WHEN France Vinton Scholes received the Serra Award of the Academy of American Franciscan History in 1956, one of his distinguished colleagues remarked to me that “Scholes is a historian's historian.” Those of us who had the privilege to work with him, students and colleagues, also knew him as a master teacher and an ideal university administrator. In 1969 when the University of New Mexico administration building was named for its former Academic Vice President and Graduate Dean, we told him that it had always been “Scholes Hall ” for us.

For Some students of Luso-Brazilian history mention of the Order of Christ brings to mind its headquarters, the magnificent Portuguese monastery at Tomar, graced by Diogo de Arruda’s great window, a masterpiece praised by Robert C. Smith as “probably the best-known single motif in Portuguese art” and “the outstanding example of Manueline preoccupation with exotic naturalism.” Others would think of the Order's successes under the aegis of the Infante Henrique, “the Navigator,” when it underwent reform, received a new rule, and obtained countless spiritual and temporal favors from the popes at Rome. Lesser known is that the Order of Christ was also a clerico-military order whose members pledged to live a more spiritual life while being ready to serve militarily their God and their King. Since a considerable number of those holding important offices in Portuguese America wore the habit of the Order it might be well to examine closely exactly what this membership entailed.

In August, 1913, President Woodrow Wilson made one of his numerous attempts to remold Mexico in the image of the United States by sending a special executive agent, John Lind, to hasten the political demise of Provisional President Victoriano Huerta. Having refused Huerta diplomatic recognition because he achieved power by military coup d'etat, Wilson instructed Lind to insist that Huerta arrange an armistice with the Constitutionalists, the revolutionaries who had risen in rebellion rather than accept the usurper's rule. Free elections, in which Huerta was not to be a candidate for President, were to follow the armistice. Following his Anglo-Saxon instincts, Wilson assumed that, if all parties abided by the results of the elections, a constitutionally legitimate government would be installed and the source of Mexico's revolutionary strife would thereby be eliminated.

It Has Been Commonly stated for almost two centuries now that the reason why the celebrated Mexican Jesuit, Francisco Javier Clavigero, was unable to publish the Spanish original of his Storia antica del Messico (Ancient History of Mexico) in Madrid stemmed from the savage attack made on the Italian edition by a highly nationalistic Spanish Jesuit, Ramón Diosdado Caballero, who considered it highly insulting and injurious to Spain and who urged the Spanish Government not to allow its publication until the author publicly retracted his damaging statements. That his bitter criticism prevented immediate publication there is no doubt, but on the basis of newly gathered evidence in Spanish and Roman archives, it is by no means clear that it was the ultimate cause for its not appearing.

For Several reasons the British merchants resident in Chile after the establishment of the patriot government in February, 1817, were in a position to exert political pressure. For one thing, they were beginning to increase in numbers and to prosper. For another, Supreme Director Bernardo O’Higgins, whose father was Irish and who himself had lived and studied in England, was predisposed toward the British and their brand of liberalism. The question of recognition was also important. After independence was declared in 1818, the government made a concerted effort to win recognition from the foreign powers. Attention was centered on Great Britain. But perhaps the most consequential factor was the potential role of the British navy.

A FEW months ago the Board of Directors of the Historical Society of New Mexico agreed that the Society should, from time to time, recognize outstanding men and women who have worked toward the same goals as the Society: to increase public understanding and knowledge of history, and, in particular, the history of New Mexico. Tonight we are honoring the distinguished historian Dr. France Vinton Scholes, whom I have known for more than thirty-five years, since the autumn day when I first walked past the shrunken heads on the fifth floor of the Peabody Museum of Archaeology and Ethnology at Harvard University to the end of a crooked office corridor–and, all unsuspecting, into my life work. Into the profession of history by the back door! This short journey into a long future led not only to many satisfying years of collaboration with Dr. Scholes, but to an abiding interest in New Mexico and the Spanish Southwest.

By The 1920's, the Brazilian population included a rich spectrum of racial and national groups dominated by an elite profoundly European in origin and outlook. At the same time, it was marked by extensive intermixture among the lower classes and public lip-service to racial tolerance, a condition attributed by Gilberto Freyre and others to Brazil's heritage, its physical environment, and its paternalistic division of labor. Most Brazilians believed that economic achievement and ability, not color, determined class standing, subscribing to the hypothesis of Brazil as a racial democracy unique among the nations.

The Industrial trade association movement in Argentina is split into two rival organizations: the Argentine Industrial Union (U. I. A., and the Confederation of Industry (C. I.), a component of the General Economic Confederation (C. G. E.). The U. I. A. represents primarily Buenos Aires interests, the C. I./C. G. E. (hereafter the Confederation) primarily industrialists of interior provinces. As such the schism between the two reflects political and economic divisions which have characterized Argentina since the nation originally freed itself from the Spanish crown.

This study traces the historical background of hostility between the U. I. A. and the Confederation to determine whether the split is as irreparable as both sides claim. Has the future of the Argentine industrial sector been foreclosed by polemics arising from the nation’s peronista past?

In Editing The Bandeirantes, The Historical Role of the Brazilian Pathfinders, Richard M. Morse points out that on many points of interpretation neither the readings he has presented “nor the whole of bandeirante history can furnish conclusive answers.” He states that “although the chronology and geography of the bandeiras have by now been fairly well pieced together by scholars, most other aspects of their history still lie open to speculation.” He concludes with a statement from a Brazilian source: “In spite of the fruitful results of research in this century, the study of bandeirismo as the combined process of political, economic and social evolution of the colony has not yet been attempted.” While thinking over Professor Morse’s introductory comments it occured to me that a careful review of all available facts concerning the seventeenth century Paulista, Domingos Jorge Velho, might contribute a useful piece in the challenging, historic puzzle.

THE state of Morelos in today's México comprised two rich and important provinces within the Aztec Confederacy when Spanish forces penetrated it for the first time in March of 1521. In that year of conflict, the Tlahuica and Xochimilca peoples who dominated the numerous settlements and fertile, well-watered, volcanic soils of its mountain-surrounded valleys were producing large quantities of valued agrarian and other goods. For generations, dating back 8,000 or more years, they and their predecessors had done so. The laborers among them—the commoners or macehuales, the serf-like, soil-bound mayeques, and the slaves—used valleys in the high-altitude, temperate to semitropical and semi-arid north and in the less-elevated, tropically hot and humid south to grow maize, beans, chile, tomatoes, peppers, squashes, some fruits, chía (a species of sage), huautli (amaranth), cotton and, perhaps, cacao.

Political orientation and motivation of Chilean army officers in the twentieth century has generally been confined to the 1924-1932 period. During those eight years the military functioned as a politically deliberative body in four distinct ways. First, in September 1924 the actions of junior and middle-grade officers caused President Arturo Alessandri Palma to resign his office, whereupon a junta composed of two generals and an admiral assumed executive functions. Four months later, in January 1925, a coup led by the progenitors of the 1924 movement deposed the junta and recalled Alessandri, allowing him to serve out the remaining few months of his five-year term.

One Of The salient characteristics of 20th century Mexican art and intellectual history has been preoccupation with the problem of national identity, or, put in another fashion, with the problem of defining lo mexicano. Most commonly, concern for lo mexicano and mexicanidad has been associated with the Mexican Revolution. The generally accepted assumption is that inasmuch as the Mexican Revolution was a revolution without ideology, it was not until Mexicans began questioning the meaning of their revolution that they asked—what are we? who are we? Yet, the volume and importance of the intellectual and artistic production of the post-revolutionary period notwithstanding, it is certainly true that Mexicans were concerned with the problem of national identity even before 1910.

Thus Did the wife of the first Spanish Minister to Mexico describe, in October, 1840, the reception given a letter written by José María Gutiérrez Estrada and published in pamphlet form together with an essay which amplified and clarified his position. The letter, addressed to President Anastasio Bustamante, carried the date August 25, 1840, whereas the pamphlet did not appear until October 18, 1840. The letter pointed to the necessity for a convention to seek a remedy for Mexico’s problems. The remedy advocated by Gutiérrez Estrada in the essay which amplified his position, and which caused such a sensation— was a constitutional monarchy.

Is it possible for two reputable and assumedly authoritative sources like the Congressional Record and Statutes at Large to contain mutually contradictory evidence as to whether the President of the United States approved or failed to approve a particular act of Congress? It could happen, obviously. It did in one instance, in fact, to the continuing confusion of students and scholars alike, who seemingly have been unaware of the discrepancy.

THROUGH the late fall and early spring of 1560, a Spanish official, Diego de Madrid, under authority of the Royal Audiencia of New Spain, travelled to twenty-five settlements within the provincia of Huexotzinco. This area, presently located in the Mexican state of Puebla, extended from the modern site of San Juan Texmelucan, in the north, to Atlixco, to the south. Madrid, named as juez de comisión, visited a region over 155 square miles in extent. The purpose of Madrid's inspection concerned a census of all persons living in the jurisdiction. Numerical totals were not the sole objective of the survey; ultimately all manner of census categories comprised the population listing: old persons, widows, widowers, deceased individuals, youths, children, artisans, church workers, “nobles,” “commoners.”

On November 20, 1681 the cathedral bell of Lima announced the official arrival of the new Viceroy of Peru, Don Melchor de Navarra y Rocafull, Duque de la Palata. The streets were decked with bunting and flowers and many people crowded windows and balconies to catch a glimpse of the new Viceroy. Palata, astride a white horse, led a procession of town councilmen, lancers, footmen, and coaches through the capital to the main plaza. There he was greeted by an artillery salute that shook the entire city. Thanking the officials who had accompanied him, Palata entered the viceregal palace and appeared at a window to the acclamation of the multitude.

A Water passage to connect the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans became a passionate desire of Spain “from the year 1513 in which Núñez de Balboa discovered the Pacific Ocean.” When the search for a natural water route failed, Spain decided to build a canal. In 1528 Spain proposed to cut four canals through Middle America: from the Lake of Nicaragua to the South Sea, from the River Chagres to Panama, across the Isthmus of Tecoantepec (sic), and from Nombre de Dios to Panama. In 1800 she added two more possible canal sites to her list, from Rio Grande near Panama to Rio Chagres and from Rio Caymito to the Embarcadero of Rio Trinidad. But none of Spain’s plans came to fruition, and independence came to Spanish America without the construction of an interoceanic canal.

In 1911 Francisco I. Madero overthrew the Mexican dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz. Unable to consolidate his initial victory and establish a stable government, Madero presided for sixteen months over the political destruction of the Mexican Republic. Then on February 9, 1913, the counterrevolutionary General Victoriano Huerta came to power following a coup d'etat.

Throughout the period of Madero's presidency the United States and the republics of Latin America had attempted without success to encourage stability in the Mexican Government. In order to begin the quest for a steadying influence in Mexico, John Barrett, the Director-General of the Pan American Union and an experienced American diplomat in Latin America, proposed that the international hemispheric organization mediate the situation, and thus work to insure an essentially Mexican solution to a Mexican problem. To this end Barrett sent a series of letters on February 13, 1913, to President Taft, Presidentelect Wilson and the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, explaining his plan. To avoid the further decay of the Mexican situation, which could eventually lead the United States to intervene with force, Director-General Barrett proposed that an international commission of mediation be called under the auspices of the Pan American Union.

AFTER the Tribunal of the Holy Office of the Inquisition was established in Mexico in 1571, one of its functionaries, Antonio de Espejo, became a wealthy cattle rancher and entrepreneur in the Bajío (lowlands) region north of Mexico City, an area which today stretches from San Juan del Río through Querétaro to Aguascalientes. During November 1582 until September 1583, Espejo made a reconnaissance of New Mexico and he became a strong contender for the royal contract to colonize New Mexico as the Spanish king and the Mexican viceroy began to screen suitable applicants. It is probable that Antonio de Espejo would have been awarded the New Mexico patent had he not fled central Mexico for the north in the spring of 1581, because there was a warrant out for his arrest on a murder charge. As a Familiar of the Inquisition Espejo attempted to claim immunity from criminal persecution. His uncle and legal representative, Francisco de Santiago, handled his affairs during the civil trial and as the Inquisition investigated the murder charges, because Espejo had already gone to the Nueva Vizcaya frontier.