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“Switching” between fast and slow processes is just reward-based branching

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2023

George Ainslie Open the ORCID record for George Ainslie [Opens in a new window]
George Ainslie*
Affiliation:
Department of Veterans Affairs, Coatesville, PA, USA [email protected] www.picoeconomics.org
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Abstract

Shortcuts to goals are rewarded by faster attainment and punished by more frequent failure, so selection of the various kinds – heuristics, cached sequences (habits or macros), gut instincts – depends on reward history just like other kinds of choice. The speeds of shortcuts lie on continua along with speeds of deliberation, and these continua have no obvious separation points.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 46 , 2023 , e113
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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