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Could Bayesian cognitive science undermine dual-process theories of reasoning?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2023

Mike Oaksford Open the ORCID record for Mike Oaksford [Opens in a new window]
Mike Oaksford*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychological Sciences, Birkbeck College, University of London, London, UK [email protected] https://www.bbk.ac.uk/our-staff/profile/8009448/mike-oaksford
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Abstract

Computational-level models proposed in recent Bayesian cognitive science predict both the “biased” and correct responses on many tasks. So, rather than possessing two reasoning systems, people can generate both possible responses within a single system. Consequently, although an account of why people make one response rather than another is required, dual processes of reasoning may not be.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 46 , 2023 , e134
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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