Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-t7fkt Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-23T04:11:50.086Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Should an individual composed of selfish goals be held responsible for her actions?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 April 2014

Natalia Washington  and
Daniel Kelly
Natalia Washington
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN 47906-2098. [email protected]@purdue.eduhttp://web.ics.purdue.edu/~drkelly/
Daniel Kelly
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN 47906-2098. [email protected]@purdue.eduhttp://web.ics.purdue.edu/~drkelly/
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

We discuss the implications of the Selfish Goal model for moral responsibility, arguing it suggests a form of skepticism we call the “locus problem.” In denying that individuals contain any genuine psychological core of information processing, the Selfish Goal model denies the kind of locus of control intuitively presupposed by ascriptions of responsibility. We briefly consider ways the problem might be overcome.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 37 , Issue 2 , April 2014 , pp. 158 - 159
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Clark, A. (2008) Soft selves and ecological control, In: Distributed cognition and the will, ed. Spurrett, D., Ross, D., Kincaid, H. & Stephens, L., pp. 101–22. MIT Press.Google Scholar
Dennett, D. C. (2003) Freedom evolves. Penguin.Google Scholar
Doris, J. (in press) Talking to ourselves: Reflection, skepticism, and agency. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Ismael, J. (2007) The situated self. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Ismael, J. (2011) Self-organization and self-governance. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 41(3):327–51.Google Scholar
Levy, N. (2012) Consciousness, implicit attitudes, and moral responsibility. Noûs. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2011.00853.x.Google Scholar
Nahmias, E. (2010) Scientific challenges to free will. In: A companion to the philosophy of action, ed. O'Connor, T. & Sandis, C., pp. 345–56. Wiley-Blackwell.Google Scholar
Roskies, A. (2006) Neuroscientific challenges to free will and responsibility. Trends in Cognitive Science 10(9):419–23.Google Scholar
Saul, J. (2013) Implicit bias, stereotype threat and women in philosophy. In: Women in philosophy: What needs to change? ed. Jenkins, F. & Hutchison, K., pp. 39–60. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Shapiro, L. (2007) The embodied cognition research programme. Philosophy Compass 2(2):338–46.Google Scholar