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Identity-based motivation and the paradox of the future self: Getting going requires thinking about time (later) in time (now)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 December 2019

Daphna Oyserman Open the ORCID record for Daphna Oyserman [Opens in a new window]  and
Andrew Dawson
Daphna Oyserman
Affiliation:
Mind and Society Center, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA90089. [email protected]@usc.eduhttps://dornsife.usc.edu/daphna-oysermanhttps://dawson.pub
Andrew Dawson
Affiliation:
Mind and Society Center, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA90089. [email protected]@usc.eduhttps://dornsife.usc.edu/daphna-oysermanhttps://dawson.pub
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Abstract

People can imagine their future selves without taking future-focused action. Identity-based motivation theory explains why. Hoerl & McCormack outline how. Present-focused action prevails because future “me” feels irrelevant to the choices facing current “me” unless future “me” is experienced as occurring now or as linked to current “me” via if-then simulations. This entails reasoning in time and about time.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 42 , 2019 , e269
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019

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References

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