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Are counterfactuals in and about time?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 December 2019

Sarah Ruth Beck Open the ORCID record for Sarah Ruth Beck [Opens in a new window]  and
Eva Rafetseder Open the ORCID record for Eva Rafetseder [Opens in a new window]
Sarah Ruth Beck
Affiliation:
School of Psychology, University of Birmingham, BirminghamB15 2TT, United Kingdom. [email protected]/staff/profiles/psychology/beck-sarah.aspx
Eva Rafetseder
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Faculty of Natural Sciences, University of Stirling, StirlingFK9 4LA, Scotland, United Kingdom. [email protected]://www.stir.ac.uk/people/257482
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Abstract

We discuss whether the two systems approach can advance understanding of children's developing counterfactual thinking. We argue that types of counterfactual thinking that are acquired early in development could be handled by the temporal updating system, whereas those that emerge in middle childhood require thinking about specific events in time.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 42 , 2019 , e245
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019

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References

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