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Infer yourself: Interoception and internal “action” in conscious selfhood

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 November 2016

Anil K. Seth
Anil K. Seth*
Affiliation:
Department of Informatics, Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science, University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9QJ, United Kingdom. [email protected]
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Abstract

Can consciousness be understood through an association with voluntary skeletomotor action selection? Although flexible and integrated action selection is a plausible function for consciousness, a narrow focus on skeletomotor control neglects the contributions to conscious selfhood and subjectivity that rest on interoception and autonomic regulation (internal “action”). I consider these issues from the perspective of predictive processing.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 39 , 2016 , e196
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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