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Social transmission bias and the cultural evolution of folk-economic beliefs

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 August 2018

David Hirshleifer
Affiliation:
Merage School of Business, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, CA 92697. [email protected]@uci.eduhttp://sites.uci.edu/dhirshle/http://sites.uci.edu/steoh/
Siew Hong Teoh
Affiliation:
Merage School of Business, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, CA 92697. [email protected]@uci.eduhttp://sites.uci.edu/dhirshle/http://sites.uci.edu/steoh/

Abstract

Evolved dispositions influence, but do not determine, how people think about economic problems. The evolutionary cognitive approach offers important insights but underweights the social transmission of ideas as a level of explanation. The need for a social explanation for the evolution of economic attitudes is evidenced, for example, by immense variations in folk-economic beliefs over time and across individuals.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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