Economic determinist attempts to deduce specific political conclusions or strategies from Marx's general theory do not jibe with Marx's own extensive political activity. Instead, Marx's development as a political theorist and organizer passed from observation of (French Revolution, Chartism) or participation in (1848, the International Workingmen's Association) existing radical movements to formulation of new theories and strategies, and then to application of these strategies in subsequent movements. In applying his general theory to formulating strategies and historical explanations, Marx utilized a framework of mainly political auxiliary statements to define the specific international and national historical setting. Faced with the defeat of a strategy or a tension between the strategy and an older theory, Marx reformulated his theory in different ways, sometimes altering these auxiliary statements rather than the general theory to explain unexpected events, more rarely changing the general theory itself. These new explanations reinforced his strategies. This impact of political experience on Marx's thinking illustrates his famous definition, drawn from Theses on Feuerbach, of revolution as a “practical-critical” activity. Taken as a whole, Marx's new explanations underline the role of politics in historical materialism and conflict with Marx's general expectation that economic oppression alone would ultimately drive the proletariat to make socialist revolution.

This article explains why previous empirical tests of the size principle have failed to produce conclusive results. Particular stress is given to seldom considered aspects of constitutional choice; their implications are explored by means of a simple simulation. Then I propose a test of the size principle and report some initial empirical findings based upon this test.

Since the language of political inquiry seems to be inescapably metaphorical, the question necessarily arises as to how metaphors of various types, including models, enter into the composition and expression of political knowledge. The solutions that have been most influential in contemporary political science can be called the verificationist and constitutivist views of political metaphor. While both views contain important elements of truth, there are fundamental difficulties in each that require the search for a more satisfactory view. An alternative view of metaphor and political knowledge is developed by reference to four main problems: Why is political speech metaphorical? How do metaphors make political things manifest? How are political metaphors tested? and Are metaphors indispensable to political expression and political knowledge?

This analysis discusses the implications of some cognitive and organizational factors for the evaluation and avoidance of failures in strategic warning. It advances three major arguments. First, efforts to assess and improve warning forecasts must take into account the policy context in which they are made and used. They cannot be based on concerns with the accuracy of forecasts alone. Second, important biases are present in retrospective case studies. Therefore, we should accept post hoc explanations of warning failures with appropriate caution. Third, a pluralistic intelligence community, as it is presently proposed for some non-U.S. systems, is unlikely to resolve the problems thought to be responsible for past strategic surprises. It may in fact compound these problems.