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Entities also require relational coding and binding
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 January 2020
Abstract
Although Bastin et al. propose a useful model for thinking about the structure of memory and memory deficits, their distinction between entities and relational encoding is incompatible with data showing that even individual objects – prototypical “entities” – are made up of distinct features which require binding. Thus, “entity” and “relational” brain regions may need to solve fundamentally the same problems.
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- Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2020
References
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