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On believing that time does not flow, but thinking that it seems to

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 December 2019

Kristie Miller Open the ORCID record for Kristie Miller [Opens in a new window] ,
Alex O. Holcombe  and
Andrew J. Latham
Kristie Miller
Affiliation:
The Centre for Time and Department of Philosophy, The University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW2006, [email protected]@sydney.edu.auhttps://sydney.edu.au/arts/philosophy/staff/profiles/kristie.miller.php https://philpeople.org/profiles/andrew-james-latham
Alex O. Holcombe
Affiliation:
School of Psychology, The University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW2006, Australia. [email protected]://sydney.edu.au/science/people/alex.holcombe.php
Andrew J. Latham
Affiliation:
The Centre for Time and Department of Philosophy, The University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW2006, [email protected]@sydney.edu.auhttps://sydney.edu.au/arts/philosophy/staff/profiles/kristie.miller.php https://philpeople.org/profiles/andrew-james-latham
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Abstract

Hoerl & McCormack (H&M) posit two systems – the temporal updating system and the temporal reasoning system – and suggest that they explain an inherent contradiction in people's naïve theory of time. We suggest there is no contradiction. Something does, however, require explanation: the tension between certain sophisticated beliefs about time, and certain phenomenological states or beliefs about those phenomenological states. The temporal updating mechanism posited by H&M may contribute to this tension.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 42 , 2019 , e265
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019

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