At this pivotal point in history, a fundamental and oft-raised issue is “international governance.” Means of effective governance are seen as necessary to more complex arrangements of world order. But achieving effective governance ultimately will mean the existence of institutions that legislate, that is, institutions that make decisions binding on the whole. As a general matter, states have been skeptical of, if not hostile toward and consequently unwilling to accept, such governance. The United Nations Security Council is a notable exception; in the sometimes broad, sometimes narrow, area of international peace and security, the Security Council has taken decisions in the name of, and binding upon, the entire international community.

In the thirty cases that have led to the adoption of dispute settlement reports in the World Trade Organization (WTO), the enforcement tool of last resort—countermeasures—has been invoked five times. This number is more—in five years—than in the forty-seven-year history of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the WTO’s predecessor. In addition, on six occasions WTO members have invoked the expedited procedure to solve disagreements concerning compliance with dispute setdement reports, a procedure newly introduced with the establishment of the WTO. In another case, compliance procedures are looming.

The extent to which foreign sovereigns are entitled to immunity in municipal courts has attracted a vast literature, in recent years especially. The majority view now seems to be that immunity need not extend to commercial transactions entered into by the state, although the precise scope of this “exception” remains unsettled, and the role of international law in “extending” or “withholding” immunity has not yet, perhaps, been clearly analyzed. Indeed, it has been denied that there is any international law rule at all on the subject, a view that would presumably leave each state free to formulate, or negotiate, its own rule.

Forty years ago, the small and underdeveloped nations on the mountainous western edge of South America formed a regional integration pact to promote economic growth, regulate foreign investment, and harmonize national laws. Overall, their enterprise has not turned out well. Riven by political schisms, economic shocks, and weak domestic legal and judicial systems, the five principal countries of the Andean Community—Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador,Peru, and Venezuela— have failed to live up to their potential as South America's second largest trading bloc. The member states have relaunched the Andean integration project and revised its policies on multiple occasions, with at best only mixed results. Not surprisingly, most commentators have ignored the Andean Community or dismissed it as a failure.

The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established in 1993 to prosecute war crimes committed during the Yugoslav conflict; the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was established in 1994 to prosecute war crimes committed during the Rwandan civil war. The Yugoslav Tribunal has the competence to try alleged offenders for crimes enumerated in Articles 2-5 of its Statute, namely, grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, violations of the laws or customs of war, genocide, and crimes against humanity. Similarly, the Rwandan Statute accords the Tribunal authority to try defendants for crimes enunciated in Articles 2-4, namely, genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II. Article 7, paragraphs (1) and (3) of the ICTY Statute and Article 6, paragraphs (1) and (3) of the ICTR Statute grant jurisdiction to these ad hoc Tribunals to try the accused for individual criminal responsibility on the bases of individual culpability and superior authority.

Nongovernmental organizations are playing an increasingly important role in international litigation. This study will analyze the participation of nongovernmental organizations, primarily as amici curiae, in the proceedings of four permanent international courts: the International Court of Justice, the European Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. After discussing the impact of amici in national and regional courts, it recommends that the International Court of Justice expand its acceptance of submissions from nongovernmental organizations in appropriate cases. The Court has a jurisdictional basis to do so and amici have usefully contributed to cases before other courts.

Every student who has ever taken a traditional international law course has learned Manley Hudson’s four elements for the emergence of a rule of customary international law:

1. (a) concordant practice by a number of States with reference to a type of situation falling within the domain of international relations;

2. (b) continuation or repetition of the practice over a considerable period of time;

3. (c) conception that the practice is required by, or consistent with, prevailing international law; and

4. (d) general acquiescence in the practice by other States.

Since the end of the Cold War a decade ago, the United Nations has exercised authority in significant new ways to address various aspects of resolving conflicts and dealing with their consequences. These new approaches have included the use offeree to end interstate and internal violence, the resolution of boundary issues and other disputes that might prolong the conflict, the elimination of threatening weapons capabilities, the prosecution of violations of international humanitarian law, and the compensation of victims of the conflict. These actions have been taken either with the consent of the state or states involved, or pursuant to the authority of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, or both.

During the last twenty years, the world has experienced a sharp rise in the number of international courts and tribunals, and a correlative expansion of their jurisdictions. These occurrences have dramatically affected and will continue to affect the fields of international law and international relations. The creation and operation of international judicial bodies that are capable of enforcing international commitments, interpreting international treaties, and settling international conflicts have facilitated the growth of international legal norms and cooperative regimes governing important areas of international law and politics, such as economic relations, human rights, and armed conflicts. International courts — understood in this article as independent judicial bodies created by international instruments and invested with the authority to apply international law to specific cases brought before them — have thus become important actors as well as policy instruments in the hands of international lawmakers. Such courts serve, in some respects, as the lynchpin of a new, rule-based international order, which increasingly displaces or purports to displace the previous power-based international order.

The roots of the modern law of war lie in the 1860s. Developments in this decade began in 1862 when Henry Dunant published Un Souvenir de Solferino, which inspired the conclusion two years later of the first Geneva Convention on treatment of the sick and wounded. Four years later came the first multilateral agreement to ban the use of a particular weapon in war. And in 1863, before either of these agreements had been concluded, the earliest official government codification of the laws of war was promulgated by the United States. This codification was issued as General Orders No. 100, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, more commonly known as the “Lieber Code.”

We have previously argued that international environmental law does not adequately promote environmental security because it has failed to adopt an ecosystem orientation. In this paper we suggest that environmental security in the context of freshwater resources can only be achieved through a sophisticated understanding of regime formation and elaboration, linked with a determined pursuit of ecosystem orientation. Our underlying assumptions are twofold. First, the protection of shared water supplies is a “good” worth promoting, whether for intrinsic or instrumental reasons. Second, whenever a resource is shared, particularly a resource that can easily be exhausted or degraded,disputes between the states involved are inevitable. Perhaps surprisingly, we have suggested that the security dimension of the problem relates not only to the potential for disputes, but also—even primarily—to the first of our underlying assumptions. Thus,scarcities of resources should also cause concern when they threaten to undermine either the way of life of a given human population or internal structures of governance and activity through the fostering of subnational conflict and the significant reduction of options for action. In this sense we agree with Richard Ullman's now-famous attempt to redefine the very concept of security. In his view, and ours, a threat to security includes

On December 16, 2003, Uganda referred the situation concerning the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) to the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC). It was the first time that a state party had invoked Articles 13(a) and 14 of the Rome Statute in order to vest the Court with jurisdiction.

For both Uganda and the ICC, the case presented an important opportunity. For Uganda, the referral was an attempt to engage an otherwise aloof international community by transforming the prosecution of LRA leaders into a litmus test for the much celebrated promise of global justice. Since 1986, LRA atrocities have wreaked havoc on the Acholi people of northern Uganda. Given the absence of any vital national interests, influential states have not been inclined either to pressure Sudan to stop harboring the LRA or to help government forces confront the insurgents. Instead, the burden was placed on Uganda to negotiate a peaceful settlement with a ruthless, cult-like insurgency. The imprimatur of international criminal justice, sought through the referral to the ICC, was a means of thrusting this long-forgotten African war back onto the international stage.

At first glance, the question of the customary character of the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 for the Protection of Victims of War might appear academic. After all, the question arises infrequently in view of the universal acceptance of the Conventions as treaties (they are binding on even more states than the Charter of the United Nations). That the matter may have practical importance, however, was recently brought home by its consideration by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the merits phase of Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua. Moreover, in numerous countries where customary law is treated as the law of the land but an act of the legislature is required to transform treaties into internal law, the question assumes importance if no such law has been enacted. Failure to enact the necessary legislation cannot affect the international obligations of these countries to implement the Geneva Conventions; but invoking a certain norm as customary rather than conventional in such situations may be crucial for ensuring protection of the individuals concerned.

In this paper, we argue that market access issues associated with the question of the optimal mandate of the World Trade Organization should be separated from nonmarket access issues. We identify race-to-the-bottom and regulatory-chill concerns as market access issues and suggest that the WTO should address these concerns. We then describe ways that WTO principles and procedures might be augmented to do so. As for nonmarket access issues, we argue that as a general matter these are best handled outside the WTO, and that, while implicit links might be encouraged, explicit links between the WTO and other labor and environmental organizations should not as a general matter be forged. We view this as a measured approach to labor and the environment within the WTO.

Preemption comes in many forms and what we think of it depends on the circumstances. One state may not strike another merely because the second might someday develop an ability and desire to attack it. Yet few would criticize a strike in the midst of an ongoing war against a second state’s program to develop new types of weapons. Between these two examples lie countless fact patterns.

In the end, each use offeree must find legitimacy in the facts and circumstances that the state believes have made it necessary. Each should be judged not on abstract concepts, but on the particular events that gave rise to it. While nations must not use preemption as a pretext for aggression, to be for or against preemption in the abstract is a mistake. The use of force preemptively is sometimes lawful and sometimes not.