If you had published your opinion about the the general right of kings without abuse of anyone, Salmasius, even though you did it during this revolution among the English, but while you were employing your freedom of writing, there was no reason why any Englishman should be enraged by you, nor would you have gained any less in asserting the opinion which you support. For if this is a command both of Moses and of Christ, ‘that all men should be subject to their kings whether good or bad, be they Spanish, French, Italian, German, English, Scots', which you asserted above (p. 127), yet what concern was it of yours, an unknown foreigner, to stammer out our laws, and to wish to lecture upon them to us from the Professional chair, as if they were your own papers and miscellanies, when you had previously (and verbosely) instructed us that our laws ought to give way, whatever they were, to the laws of God.

Now it is generally enough agreed that it is not so much by your own wish that you have applied your mind to the royal cause, as because you have been hired, partly for payment (a very large one too, considering the resources of the man who hired you) and partly by hope of some greater reward, to mangle with your notorious pamphlet the English, who trouble none of their neighbours and manage their own affairs by themselves. Were this not so, is it credible that anyone would be so shameless or insane as not to hesitate, though he was a distant stranger, to plunge himself gratuitously into our affairs and even attach himself to a party? For what harm does it do you how the English control their own affairs? What do you want for yourself, Olus, what are you looking for? Do you have nothing at home to concern you? Would that you had the same cares as that most famous Olus in the epigram, and perhaps you have; certainly you deserve them. Or did that wife who spurs you on, who is said to have urged you on when you yourself were already running to write this to please the exiled Charles, did she predict for you perhaps greater commissions in England and I don't know what fees on Charles's return?

SOPHOCLES

Ἀναρχίας γὰρ μείζον οὐκ ἔστιν κακόν;

[Antigone 672: what evils are not caused by anarchy?]

PLATO.

Ὁ βασιν εὺς ὡς θεὸς ἐξ ἀνθρώπων.

[the king is as a god amongst men]

THE PREFACE

In every alteration of government there is something new, which none can either divine or judge of till time hath tried it. We read of many several ways of government. But they have all, or most of them, been of particular cities, with none or very small territories at first belonging to them. At this present the government of the Low Countries and of Switzerland are not appropriated either of them to any one city. For they are compounded of several petty principalities which have special and different laws and privileges each of them. Insomuch that the United Provinces and united cantons are but confederacies and leaguers, and not two entire commonweals; associates only for mutual defence. Nay, the cantons of Switzerland are not only several republics, but reputed to have different forms of commonweals – some being said to be aristocratically governed, and others democratically, as the mountaineers. And some of the cantons are papists, and some Protestants, and some mixed of both. We do not find that any large or great dominion or kingdom united in *one*447 government and under the same laws, was ever reduced at *once*448 to any kind of popular government, and not confined to the subjection of one city.

I think it is now clear enough that the king of England can be judged even by the laws of the English and that he has his lawful judges, which was the matter to be proven. How do you go on (for I shall not repeat my answers to your repetirions)? ‘From the very matters now for which meetings are usually called', you say, ‘it is all downhill to show that the king is above parliament.’ Let it be as downhill a slope as you wish, you will instantly feel yourself being hurled headlong down it. ‘Parliament', you say, ‘is usually assembled upon affairs of great importance, in which the safety of the kingdom and people is concerned.’ If the king summons parliament to attend to the people's business, not his own, and does not do even that except by the consent and at the judgement of those he summons, what even is he, I beg you, than a servant and agent of the people? Since, without the votes of those whom the people send, he cannot decide even the least thing either concerning others or even concerning himself. This also goes to prove that it is the king's duty to summon parliament whenever the people ask since it is the people's business, not the king's, that is dealt with in those assemblies, and that by the will of the people.

For although the king's assent was usually sought out of respect - and in matters of lesser importance concerning only the advantage of private persons he might not give it and might speak in accordance with that formula, ‘The king will advise’ - in matters which concern the common safety and liberty of all people, he could in absolutely no way say no, since that would be both against his coronation oath, by which he was held as if by the firmest law, and against the chief article of the Magna Carta, Ch. 29: ‘We will not refuse, we will not delay right or justice to any man.’ Will the king not refuse right or justice, and will he refuse the making of just laws? Not to any man, so not to all men?

In recent years there has been an explosion of interest in social history and in Women's Studies. Research has shed much light on the history of patriarchal attitudes and practices – not least in seventeenth-century England. The writings of Sir Robert Filmer are classic texts of seventeenth-century patriarchalist political thinking. Until now, the only modern edition of Filmer's political works has been Peter Laslett's. It was published in 1949 and has become quite a scarce book. The purpose of the present edition is to make Filmer's political works readily available.

Laslett's edition drew for the first time on the important Cambridge manuscript of Filmer's longest work, the Patriarcha. However, the text which Laslett printed contains a substantial number of mis-readings. For example, it gives the opening words of Patriarcha as ‘Within the last hundred years’ whereas the Cambridge manuscript in fact reads ‘Within this last hundred of years’, and similar errors occur throughout the book. Moreover, Laslett used only the Cambridge manuscript of Patriarcha. The present edition is based not just on that manuscript, but also on another important manuscript of Patriarcha at Chicago University Library. In the case of works other than Patriarcha, Laslett reprinted the text of the 1684 republication of Filmer's writings. The 1684 edition has no textual authority. This edition is based on manuscripts of sections of Filmer's Observations on Hobbes, Directions for Obedience and The Necessity of the Absolute Power of all Kings, and on the authoritative first printed editions of all of Filmer's writings, published in 1648 and 1652.

IF men within themselves would be govern'd by reason, and not generally give up thir understanding to a double tyrannie, of Custom from without, and blind affections within, they would discerne better, what it is to favour and uphold the Tyrant of a Nation. But being slaves within doors, no wonder that they strive so much to have the public State conformably govern'd to the inward vitious rule, by which they govern themselves. For indeed none can love freedom heartilie, but good men; the rest love not freedom, but licence; which never hath more scope or more indulgence then under Tyrants. Hence is it that Tyrants are not oft offended, nor stand much in doubt of bad men, as being all naturally servile; but in whom vertue and true worth most is eminent, them they feare in earnest, as by right thir Maisters, against them lies all thir hatred and suspicion. Consequentlie neither doe bad men hate Tyrants, but have been alwayes readiest with the falsifi'd names of Loyalty, and Obedience, to colour over thir base compliances. And although somtimes for shame, and when it comes to thir owne grievances, of purse especially, they would seeme good Patriots, and side with the better cause, yet when others for the deliverance of thir Countrie, endu'd with fortitude and Heroick vertue to feare nothing but the curse writt'n against those That doe the worke of the Lord negligently,3 would goe on to remove, not only die calamities and thraldoms of a People, but the roots and causes whence they spring, streight these men, and sure helpers at need, as if they hated only the miseries but not the mischiefs, after they have juggPd and palter'd with the world, bandied and born armes against thir King, devested him, disannointed him, nay curs'd him all over in thir Pulpits and thir Pamphlets, to the ingaging of sincere and real men, beyond what is possible or honest to retreat from, not only turne revolters from those principles, which only could at first move them, but lay the staine of disloyaltie, and worse, on those proceedings, which are the necessary consequences of thir own former actions; nor dislik'd by themselves, were they manag'd to the intire advantages of thir own Faction;

In seventeenth-century England, social theory – and practice – gave fathers and husbands very wide authority over their wives and children. People said that fatherly (or patriarchal) authority was derived from God. The father, they claimed, was head of the family according to the divine law of nature; his wife, children and servants owed him obedience by the will of God Himself. Fatherly power over the family was natural, and God was the author of nature. These ideas were held by people of widely differing political opinions. It was perfectly possible to argue in favour of an authoritarian and patriarchal family, and against an authoritarian state. Many theorists did in fact draw a sharp distinction between family and state, arguing that what was true of the one institution need not necessarily be true of the other. But some applied social theory to politics, and claimed that rulers have fatherly power over their subjects. Just as a father's power over his children does not stem from their consent, they said, so the king's power is not derived from the consent of his subjects, but from God alone. The state, they argued, is a family, and the king its father. They concluded that kings are accountable to God alone and that they can never be resisted by their subjects. The most famous of these theorists was Sir Robert Filmer. His patriarchalist political theory was set out in several works, of which the longest was Patriarcha. To understand Filmer's ideas it is necessary to know something about his life, and also about the context (or rather, contexts) of his thought.

The Cambridge University Press and the editors of the new series of Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought have kindly invited me to produce a second edition of Kant's Political Writings, of which the first edition first appeared in an earlier series almost twenty years ago. They also agreed that the volume might be enlarged by three additional texts. To decide on the most suitable texts presented me with anything but an easy choice. The three suitable pieces chosen, the reviews of Herder's Ideas on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind, Conjectures on the Beginning of Human History and What Is Orientation in Thinking?, are not ‘political’ writings in the narrow sense of the word. They do, however, supply a context for the strictly political writings published in the first edition; for all of them illustrate Kant's critical approach to reasoning and his attitude to the public use of reason without which political justice could not, in his view, be achieved. What Is Orientation in Thinking? does so particularly clearly. It also introduces the reader to the moral basis of Kant's politics, while the other two texts illustrate Kant's conception of history, another pillar of his political thought. I greatly regret that there was no space to include the other pieces relating to politics mentioned in the preface to the first edition. Perhaps one day the constraints on space will be less pressing and all writings by Kant which refer to politics, including the whole of the Theory of Right, can be printed in a later edition.

In order to keep down printing costs and make the volume affordable by students the text of the first edition could not be substantially altered. For this reason, it has unfortunately not been possible to revise and enlarge my introduction itself. I have, however, been able to add a postscript in which I take up issues raised during the discussion of Kant's political thought over the past two decades. I have also provided a more extensive bibliography and a new index.

My thanks are due to Barry Nisbet for translating the additional texts and for giving me invaluable help by commenting on and checking my manuscript.

Kant's essay was occasioned by a dispute between Moses Mendelssohn (1729-86), a Jewish philosopher of Berlin with whom Kant corresponded and whom he esteemed greatly, and Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743-1819), a writer and friend of Goethe's who had attacked Mendelssohn's interpretation of Spinoza. It was a bitter dispute because Jacobi had, in Mendelssohn's view, maligned the reputation of their late common friend, the writer and dramatist Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729—81) when he claimed that Lessing had been a follower of Spinoza and hence a pantheist who did not believe in a personal God. Mendelssohn rebutted this charge and maintained that Jacobi had misunderstood Lessing. Their argument is of historical interest only.

Kant's essay, however, provides an introduction to his critical philosophy and shows how his discussion of the theoretical use of reason, as argued in detail in the Critique of Pure Reason and in the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Can Claim the Status of a Science ﹛Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können) (1783), necessarily leads on to the practical use of reason as defined in his writings on ethics (for instance, in the Critique of Practical Reason (1788) and the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten) (1785)), which in turn provide the foundation of his political writing. Kant did not openly attack either of the two writings in question, but thought it necessary to defend his late friend Mendelssohn while at the same time pointing out some shortcomings in Mendelssohn's argument (Mendelssohn had put forward proofs for the existence of God which Kant held to be illegitimate). He proceeds to show that the belief in reason is a ‘signpost or compass'1 which enables us to orientate our thinking. The use of reason is necessary in order to limit our enquiries to what can, in principle, be discovered and to prevent us from seeking to discover what is beyond the boundaries of knowledge. But the right use of reason also makes it possible for us to act morally. We have to avoid falling victim to zealotry or superstition—that would even be politically dangerous, for it would sooner or later lead to political repression by the authorities who would not be willing to tolerate the spreading of foolish and subversive opinions.

Ideas on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind by Johann Gottfried Herder. Quern te Deus esse iussit et humana qua parte locatus es in re disce. Part One. 318 pp. Quarto. Hartknoch: Riga and Leipzig. 1784.

In this work, our ingenious and eloquent author displays those distinctive qualities of mind for which he has already gained recognition. For this reason, the work is perhaps as little subject to ordinary standards of judgement as are some of the other products of his pen. It is as if his genius did not simply bring together ideas from the broad sphere of the arts and sciences in order to supplement them with other ideas which might be communicated to others, but as if he adapted them, by a certain law of assimilation (to borrow his own expression) and in a way peculiar to himself, to his own specific mode of thinking. They thus become markedly different from those by which other minds are furthered and sustained (p.292), and are accordingly less capable of being communicated to others. Consequently, what he understands by the philosophy of the history of mankind may well be something quite different from what is usually understood by that term. His approach does not entail, for example, a logical precision in the definition of concepts or careful distinctions and consistency in the use of principles, but rather a cursory and comprehensive vision and a ready facility for discovering analogies, together with a bold imagination in putting these analogies to use. This is combined with an aptitude for arousing sympathy for his subject—which is always kept at an obscure distance—by means of feelings and sentiments; and these in turn, as the product of weighty thoughts or as highly significant pointers, lead us to expect more of them than cool assessment would ever be likely to discover. Nevertheless, since freedom of thought (which is present here in ample measure), as exercised by a fertile mind, always affords food for thought, we shall attempt as far as possible to extract the most important and characteristic of the author's ideas and to present them in his own words, adding in conclusion a few remarks concerning the whole.

This work begins with a preface and a general introduction. Its main body falls into two parts—The Metaphysical Elements of the Theory of Right and The Metaphysical Elements of the Theory of Virtue. The extracts included in the present edition are taken only from The Metaphysical Elements of the Theory of Right. They include the most important paragraphs from the introduction to this part of the work, and its second main section, which deals with The Theory of Public Right. In order to place the relevant passages in their proper context, I have provided a brief summary of the other sections preceding The Theory of Public Right.

In the preface to The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant points out that a complete metaphysics of right is impossible because completeness in an account of empirical matters is impossible. He refers only to The Metaphysical Elements of the Theory of Right because the second part, The Metaphysical Elements of the Theory of Virtue, was published at a later date. Kant also states that, in his treatise, he has put into the body of the text those arguments relating to the system of right which were arrived at by a priori reasoning and has relegated those relating to specific empirical cases to the notes. Kant then defends the apparent obscurity of his style by saying that it is impossible to aim at popularity in a work involving a system of criticism of the faculty of reason.

In his general introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant discusses the fundamental terms and presuppositions of this work, pointing out that science can make progress without explicit reference to a priori laws, but that the case of morality is different. Moral laws are laws only in so far as they have an a priori basis and are necessary. He explains why he distinguishes between legal and moral laws: the former admit of no incentive except that of duty, the latter do not.

A full account of this introduction would be too long to justify inclusion here. Kant proceeds to provide definitions for many of the terms which he uses, thus supplying a brief account of the principles underlying his moral philosophy (cf. my introduction pp. 17-21 for a brief discussion of his moral philosophy).