Most legal systems in the West allow for involuntary treatment of mental illness, usually on the basis that without such treatment the person would be a danger to themselves or others. While historically the mental health law jurisdiction has been a protective one, it has become increasingly influenced by civil rights and international human rights law, which privilege the value of autonomy and the right to personal liberty.

In this regard, an important principle that has developed is that decisions about treatment for mental illness must be the “least restrictive alternative” available. This may mean, for example, that a person is supported to make a decision on treatment for their mental illness, according to evolving practices of “supported decision-making,” so that their legal capacity is still recognized. If involuntary treatment is required, the “least restrictive” approach demands that the liberty and integrity of the person be respected to the greatest extent possible.

The Mental Health Act 2016 (Qld) (“MHAQ”) prescribes that decision-making on non-consensual treatment should preferably be done according to what it calls the “less restrictive way.” However, the “less restrictive way” is defined as decision-making by patients under advance directives, and also by substitute decision-makers, including by attorneys or guardians not appointed by the patient, usually a family member. The MHAQ states that these arrangements are distinguished from and prioritized over what it calls “involuntary treatment and care,” where the decision for non-consensual treatment is made by the treating team.

However, we argue that these arrangements are not in fact “less restrictive” of the person’s autonomy, but are less accountable forms of decision-making. Decision-making by treating teams under involuntary treatment provisions is subject to higher levels of transparency and accountability. In Australian states these decisions are reviewed regularly by a specially constituted, independent mental health tribunal. By contrast, treatment decisions made under the “less restrictive way” are not even defined as constituting involuntary treatment, and are outside the scope of the tribunal’s review.

In the case of decision-making by advance directive, we acknowledge that this is widely considered to be “less restrictive” of a person’s right to legal capacity and autonomy. However, in these cases, the patient may actually be refusing treatment at the time the advance directive is relied upon. This raises serious questions as to whether such “voluntary” admissions and treatment should not be subject to the same oversight and accountability as involuntary ones. Patients have a right to less restrictive forms of decision-making, but when deprived of their liberty, they also have a right to adequate safeguards established by law.

The term “less restrictive” in the MHAQ is largely misplaced and misleading. In the case of advance directives, it deflects attention from the potentially restrictive nature of the treatment and the lack of accountability. Even more problematically, the privileging of private substitute decision-making under the less restrictive way ignores the real risk of abuse and undue influence within the personal and family sphere. We argue that the “less restrictive way” under the MHAQ is a step backwards for the rights of patients, in that it shifts power to family on the risky assumption that decision-making by these less supervised individuals is more likely to uphold human rights. We believe that this reflects a pre-feminist assumption that the informal, family, private sphere is nearly always safe. This is a contentious assumption, which nevertheless underpins much unproblematized thinking and advocacy on supported decision-making. This issue also highlights the need for further elucidation and discussion on what least restrictive means in the context of involuntary treatment for mental illness.

For over a decade and for the foreseeable future, federal agencies have made efforts to promote value-based care through various incentive schemes, such as the recent “Regulatory Sprint to Coordinated Care.” Federal incentive schemes and other “macro tailwinds” have brought in private equity investors, especially in the context of primary care for Medicare beneficiaries. Oak Street Health and its private equity backers were pioneers in this space, applying buy-and-build strategies to create “next-generation” primary care networks “that focus largely or entirely on Medicare Advantage enrollees.” Although Oak Street Health persuasively established a workable “playbook” for private equity investment in value-based care, and forecasts have been favorable, the ultimate market viability of this value-based playbook hinges on whether or not private equity investors can locate corporate buyers. The market viability of such a strategy has now been reconfirmed by the acquisition of Oak Street Health by CVS Health (“CVS”), announced February 8, 2023, and closed May 2, 2023, especially given that the incentives and the efficiencies associated with this deal are likely to be applicable to large-scale vertically integrated “payvider” corporations more generally. This Recent Transaction Comment examines CVS’s acquisition of Oak Street Health to consider what factors might lead vertically integrated health care corporations to acquire value-based primary care networks in the future, and what knock on effects such acquisitions might have on future private equity buyouts in health care.

This RCD analyzes the Alabama Supreme Court’s recent answer to two certified questions sent to the court from the Eleventh Circuit. The questions involved whether a pharmaceutical company’s duty to warn included a duty to provide instructions about how to properly mitigate for warned of risks, and if the pharmaceutical company had such a duty could a plaintiff recover if their physician would have prescribed the same drug but just changed their monitoring scheme. The Alabama Supreme Court answered both questions in the affirmative, expanding the causation standard in failure to warn claims.

This Article analyzes the 2021 judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Mst. Safia Bano v. Home Department, Government of Punjab. The case has garnered significant local and international attention due to the Court’s ruling that a death sentence may not be carried out on a defendant who has a mental illness. Setting the case against the backdrop of Pakistan’s Islamic and colonial contexts, this article argues that the Supreme Court has reshaped the insanity defense in Pakistani law by placing the determination of a defendant’s mental state mainly in the hands of medical professionals. However, the Court’s reliance on medical professionals and the subsequent downplaying of the “moral capacity” element of the insanity defense—a determination of law made by courts—has created an obstacle for courts to punish offenders more stringently in future cases due to the popular belief that mental health professionals are ill-equipped to answer broader questions of justice for victims and society. The article recommends that this issue can be remedied by establishing an objective legal test for insanity that considers Islamic law, Pakistani precedent, and advances in medical science.

Treatment of mental illness in the United States is woefully inadequate. One-third of adults report having a mental health condition or substance use disorder, but less than half receive treatment for their condition.

Access is the problem. The U.S. is short on mental health professionals: more psychiatrists are needed and psychologists and social workers are overextended. Proposed solutions are to (1) increase reimbursement rates for psychiatrists and other mental health practitioners, and (2) use a wider range of providers, including nurses and family support specialists—all good ideas. My focus however is on two other forces that are moving into the behavioral health area, offering both financing and technologies to extend the reach of mental health services—private equity and telemental health.

First, private equity firms see high demand in this market. Behavioral health is desperately needed but is highly fragmented and lacking in innovation. Private equity is attracted to outpatient programs that target specific conditions that have evidence-based clinical models—programs aimed at addiction, eating disorders, and autism; these areas require less capital. Federal and state reimbursement is available, some regulations have been relaxed to allow remote prescribing of medicine; and innovative telehealth tools can be used. The problem is that private equity has a poor track record in both nursing home care and behavioral care for teens. The private equity model and its financial incentives are at odds with good care.

Second, telemental health tools, already in use because of the need during the pandemic, appear attractive. These tools require less capital to treat a higher volume of patients and promise much improved access to mental health treatment for populations that could not get such care because of travel distance, costs, and time limitations. The problem is that the telemental health tools have yet to be subjected to evidence-based testing.

My goal in this article is to test whether these two developments – private equity and telemental health —can improve access for patients at an acceptable level of quality. I conclude that both have substantial problems and I offer a range of regulatory approaches to control patient abuses and poor quality.

Many people who experience opioid use disorder rely on Medicaid. The high penetration of managed care systems into Medicaid raises the importance of understanding states’ expectations regarding coverage, access to care, and health system performance and effectively elevates agreements between states and plans into blueprints for coverage and care. Federal law broadly regulates these structured agreements while leaving a high degree of discretion to states and plans. In this study, researchers reviewed the provisions of 15 state Medicaid managed care contract related to substance use disorder (SUD) treatment to identify whether certain elements of SUD treatment were a stated expectation and the extent to which the details of those expectations varied across states in ways that ultimately could affect evaluation of performance and health outcomes. We found that while all states include SUD treatment as a stated contract expectation, discussions around coverage of specific services and nationally recognized guidelines varied. These variations reflect key state choices regarding how much deference to afford their plans in coverage design and plan administration and reveal important differences in purchasing expectations that could carry implications for efforts to examine similarities and differences in access, quality, and health outcomes within managed care across the states.

This Article seeks to synthesize academic research on home healthcare workers during the COVID-19 pandemic to understand how their workplace challenges were magnified. Crisis communication researchers note that a crisis provides both opportunities and threats for growth. This Article argues that many of the issues that have impacted home healthcare workers have always been present, but the pandemic allows policy makers the ability to see them clearly because the pandemic brought a spotlight to the issues that home healthcare workers face on a daily basis. Consequently, the author employed a narrative analysis of the literature concerning home healthcare workers during the pandemic to understand how the pandemic exacerbated structural issues that led to an increase in mental health difficulties for this population. By understanding how the pandemic exacerbated mental health issues, policy makers can craft solutions that can withstand the next public health crisis which will undoubtedly impact the most disenfranchised.

Since the publication of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Dobbs v Jackson Women’s Health in June of 2022, much attention has been paid to the direct effects of that decision on reproductive health care for pregnant or potentially pregnant individuals; and to the potential effects of the Court’s approach in Dobbs to other established precedent related to privacy and autonomy, such as rights to contraception and marriage equality. This Article will explore another potential negative consequence of Dobbs; its potential effect on the constitutional parameters of the law of civil commitment and involuntary medication of the mentally ill.

The foundational Supreme Court case establishing the parameters of the State’s right to involuntarily commit an individual to a mental institution was decided only two years after Roe v. Wade. In 1975, the Supreme Court in O’Connor v Donaldson held that an individual has a liberty interest in “prefer[ring] one’s home to the comforts of an institution,” and that a State could not, “without more,” confine a non-dangerous individual. The two-prong test of requiring a showing of both mental illness and dangerousness to one’s self or to others has remained the cornerstone of civil commitment law ever since.

The language and analysis of O’Connor is similar to that of Roe, the abortion rights case overturned by Dobbs. In particular, the grounding of the right to avoid civil commitment in the individual liberty and privacy interests are common themes in the two cases. The current Court, in its decision in Dobbs, has cast substantial doubt on the continued vitality of that analysis; and one can easily imagine a reconceptualization of O’Connor along the lines of Dobbs that substantially alters the requirements for civil commitment. In particular, the reliance in Dobbs and other recent Supreme Court opinions on historical precedent as a linchpin of originalist analysis could lead the Court to search for justifications in colonial or 19th-century mental health practices, time periods which predate modern psychiatric science.

This Article will explore the parallels in approach between Roe and O’Connor, and will suggest ways in which the post-Dobbs Supreme Court majority might disrupt the civil commitment status quo, including potential expansion of civil commitment or other detention of pregnant individuals for the protection of the fetus; and possible relaxation of the dangerousness requirement for civil commitment articulated in O’Connor.

In June 2022, in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the precedent set by the 1973 decision in Roe vs. Wade, leaving access to abortion to be regulated by each state, rather than a U.S. constitutional right. Some states are setting gestational age limits, beyond which point only under certain circumstances can an abortion be obtained. Other states are banning abortion outright (regardless of gestational age) unless an “exception” is met. Certain states include an exception for abortion when a woman’s physical health is at risk if they continue the pregnancy, but, at the same time, do not provide an exception for women whose mental health is at risk (a “mental health exception”).

Mental health conditions that develop, continue, or are exacerbated during pregnancy may be manageable or treatable, and women may want to continue their pregnancy even while experiencing such conditions. However, the absence of a choice to terminate their pregnancy as a result of these mental health conditions means women who are unable to successfully manage or treat their mental health during pregnancy have no choice but to experience the impact on their mental health – and reconcile any resulting impact on the fetus.

This article will discuss the role a mental health exception plays in state abortion statutes by analyzing the impact of pregnancy on mental health and resources available to support those who experience mental health impacts during pregnancy while, simultaneously, advocating for the inclusion of a mental health exception in state abortion laws.

Many insurers exclude coverage for transgender individuals. Litigation challenging these exclusions has increased. Most of these cases successfully advance equality claims by arguing that trans exclusions discriminate based on sex. That is, procedures performed on patients for reasons unrelated to gender affirming care are being denied to transgender individuals. There are, however, limitations to this argument. First, some courts may construe care narrowly and hold that some procedures are unique to gender affirming care that have no analog in other contexts. Second, a court that is hostile to the sex discrimination argument might hold that the denial does not arise from sex discrimination, but rather, because of the kind of diagnosis at issue. Further, the sex discrimination argument might force transgender individuals into making claims based on a binarized gender identity which may not conform with their lived experience.

Claims based on the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 (MHPAEA) can address these shortcomings. This Act prohibits insurers from discriminating against mental health diagnoses—for example, procedures that insurers cover because of medical or surgical diagnoses should also be covered if indicated for mental health diagnoses. Gender dysphoria is a recognized mental health diagnosis. Transgender individuals seeking gender affirming care arising from gender dysphoria can thus claim that exclusions of coverage violate the MHPAEA. Some transgender individuals might raise concerns that such an approach would lead to increased medicalization of trans identity. However, an MHPAEA claim would only appear in cases where a transgender individual is voluntarily submitting themselves to medical assistance in order to advance their own autonomy.

Suicide is one of the most common causes of death among individuals younger than eighteen years old. While psychological and social sciences continue to study the causes of the increasing prevalence of suicide in children and teens, the law largely continues to treat suicide as an isolated event. This Note tracks the historical treatment of suicide both under tort and criminal law, supporting the shift away from the traditional view of suicide towards one that more closely aligns with the growing understanding of the many factors that can contribute to a minor’s suicide. Ultimately, this Note argues that many minor suicides should be treated as foreseeable, allowing actions in tort.