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American Legislative Decision Making and the Size Principle

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Fred Thompson
Fred Thompson*
Affiliation:
Economic Council of Canada and, University of California, Los Angeles
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Abstract

This article explains why previous empirical tests of the size principle have failed to produce conclusive results. Particular stress is given to seldom considered aspects of constitutional choice; their implications are explored by means of a simple simulation. Then I propose a test of the size principle and report some initial empirical findings based upon this test.

Type
Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 73 , Issue 4 , December 1979 , pp. 1100 - 1108
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1979

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