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Metacognition and conscious experience
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 November 2016
Abstract
Morsella et al. focus on the conscious nature of sensation. However, also critical to an understanding of consciousness is the role of internally generated experience, such as the content of autobiographical memory or metacognitive experiences. For example, tip-of-the-tongue states are conscious feelings that arise when recall fails. Internally driven experiences drive us to action and therefore are consistent with the current approach.
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