The target article does not provide insight into how the proposed neural blackboard architecture can be mapped to known neural structures in the brain. There are theories suggesting that the thalamus may be a good candidate. However, the experimental evidence suggests that the cortex may be involved (if in fact the blackboard is implemented in the brain). Issues arising from such a mapping will be discussed.

Instinct theory parsimoniously clarifies the relationships between emotions, such as fear and anxiety, and perceptions, thoughts, and actions. Its acceptance allows more elegant insights into riddles of obsessions and compulsions. Their relationship to anxiety and dysexecutive function needs to be explained, as does their characteristic egodystonia, while avoiding the pitfalls of cognitivist, empiricist, and teleological thinking.

An important component of souls is the capacity for free will, as the origin of agency within an individual. Belief in souls arises in part from the experience of conscious will, a compelling feeling of personal causation that accompanies almost every action we take, and suggests that an immaterial self is in charge of the physical body.

As prototypical incentive with biological meaning, food illustrates the distinction between money as tool and money as drug. However, consistent neuroscience results challenge this view of food as intrinsic value and opposite to drugs of abuse. The scarce availability over evolutionary time of both food and money may explain their similar drug-like non-satiability, suggesting an integrated mechanism for generalized reinforcers.

The target article presents arguments for a motivational system dedicated exclusively to the detection of, and reaction to, particular threats to fitness, the so-called Hazard-Precaution System, which, according to the authors, drives ritualized behavior. We approach the issue of a motivational system from three perspectivesdevelopmental, psychopathological, and ethnological.

Two areas of research for testing Nell's theory are suggested. One is cruelty's seemingly negative correlation with age, which would confirm its linkage with testosterone, sex, and dominance. The other is the special field of leisure activity called thanatourism, that is, the transformation of loci of human horror into tourist attractions.

Principles of Brain Evolution (Striedter 2005) places little emphasis on natural selection. However, one cannot fully appreciate the diversity of brains across species, nor the evolutionary processes driving such diversity, without an understanding of the effects of natural selection. Had Striedter included more extensive discussions about natural selection, his text would have been more balanced and comprehensive.

The target article skillfully evaluates data on mental disorders in relation to predictions from evolutionary genetic theories of neutral evolution, balancing selection, and polygenic mutation-selection balance, resulting in a negative outlook for the likelihood of success finding genes for mental disorders. Nevertheless, new conceptualizations, methods, and continued interactions across disciplines provide hope.

Bering's findings about the mental representation of dead agents are important, although his opposition between “endemic” and “cultural” concepts is misleading. Endemic and cultural are overlapping, not exclusive categories. It is also diffcult to see why reasoning about the dead would require a specific cognitive mechanism. Bering presents no clear evidence for the claim that the postulated mechanism is an adaptation.

Bering contends that belief in the afterlife is explained by the simulation constraint hypothesis: the claim that we cannot imagine what it is like to be dead. This explanation suffers from some difficulties. First, it implies the existence of a corresponding belief in the “beforelife.” Second, a simpler explanation will suffice. Rather than appeal to constraints on our thoughts about death, we suggest that belief in the afterlife can be better explained by the lack of such constraints.

Social behaviour is but an expression of instinctive mechanisms whereby the aggressive instinct is of particular importance, having given rise to most of the complexity of social behaviour through processes of phylogenetic and cultural ritualisation. The role of the aggressive instinct is to dynamically maintain the ranking order in a group, and much of social interaction is concerned with this, including monetary exchange.

What is certain, is that with the elimination of aggression, … the tackling of a task or problem, the self-respect [in] everything that a man does from morning till evening, from the morning shave to the sublimest artistic or scientific creation, would lose all impetus; everything associated with ambition, ranking order, and countless other equally indispensable behaviour patterns would probably also disappear from human life.

— Konrad Lorenz (1963/2002, p. 269)

I ask four questions: (1) Why should we think that our hominid ancestor's predation is not just a causal influence but the main causal factor responsible for human cruelty? (2) Why not think of human cruelty as a necessary part of a syndrome in which other phenomena are necessarily involved? (3) What definitions of cruelty does Nell propose that we operate with? And (4) what about the meaning of cruelty for human beings?

The attempt to derive mental function from brain structure is highly constrained by study of the allometric changes among brain components with evolution. In particular, even if homologous structures in different species produce similar computations, they may be constituents of larger systems (e.g., cortical-subcortical loops) that exhibit different composite operations as a function of relative size and connectivity in different-sized brains. The resulting evolutionary constraints set useful and specific conditions on candidate hypotheses of brain circuit computation.

In this commentary, we critique the appropriate behavioural features for evolutionary genetic analysis, the role of the environment, and the viability of a general evolutionary genetic model for all common mental disorders. In light of these issues, we suggest that the authors may have prematurely discounted the role of some of the mechanisms they review, particularly balancing selection.

A study of the organization of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) rituals in time and space illuminates a postulated mechanism on shifting focus in action parsing, from mid-ranged actions to finer movements (gestures). Performance of OCD rituals also involves high concentration rather than the automated, less attended performance of rituals in normal and stereotyped behaviors in animals and humans.

If rituals persist in part because of their memory-taxing attributes, from whence do they arise? I suggest that magical practices form the core of rituals, and that many such practices derive from learned pseudo-causal associations. Spurious associations are likely to be acquired during problem-solving under conditions of ambiguity and danger, and are often a consequence of imitative social learning.

Although theorizing the non-tool motivations for desiring money is a worthwhile goal, Lea & Webley (L&W) offer a view that is too individualistic, too biological, and ultimately too linked to a tool-based view of money motivation. I argue that our fascination with money is social, learned, and ritualistic. Through the magic of money rituals we overcome biological motivations and become civilized.

The target article speaks loudest about what it cannot see – that man exists in God. Its claim that supernatural beliefs are “evolved errors” rests on unwarranted assumption and mistaken argument. Implications for evolutionary study are considered.

This response deals with seven of the major challenges the commentators have raised to the target article. First, I show that the historical-anecdotal method I have followed has its roots in sociology, and that there is a strong case for the development of a psychology of history. Next, the observational data suggesting that intentional cruelty cannot be restricted to humans is rebutted on the grounds that cruelty requires not only an intention to inflict pain, but to do so because that pain would cause the victim to sufferwhich requires a theory of mind. Third, in the light of the commentaries, I recognise that not only predation but also intraspecific aggression contributes to the development of cruelty. Fourth, I contrast nativists and environmentalists, the former regarding cruelty as a universal human capacity and the latter holding the view that cruelty is acquired through social learning, and argue that there is an otherworldly quality to the environmentalist view. I then show (the fifth challenge) that the target article does generate testable hypotheses. Sixth is a consideration of the implications of the target article for the re-admission of the concept of evil to the psychological lexicon; and seventh, a consideration of the commentaries which note that the cultivation of compassion is a tool for the prevention of cruelty. The last section of the response replies to questions of detail and rebuts some misrepresentations of my argument.

It is argued that van der Velde and de Kamps employ binding circuitry that effectively constitutes a form of conjunctive binding. Analogies with prior systems are discussed and hypothetical origins of binding circuitry are examined for credibility.