They fall deep in debt, and one trainee became so disturbed that he committed murder.

In 1993, when Japan still depended on foreign labor in the last days before the Bubble Economy burst, the Japanese government introduced a Foreign Training Internship Program. Although it was claimed that this system was designed to support foreigners in their acquisition of technical skills and knowledge of Japanese advanced technology, in reality it has been used to make up for a shortage of unskilled labor in Japan. Because the Japanese government is reluctant to invite transnational migrant laborers into the country, companies have had to look for new ways to find workers. As a result, many foreigners enrolled in the training-internship program—with valid three-year work permits—become a source of cheap labor, and end up working under wretched conditions.

South Korea's welfare system has undergone radical institutional expansion since the 1990s, largely as a consequence of the financial crisis of 1997. Despite these changes, however, public social expenditure remains extremely low in comparison with all other Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. The social insurance system and social welfare service sector remain underdeveloped. The current welfare system in Korea can best be characterized as a residual model in which state intervention remains limited and the family and the private market economy play the central roles in providing a social safety net. This situation is largely the legacy of the “growth-first” ideology, which has remained the dominant approach favored by the majority of Korea's political and economic decision-makers since the period of authoritarian rule (1961–1993), together with the adoption of Western European-style neoliberal restructuring, which was implemented following the financial crisis of 1997.

In recent years, the mayors of cities hosting American bases in Japan, and particularly in Okinawa, propelled by powerful citizen movements, have resisted American plans for base reorganization that would expand the US military presence in their communities. In many cases, powerful pressure from Tokyo, in the form of threats to cut off development aid to local communities, and offers to buy off local opposition, have succeeded in dividing local communities and forcing local officials to yield to the power of the center. The Hiroshima-based Chugoku Shinbun here examines realignments involving Atsugi Air Base, Iwakuni Marine Base and Yokosuka Naval Base, three locales experiencing major upgrading of U.S. military power and changes in the structuring of U.S. forces in Japan. ms

Sixty-six years after Japan's annexation of the former Ryukyu Kingdom in 1879, in the waning months of the Asia-Pacific War, the American military partitioned the Ryukyu Islands from Japan. The replacement of Okinawa Prefecture by US military rule in the Ryukyus from 1945 had profound implications, for residents of the occupied islands. A major repercussion of the military government's separation of the Ryukyus was the enforced isolation of the four main island groups from occupied Japan. The Ryukyuan-Japanese border severed longstanding administrative and economic links, while restrictive border controls prohibited free travel and interaction between the two sides. Another consequence of this imposed barrier was the socio-economic problem of how to provide for the livelihood and welfare of the island residents, who thereby became entirely dependent on the military government. These problems were compounded by the massive destruction, loss of life, and overall displacement of residents in the wake of war, especially in Okinawa.

In 1944 President Franklin Roosevelt dispatched vice president Henry A. Wallace to meet with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and offer him the “return” of Indochina to China. Chiang wisely declined the offer.

The demolition of a French empire at Dien Bien Phu is inspiration to a Taliban aiming to erode the resolve of the United States and its allies, writes Paul Rogers.

There have been many suggestions among media and military analysts since 2003 of possible parallels between the war in Iraq and the United States imbroglio in Vietnam that ended so humiliatingly in 1975. The argument is most prominently made by critics of both wars, though it has also been articulated by defence analysts and officials concerned that the US learns the “right” lessons from its costly Vietnam experience.

In this interview, Wang Jisi, Dean of International Studies at Beijing University and a leading Chinese specialist on international relations, tackles the question of the end of US hegemony and US-China relations. The interview, conducted prior to the October financial pandemic in the US and globally, and prior to the election of Barack Obama as president, ranges widely over China as a rising power, the United States and changing world dynamics. While rejecting the very premise of a US-China alliance, pointing to reactionary US policies in Israel/Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan. Noting US hypocrisy as in its embrace of Saudi Arabia while speaking of human rights, and pointing to fundamental US weaknesses, Wang nevertheless makes the case for US-China cooperation and challenges the view that the US is in ineluctable decline as a global power. ms

The US-Iraq agreement signed on November 27, 2008 at a moment when the world was mesmerized by the Mumbai bombing, is an extraordinary document, not only for the US-Iraq War, but in the history of the American empire of bases and that nation's numerous twentieth century wars. Going well beyond the commitments that either George W. Bush or Barack Obama offered, the agreement states unequivocally that “All the United States Forces shall withdraw from all Iraqi territory no later than December 31, 2011” (Art. 24.1). Moreover, “All United States combat forces shall withdraw from Iraqi cities, villages, and localities no later than the time at which Iraqi Security Forces assume full responsibility for security in an Iraqi province, provided that such withdrawal is completed no later than June 30, 2009,” (Art. 24.2).

I would like to provide some context for the article “Patients Adrift: The Elderly and Japan's Life-Threatening Health Reforms” by Hiratate Hideaki, recently translated from Shukan Kinyobi for publication in Japan Focus. Japan has a long and honorable tradition of muckraking reporting on its medical care system. To illustrate that point with a personal anecdote: My colleague Naoki Ikegami and I published a book about a decade ago called Japan's Medical Care (Nihon no Iryou, Chuuou Kouron Shinsho) itself a translation of a book we published in English called The Art of Balance in Health Policy: Maintaining Japan's Low-Cost, Egalitarian System (Cambridge University Press). Although it pointed out quite a few problems, the overall tone of our book was as positive as the English title indicates. Many Japanese readers told us it was the first time they had ever read anything good about their own medical care system. They were used to reading magazine articles and books full of pitiful anecdotes and unrelenting criticism.

The use and potential misuse of sovereign wealth funds in Asia has been newsworthy of late, especially because of their size and high profile investments. China and – and possibly Japan as well – look to parlay their governmentowned investment vehicles. With its small population base, and vast reserves of oil and natural gas, the small Southeast Asian nation of Brunei Darussalam, located on the northeastern side of the island of Borneo, has been able to lever its economy into providing an enviable standard of living for its population and mega-billions for its ruling Royal family.

The article posted here by Dai Qing appears in a December 2008 special issue on The Heritage of Beijing Water, guest edited for The China Heritage Quarterly by the Beijing-based writer, historical investigative journalist and water activist. The issue focuses on the aqueous heritage of China's capital city. Reflecting on the well-springs of the Olympic year and the bountiful supply of water during 2008, Dai Qing discusses the diminishing heritage of a resource that sustained the ancient city in the past, shaped much of its life, and determines its future. The issue features a map of Beijing Waterways and an important study, ‘Beijing's Water Crisis, 1949-2008’ with important contributions by Probe International, an independent Canada-based think-tank and environmental protection group.

In Stockholm last fall, walking past a McDonald's, Tan Dun turned to me and said: “Some 20 years ago, I was still planting rice in China. And now I'm conducting orchestras in all the great concert houses of the world: La Scala, the Met, the Berlin Philharmonic. I still can't believe it.”

The lone survivor of a Japanese infantry unit in World War 2, Nishimura Kokichi promised his comrades he would bring their bodies back to Japan. Sixty years later, he is still trying to fulfill his pledge in a story of indomitable will and determination.

Former Prime Minister Mori Yoshiro seems an unlikely champion of a multicultural Japan. His brief term of office is, after all, perhaps best remembered for the furore he evoked by a speech in which he described Japan as a “Divine Nation headed by the Emperor”. This echo of prewar nationalism stirred fears at home and abroad that senior Japanese politicians still subscribed to Shinto myths of a unique and racially superior Japan. Yet Mori today is an active participant in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party's “Diet Members' League for Promoting Exchanges of Foreign Human Resources” (Gaikoku Jinzai Koryu Suishin Giin Renmei), an awkwardly-named body whose mission is to promote mass immigration by making Japan a magnet for skilled workers from around the world. (Akashi and Ogawa 2008, 69)

From Rarotonga, the Cook Islands. The sea is blue, beaches with golden sand boast palm trees bending almost to the water surface. Beneath barely detectable waves, marine life is fascinating and diverse. On hotel terraces, coconut juices cool the refined throats of jet setters. Traditional huts rub shoulders with some of the most expensive resorts in the world. 500 US dollars would hardly sustain a couple for more than a day here in one of the most expensive parts of the world. Together with neighboring French Polynesia, this has become one of the most expensive parts of the world.

At the beginning of the third week of September in Hanamaki our thoughts turn, with the hand of the clock, to another world. The autumnal equinox certainly reinforces this; for this is the season in Japan of recalling those who came before us, a time when many Japanese people choose to visit the gravesites of their ancestors.

As the US public is dimly aware, things are not going very well in Afghanistan.

The United Nation situation map for Afghanistan issued September 3 (the most recent available) paints a grim picture: The large swaths shaded with the purple diagonal lines are places where things are getting worse. This includes the entire area surrounding Kandahar on the Pakistan border in the south, as well as areas on the Pakistan-Tajikstan border in the Northeast and other areas on the Turkmenistan border to the Northwest.

The scientific term Minakatella longifolia G. Lister may be known only to biologists, but behind the story of this slime mold—and of how specimens came to be kept at the Natural History Museum in London—is the life of one of the most fascinating men of Japan's modern era: Minakata Kumagusu.

Introduction. All is not as it appears in Dili, that “pestilential place,” as described early last century by Joseph Conrad in his classic novel, Victory. The question posed by Bob Broughton is certainly valid, namely, how did one man – Alfredo Reinado – hold hostage the fortunes of this young nation? The answer is certainly murkier than the standard democratic elections narrative which, remarkably, saw in 2007 a constitutional crisis leading to the reversal of roles of the President and Prime Minister in East Timor. As Boughton highlights, it is important to pay attention to personalities and politics.

“So, how do you like Japan, Mr. Binney?'

The scene: a party at the Sumitomo Bank back in 1984 for the new manager of Chase Manhattan's Tokyo branch where I was then working.

Whoops. Most of us from Chase looked at the floor while our hosts tittered politely. Our manager should have said he enjoyed Asahi Beer, not Sapporo. Because Asahi was the Sumitomo group brewer and naturally the Sumitomo Bank served as the company's socalled “main bank”. At that time, Sumitomo Bank was regularly seconding its own people to the then-troubled beer maker including two of its presidents.