Aspects of cognitive immaturity may serve both to adapt children to their immediate environment and to prepare them for future ones. Language may have evolved in children's groups in the context of play. Developmental plasticity provides variability upon which natural selection operates, and such plasticity, that likely played an important role in the evolution of language, characterizes human children today.

Contrary to the assertions made in the target article, temporal synchrony, coupled with an appropriate choice of representational primitives, leads to a functionally adequate and neurally plausible architecture that addresses the massiveness of the binding problem, the problem of 2, the problem of variables, and the transformation of activity-based transient representations of events and situations into structure-based persistent encodings of the same.

Diverse evidence from genomics, epidemiology, neurophysiology, psychology, and evolutionary biology converges on simple general mechanisms, based on negative secondary effects of strong selection, for how mental disorders such as psychosis have evolved and how they are sustained.

We consider evidence for ritualized behavior in the sporting domain, noting that such behavior appears commonplace both before a competitive encounter and as part of pre-performance routines. The specific times when ritualized behaviors are displayed support the supposition that they provide temporary relief from pre-competition anxiety and act as thought suppressors in the moments preceding skill execution.

A testable model of the origin of money is outlined. Based on the notion of epistemic structures, the account integrates the tool and drug views using a common underlying model, and addresses the two puzzles presented by Lea & Webley (L&W) – money's biological roots and the adaptive significance of our tendency to acquire money.

Human cognition is unique in the way in which it relies on combinatorial (or compositional) structures. Language provides ample evidence for the existence of combinatorial structures, but they can also be found in visual cognition. To understand the neural basis of human cognition, it is therefore essential to understand how combinatorial structures can be instantiated in neural terms. In his recent book on the foundations of language, Jackendoff described four fundamental problems for a neural instantiation of combinatorial structures: the massiveness of the binding problem, the problem of 2, the problem of variables, and the transformation of combinatorial structures from working memory to long-term memory. This paper aims to show that these problems can be solved by means of neural “blackboard” architectures. For this purpose, a neural blackboard architecture for sentence structure is presented. In this architecture, neural structures that encode for words are temporarily bound in a manner that preserves the structure of the sentence. It is shown that the architecture solves the four problems presented by Jackendoff. The ability of the architecture to instantiate sentence structures is illustrated with examples of sentence complexity observed in human language performance. Similarities exist between the architecture for sentence structure and blackboard architectures for combinatorial structures in visual cognition, derived from the structure of the visual cortex. These architectures are briefly discussed, together with an example of a combinatorial structure in which the blackboard architectures for language and vision are combined. In this way, the architecture for language is grounded in perception. Perspectives and potential developments of the architectures are discussed.

van der Velde & de Kamps argue for the importance of considering the binding problem in accounts of human mental representation. However, their proposed solution fails as a complete account because it represents the bindings between roles and their fillers through associations (or connections). In addition, many criticisms leveled by the authors towards synchrony-based bindings models do not hold.

One way of dealing with the proliferation of conjectures that accompany the diverse study of the evolution of language is to develop precise and testable models which reveal otherwise latent implications. We suggest how verbal theories of the role of individual development in language evolution can benefit from formal modeling, and vice versa.

There is a spectrum of child psychiatric and neurological disorders, in all of which a comorbidity with obsessive-compulsive disorder and ritualized behavior is very common. Therefore, they may appear as a basis for the rituals in children that cross into adolescence and adulthood. Resolving the nature of these disorders may help us to better understand Why ritualized behavior?

We describe delusional disorder–jealous type (“morbid jealousy”) with the adaptationist perspective used by Darwinian psychiatrists and evolutionary psychologists to explain the relatively common existence and continued prevalence of mental disorders. We then apply the “harmful dysfunction” analysis to morbid jealousy, including a discussion of this disorder as (1) an end on a continuum of normal jealousy or (2) a discrete entity.

A major weakness in Erdelyi's account concerns the claim that repression can become conscious. A relational account of cognition demonstrates that if repression is successful, then the repressive act cannot become known. Additionally, “resistance” further distinguishes “repression” from “suppression.” Rather than blurring the distinction between these processes, it is possible to recognise a series of defences. Suggestions are provided for alternative research avenues.

Applying the reciprocity instinct to monetary transactions implies that the reaction to monetary debt and monetary credit are similar. However, evidence suggests an asymmetry. I suggest that the “autonomy instinct” fits better with human behavior towards money. I show that people value autonomy, and I show how money can serve this instinct.

van der Velde & de Kamps (dvV&dK) present a response to Jackendoff's four challenges in terms of a computational model. This commentary supports the position that neural assemblies mediated by recurrence and delay indeed have sufficient theoretical power to deal with all four challenges. However, we question the specifics of the model proposed, in terms of both neurophysiological plausibility and computational complexity.

The target article overestimates the power of money as a motive/incentive in order to justify trying to provide a biological theory. A great deal of the article is spent trying to force-fit other explanations into this course categorization. Lea & Webley's (L&W's) account seems to ignore systematic, individual differences, as well as the literature on many negative affective associations of money and behavioural economics, which is a cognitive account of money motivation.

Erdelyi's unified theory of repression offers a significant advance in understanding the disparate findings related to repression. However, the theory de-emphasizes the role of motive in repression, and it is argued here that motive is critical to the understanding of repression as it occurs in the mental life of individuals.

We address two points. First, one must explain how different, rare mutations ultimately lead to common psychopathological conditions. The developmental instability model offers one solution. Second, Keller & Miller (K&M) perhaps miss the major processes other than variation fueled by rare deleterious mutations that account for interesting genetic variation in psychopathology, particularly when single alleles have non-negligible effects: Red Queen processes.

The theory of ritualized behavior should offer insight about cultural rituals. Considering ritualized behaviors' scripted actions and both the frequent absence of anxiety and the routinization of many cultural rituals, questions remain about how much and what precisely gets explained. Among religious rituals, ritualized behaviors arise more strikingly in special agent rituals, but that might be because they usually include novices.

Life history shaped language as, cascading in time, social strategies became more verbal. Although the insight is important, Locke & Bogin (L&B) also advocate a code model of language. Rejecting this input-output view, I emphasize the interpersonal dynamics of dialogue. From this perspective, childish minds as well as language could be derived from the selective advantages of a total interactional history.

Erdelyi's unified theory includes the idea that traumatic memories can be unconsciously repressed so that they are enduringly inaccessible to deliberate recall. I argue here that clinical evidence for repressed memory is illusory, and illustrate this claim by examining previous studies of putative repressed memories and also recent research on nonverbal behaviors among survivors of childhood sexual abuse.

Boyer & Lienard's (B&L's) biological model of ritual achieves a rather straightforward account of features shared by ritual pathology and the idiosyncratic rituals of children; but complexities accrue in extending it to human ritual culture generally. My commentary suggests that the ritual cultural traditions of animals such as songbirds share structural features, handicap-based origin, as well as the enabling neural mechanism of vocal learning with human ritual culture.