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The primary (dis)function of consciousness: (Non)Integration

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 November 2016

Liad Mudrik
Liad Mudrik*
Affiliation:
School of Psychological Sciences and Sagol School of Neuroscience, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, 69978, Israel. [email protected]://www.mudriklab.tau.ac.il
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Abstract

Morsella et al. put forward an interesting theory about the functions of consciousness. However, I argue that this theory is more about showing what is not the function of consciousness, and claiming that it does not integrate, than vice versa – as opposed to its proclaimed goal. In addition, the question of phenomenality and its relations with integration is still left open.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 39 , 2016 , e189
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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