Iowa Gambling Task, and that healthy participants even have conscious knowledge about the task's payoff structure. Improved methods of analysis and new behavioral findings suggest that this conclusion is premature.

For the authors, evolutionary approaches should rely less on evolutionary psychology, which studies innate fixed capacities, and more on cultural selection, which emphasizes cultural learning and symbolic innovation. However, successful policies do not seem to culturally reengineer people. Rather, they work by tapping into old human instincts (fairness preference, reputation management, resource seeking) to motivate individuals to change their behaviors.

Children adopt an inherence-based view of some social categories, viewing certain social categories as reflecting the inherent features of their members. Thinking of social categories in these terms contributes to prejudice and intergroup conflict. Thus, understanding what leads children to apply inherence-based views to particular categories could provide new direction for efforts to reduce these negative social phenomena.

The metaphor of selfish goals is misguided. Organisms can be considered vessels that further the interests of their genes, but not vessels that further the interests of their goals. Although goals can act at cross-purposes to each other and to longevity, such trade-offs are predicted by evolutionary theory. The metaphor of selfish goals provides no purchase on this problem.

Ackermann et al.'s arguments in the target article need sharpening and rethinking at both mechanistic and evolutionary levels. First, the authors' evolutionary arguments are inconsistent with recent evidence concerning nonhuman animal rhythmic abilities. Second, prosodic intonation conveys much more complex linguistic information than mere emotional expression. Finally, human adults' basal ganglia have a considerably wider role in speech modulation than Ackermann et al. surmise.

We extend Smaldino's approach to collaboration and social organization in cultural evolution to include cognition. By showing how recent work on emergent group-level cognition can be incorporated within Smaldino's framework, we extend that framework's scope to encompass collaborative memory, decision making, and intelligent action. We argue that beneficial effects arise only in certain forms of cognitive interdependence, in surprisingly fragile conditions.

Our commentary focuses on juxtaposing the proposed science of intentional change with facts and concepts pertaining to the level of large populations or changes on a worldwide scale. Although we find a unified evolutionary theory promising, we think that long-term and large-scale, scientifically guided – that is, intentional – social change is not only impossible, but also undesirable.

We discuss the implications of the Selfish Goal model for moral responsibility, arguing it suggests a form of skepticism we call the “locus problem.” In denying that individuals contain any genuine psychological core of information processing, the Selfish Goal model denies the kind of locus of control intuitively presupposed by ascriptions of responsibility. We briefly consider ways the problem might be overcome.

Ackermann et al. outline a model for elaboration of subcortical motor outputs as a driving force for the development of the apparently unique behaviour of language in humans. They emphasize circuits in the striatum and midbrain, and acknowledge, but do not explore, the importance of the auditory perceptual pathway for evolution of verbal communication. We suggest that understanding the evolution of language will also require understanding of vocalization perception, especially in the auditory cortex.

Newell & Shanks (N&S) argue that when awareness measures are more reliable and valid, greater evidence of awareness of supposedly unconscious influences is revealed. A related issue is that unconsciousness is typically the null hypothesis that evidence of awareness will not emerge. As it is difficult to conclude the null, it is also difficult to conclude a lack of conscious awareness.