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Scale-free architectures support representational diversity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 June 2020

Chris Fields Open the ORCID record for Chris Fields [Opens in a new window]  and
James F. Glazebrook
Chris Fields
Affiliation:
Independent, 11106Caunes-Minervois, France. [email protected] https://chrisfieldsresearch.com
James F. Glazebrook
Affiliation:
Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, Eastern Illinois University, Charleston, [email protected] https://faculty.math.illinois.edu/~glazebro/
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Abstract

Gilead et al. propose an ontology of abstract representations based on folk-psychological conceptions of cognitive architecture. There is, however, no evidence that the experience of cognition reveals the architecture of cognition. Scale-free architectural models propose that cognition has the same computational architecture from sub-cellular to whole-organism scales. This scale-free architecture supports representations with diverse functions and levels of abstraction.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 43 , 2020 , e133
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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