The degree to which an international treaty is “directly applied” or “self-executing” in a national (municipal) legal system, i.e., to what extent the treaty norms are treated directly as norms of domestic law (“statutelike law”) without a further “act of transformation,” has been debated in an extensive literature for more than a century. This subject is now receiving increased recognition as part of a broader trend acknowledging that understanding an international legal system necessitates understanding the relationship of national legal and political systems to that international system. In connection with treaties, the basic concepts of “monism” and “dualism” have long been used to explain some of the relationships of treaty law to domestic law.

The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, also known as the Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, was adopted by the 18th Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), held in Nairobi in June 1981. Contrary to some expectations, the Charter stayed in limbo for only 5 years. It entered into force on October 21, 1986, after the deposit of the 26th instrument of ratification, the number required by its Article 63(3). By April 16, 1987, there were 33 states parties to the Charter, which makes it the largest regional human rights system in existence.

A continuing debate in international human rights law concerns the result of invalid reservations to multilateral treaties. The cardinal rule holds that a reservation cannot be incompatible with the object and purpose of a treaty. Yet a normative puzzle remains: what legal remedy should follow the determination of the invalidity of a reservation? Leading commentators have discussed a limited set of options. Three choices can be identified:

For many, the enactment of the European Union’s Treaty of Lisbon, with its range of significant human rights provisions, marks the EU’s coming of age as a human rights actor. The Lisbon Treaty inaugurated the legally binding character of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EU Charter), enshrined a commitment to accede to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and, in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), identified human rights as a foundational value. These changes have already drawn comment as developments that “will change the face of the Union fundamentally,” that take the protection of rights in the EU “to a new level,” and that indicate that “the arguments for improving the status of human rights in EU law… have finally been heard. There is general agreement, in other words, that the EU has reached the high point of its engagement with human rights.

When we were invited to contribute a positivist perspective to the present symposium, we did not know whether to regard this invitation as flattering or as an insult: does positivism not represent old-fashioned, conservative, continental European nineteenthcentury views—naive ideas of dead white males on the possibility of objectivity in law and morals? There is little we can do about being male and white, but we have certainly not seen ourselves as positivists of that kind. From the range of methodologies that the editors assembled, we could associate ourselves with several approaches just as much as with positivism. But in reflecting on our day-to-day legal work, we realized that, for better or for worse, we indeed employ the tools developed by the “positivist” tradition.

The lowered national barriers to global trade reveal opportunities for a world without parochial frontiers. One of these opportunities lies in the area of competition law. Competition law is designed to enhance the economic welfare of people by,among other things, breaking down private barriers and preventing the creation and misuse of corporate power through combinations and monopolistic strategies.

This Article applies the theory of comparative institutional analysis to evaluate the trade-offs associated with alternative mechanisms for resolving investment disputes. We assess the trade-offs in light of the principle of accountability under the rule of law, which underpins the goals of fairness, efficiency, and peace that are attributed to investment law. The Article makes two recommendations: first, reforms should address complementarity between domestic and international institutions; second, institutional choices should respond to the different contexts that states face.

On the afternoon of October 1, 1946, the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg sentenced twelve of the twenty-two Nazi defendants to death by hanging and seven to imprisonment for terms ranging from ten years to life. Three were acquitted. Three of the six accused organizations were found to be criminal. The reading of these sentences was preceded by the reading, through the whole of September 30, of the general opinion of the Tribunal on the four counts of the indictment and, on the morning of October 1, of the opinion on the charges against each defendant.1 The Control Council for Germany considered applications for clemency for most of those convicted but did not grant them and carried out the executions of those sentenced to death on October16 with the exception of Martin Bormann who had not been found and Hermann Goering who had succeeded in committing suicide a few hours earlier. Thus came to an end what President Truman described as “ the first international criminal assize in history.” “ I have no hesitancy in declaring,” continued the President, “ that the historic precedent set at Nuremberg abundantly justifies the expenditure of effort, prodigious though it was. This precedent becomes basic in the international law of the future. The principles established and the results achieved place International Law on the side of peace as against aggressive warfare.” 2

Before 1991, the relationship between the protection of the environment and international trade was an arcane specialty that attracted little attention. In 1971 the GATT Council established a Working Group on Environmental Measures and International Trade. This group did not even meet for over twenty years.

Everything changed with the decision in the Tuna/Dolphin I case, in which a GATT dispute resolution panel declared a United States embargo on tuna caught by fishing methods causing high dolphin mortality to be illegal. The Tuna/Dolphin I decision produced an explosion of rhetoric in both learned journals and the popular press. It was also a very interesting clash of very different “cultures,” trade specialists versus environmentalists. At die outset, neither group knew much about the other. Now, however, the legal and political issues have been identified and ventilated, mutual understanding has increased, and the process has begun to reconcile two values that are absolutely essential to the well-being of mankind: protection of the environment and international free trade.

Article 50 of the Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, which were presented by the International Law Commission to the General Assembly in 1966 and which the General Assembly has referred, as the basic proposal for consideration, to the international conference of plenipotentiaries, provides under the heading “Treaties conflicting with a peremptory norm of general international law (jus cogens)” that:

Under universal jurisdiction, any state in the world may prosecute and try the core international crimes— crimes against humanity, genocide, torture, and war crimes—without any territorial, personal, or national-interest link to the crime in question whenit was committed.The jurisdictional claim is predicated on the atrocious nature of the crime and legally based on treaties or customary international law. Unlike the regime of international criminal tribunals created by the United Nations Security Council and the enforcement regime of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the regime of universal jurisdiction is completely decentralized.

Over the last ten years, international relations (IR) theory, a branch of political science, has animated some of the most exciting scholarship in international law.1 If a true joint discipline has not yet emerged,2 scholars in both fields have clearly established the value of interdisciplinary cross-fertilization. Yet IR—like international law—comprises several distinct theoretical approaches or “methods.” While this complexity makes interactions between the disciplines especially rich, it also makes them difficult to explore concisely. This essay thus constitutes something of a minisymposium in itself: it summarizes the four principal schools of IR theory—conventionally identified as “realist,” “institutionalist,” “liberal” and “constructivist”—and then applies them to the norms and institutions governing serious violations of human dignity during internal conflicts (the “atrocities regime”).

It is now 30 years since the conclusion of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil marked the international community’s first serious attempt to cope with the increasing scale of marine pollution. Since then, pollution of the seas by oil, chemicals, nuclear waste and the effluent of urban industrial society has continued to grow and to cause ever more serious damage to the living resources and ecology of the marine environment and to the shores of coastal states. The control, reduction and elimination of marine pollution has become one of the major issues in the contemporary law of the sea and it has proved to be a complex task, requiring the creation of a new and growing body of international law. This process, though in certain respects still incomplete, has reached its potentially most significant stage of codification and development through the provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention of 1982.

The legal status of humanitarian intervention poses a profound challenge to the future of global order. The central question is easy to formulate but notoriously difficult to answer: Should international law permit states to intervene militarily to stop a genocide or comparable atrocity without Security Council authorization? That question has acquired even greater significance in the wake of military interventions in Kosovo and Iraq, and nonintervention in the Sudan. Concerted deliberation on these issues, however, has reached an impasse. A key obstacle to legalizing unilateral humanitarian intervention (UHI) is the overriding concern that states would use the pretext of humanitarian intervention to wage wars for ulterior motives. In this article, I argue that it is just as likely, or even more likely, that the impact on states would be the opposite. Drawing on recent empirical studies, I contend that legalizing UHI should in important respects discourage wars with ulterior motives, and I discuss changes to international legal institutions that would amplify that potential effect.

Any examination of self-determination runs promptly into the difficulty that while the concept lends itself to simple formulation in words which have a ring of universal applicability and perhaps of revolutionary slogans, when the time comes to put it into operation it turns out to be a complex matter hedged in by limitations and caveats. In a different turn of phrase, what is stated in big print—as in the reiterated United Nations injunction: All peoples have the right to self-determination—is drastically modified by what follows in small print. Indeed, once the major original exercise of self-determination has been undertaken, the small print takes over and becomes the big print which establishes the new and far more restrictive guidelines.

International organizations (or IOs)—intergovernmental entities established by treaty, usually composed of permanent secretariats, plenary assemblies involving all member states, and executive organs with more limited participation—are a twentieth-century phenomenon having little in common with earlier forms of institutionalized cooperation, including those in the ancient world. The story of how, shortly after the turn of the last century, the Euro-American lawyers that dominated the field of international law sought to transcend the chaos of war by “moving to institutions” has been told elsewhere and needs no repeating here. David Kennedy, Martti Koskenniemi, and David Bederman, among others, have described the disparate individuals, separated by nationality, juridical philosophy, and competing “idealist”/“realist” schools of thought, who nevertheless shared a messianic, quasi-religious, and coherent “internationalist sensibility” that sought to institutionalize multilateral diplomacy with a view to promoting civilization and progress. Kennedy locates the move to international organization in turn-of-the-century reformist aspirations for parliamentary, administrative, and judicial mechanisms that, in the Victorian language of the day, would convert “passion into reason.” By the time this Journal was established, the Congress of Vienna’s concert system had provided a model for an incipient (albeit only periodic) pseudo-parliament; diverse public administrative unions and river commissions suggested the possibilities for international administration and even the interstate pooling of funds; and the Permanent Court of Arbitration presaged an international judiciary.

The first volume of this American Journal of International Law has shown urbi et orbi that America possesses a number of prominent international jurists who are of equal rank to those of Europe as regards learning, idealism, constructive power, and literary skill.