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4095 results in Texts in political thought

Page 188 of 205

  • 16 - On methods of dissolving obligations arising from agreements

  • from BOOK I
  • Samuel Pufendorf
  • Edited by James Tully, McGill University, Montréal
  • Translated by Michael Silverthorne, McGill University, Montréal
  • Book:
    Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen according to Natural Law
    Published online:
    14 September 2019
    Print publication:
    26 July 1991, pp 105-107

  • Summary

    1. There are various methods of dissolving obligations based on agreement the effect of which is the extinction of the duties derived from them. The most natural is die fulfilment or payment of what was agreed upon. It is normally the debtor who is obliged to pay; but the Obligation is also dissolved if Performance is made by another party in the name of the person who contracted the Obligation, if in fact it would not make any difference who satisfies the agreement. There is a condition, however, that the person who pays for another without the intention of making it a gift may claim from him what he has spent.

    Payment must be made to the creditor, or to one whom he has delegated to accept the debt in his name.

    Finally, Performance or payment must be exactly what was agreed upon, not something else instead; it must be whole, not damaged, not merely a part and not divided; and it must be at the time and place agreed. However, the creditor's humanity or the debtor's inability to pay may often force an extension of the payment date or acceptance of something else instead.

    2. Obligations are also extinguished by compensation. This is a reciprocal adjustment of credit and debt, or the liberation of the debtor for the reason that the creditor evidently owes him in his turn something of the same kind and value. For ‘so much’ is ‘the same\ particularly in the case of fungibles, and in the case of a reciprocal debt I would have to give straight back what I have just received. Therefore to avoid unnecessary transactions the most convenient way of making the payment is for both parties to keep what they have.

    It is obvious that compensation in the strict sense is properly made where it is a question of fungible objects of the same kind whether at the due time for payment or later, but not where it is a question of other things or other types of Performance, unless on both sides they are reduced to an estimate of their value, that is to money.

    3. An Obligation is also ended by release, or remission offered by the person to whom the debt was due and who had an interest in the fulfilment of the Obligation.

  • 17 - On interpretation

  • from BOOK I
  • Samuel Pufendorf
  • Edited by James Tully, McGill University, Montréal
  • Translated by Michael Silverthorne, McGill University, Montréal
  • Book:
    Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen according to Natural Law
    Published online:
    14 September 2019
    Print publication:
    26 July 1991, pp 108-112

  • Summary

    1. It is certainly true that one's Obligation in matters enjoined by authority is limited to what the authority intended, just as one's own voluntary commitments extend no further than one's intention. But a man cannot teil another man's will except from acts and signs apparent to his senses. Hence one's obligations, so far as human judgement goes, are held to consist in what a correct interpretation of the signs indicates. It is therefore a great contribution to a proper understanding of laws and agreements, and of doing one's duty on the basis of them, to draw up rules of sound interpretation, and particularly the interpretation of words, since words are the commonest signs.

    2. The rule about words in common use is: words are normally to be taken in their own proper and accepted sense, the sense which they have not so much from strict propriety or grammatical analogy or similarity of derivation as from common usage. ‘Common usage is the arbiter, the law and the norm of Speech.'

    3. Terms of art are to be explained according to the definitions of the experts in each art. But if terms of art are differently defined by different experts, it will tend to avoid disputes if we express in ordinary words what we understand by any particular term.

    4. Conjectures are needed to extract the real meaning, if words or expressions are ambiguous, or if certain parts of a piece seem to contradict each other, provided that they can be reconciled by skilful exegesis. For where there is a certain and obvious contradiction, the later passage supersedes the earlier.

    5. Conjectures about the intention and correct sense of an ambiguous or intricate passage are made on the basis of subject-matter, effect and related passages.

    The rule on subject-matter is: words are normally to be understood in the light of the subject. For the Speaker is presumed always to have in mind the subject of his discourse; and therefore the meanings of the words should always be appropriate to it.

    6. The rule on effect and consequences is: if the words taken in a simple, literal sense would have no effect or an absurd effect, one should diverge from the commonly accepted sense only so far as is necessary to avoid meaninglessness or absurdity.

  • 2 - On the rule of human actions, or on law in general

  • from BOOK I
  • Samuel Pufendorf
  • Edited by James Tully, McGill University, Montréal
  • Translated by Michael Silverthorne, McGill University, Montréal
  • Book:
    Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen according to Natural Law
    Published online:
    14 September 2019
    Print publication:
    26 July 1991, pp 27-32

  • Summary

    1. Human actions arise from the will. But the acts of will of an individual are not consistent in themselves; and the wills of different men tend in different directions. For mankind to have achieved order and decency therefore, there must have been some rule to which those wills might conform. For otherwise if each man, amid so much liberty to will and such diversity of inclinations and desires, had done whatever came into his mind without reflective reference to a fixed rule, the result would inevitably have been great confusion among men.

    2. This rule is called law [lex]. Law is a decree by which a superior obliges one who is subject to him to conform his actions to the superior's prescript [praescriptum].

    3. To understand this definition better, one must answer these questions: what is Obligation? what is its origin? who can incur Obligation, and who can impose Obligation on another? Obligation is commonly defined as a bond of right by which we are constrained by the necessity of making some Performance. That is,

    Obligation places a kind of bridle on our liberty, so that, though the will can in fact take different directions it yet finds itself imbued by it with an internal sense (so to speak), so that it is compelled to recognize that it has not acted rightly if the subsequent action does not conform to the prescribed rule. Consequently, if anything bad happens to a man for that reason, he judges that he deserves it, since he could have avoided it by following the rule, as he should have done.

    4. There are two reasons why man is fit to incur Obligation: (1) he has a will capable of moving in various directions and so able to conform to the rule; and (2) he is not free from the authority of a superior. For there is no expectation of free action where an agent's powers are tied by nature to a uniform mode of behaviour; and it is pointless to prescribe a rule to one who can neither understand nor conform to it.

  • 7 - On the functions of the sovereign power

  • from BOOK II
  • Samuel Pufendorf
  • Edited by James Tully, McGill University, Montréal
  • Translated by Michael Silverthorne, McGill University, Montréal
  • Book:
    Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen according to Natural Law
    Published online:
    14 September 2019
    Print publication:
    26 July 1991, pp 139-141

  • Summary

    1. The functions of die sovereign power [summi imperii] and the means by which its force operates in states may be clearly inferred from the nature and purpose of states.

    2. In a State all have subjected their own will to the will of those in power in matters affecting the state's security, so that they are willing to do whatever the rulers wish. For this to be possible, those in power must signify to the Citizens their will in such matters. They do this not only by instructions addressed to individuals on particular matters, but also by general rules, so that there may always be certainty as to what is to be done and what is not to be done. This is also the normal means by which it is determined what each must regard as his own and what as another's; what is to be taken as lawful in that State, what as unlawful; what as good, what as bad; what remains of each man's natural liberty, or how each must reconcile the enjoyment of his own rights with the tranquillity of the State; and what each man of his own right may require of another and in what manner. Clear definition of all these matters makes a vital contribution to the dignity and tranquillity of the State.

    3. The over-riding purpose of states is that, by mutual cooperation and assistance, men may be safe from the losses and injuries which they may and often do inflict on each other. To obtain this from those with whom we are united in one society, it is not enough that we make agreement with each other not to inflict injuries on each other, nor even that the bare will of a superior be made known to the Citizens; fear of punishment is needed, and the capacity to inflict it immediately. To achieve its purpose, the penalty must be nicely judged, so that it clearly costs more to break the law than to observe it; the severity of the penalty must outweigh the pleasure or profit won or expected from wrongdoing. For men cannot help choosing the lesser of two evils.

  • 5 - On the impulsive cause of constituting the state

  • from BOOK II
  • Samuel Pufendorf
  • Edited by James Tully, McGill University, Montréal
  • Translated by Michael Silverthorne, McGill University, Montréal
  • Book:
    Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen according to Natural Law
    Published online:
    14 September 2019
    Print publication:
    26 July 1991, pp 132-134

  • Summary

    1. There seems to be hardly any amenity or advantage that cannot be secured by the duties and conditions [status] we have so far discussed. Nevertheless we must now investigate why men have not been content with those first small associations [societas], but have constituted large associations which go by the name of states [civitas]. For this is the basis from which we must derive the justification of the duties which go with men's civil State [status civilis].

    2. It is not enough to say here that man is drawn to civil society [societas civilis] by nature herseif, so that he cannot and will not live without it. For man is obviously an animal that loves himself and his own advantage in the highest degree. It is undoubtedly therefore necessary that in freely aspiring to civil society he has his eye on some advantage coming to himself from it. Again, man was likely to be the most miserable of animals without association [societas] with his fellows; yet his natural desires and needs could have been abundantly met by the earliest societies and by duties based on humanity or agreements. We cannot therefore infer directly from man's sociality [socialitas] that his nature tends precisely to civil society.

    3. This will become clearer if we consider: (1) the human condition which results from the constitution of states; (2) the requirements for a man to be truly said to be a political animal, i.e., a good Citizen; and finally, (3) the observed features of human nature which are repugnant to the character of civil society.

    4. (1) In becoming a Citizen, a man loses his natural liberty and subjects himself to an authority whose powers include the right of life and death. At its command he must do much he would otherwise avoid; and he must not do much that he would otherwise powerfully desire to do. Again, in most of his actions he must take into account the good of society, which often seems to conflict with the good of individuals. Yet he has a congenital tendency to want to be subject to no one, to act at his own discretion, and to set his course for his own advantage in everything.

  • 3 - On natural law

  • from BOOK I
  • Samuel Pufendorf
  • Edited by James Tully, McGill University, Montréal
  • Translated by Michael Silverthorne, McGill University, Montréal
  • Book:
    Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen according to Natural Law
    Published online:
    14 September 2019
    Print publication:
    26 July 1991, pp 33-38

  • Summary

    1. What is die character of natural law? What is its necessity? And in what precepts does it consist in die actual condition of mankind? These questions are most clearly answered by a close scrutiny of die nature and character of man. Just as one makes great progress towards an accurate knowledge of civil laws by first achieving a good understanding of the condition of a State and die customs and occupations of its Citizens, so if one first takes a view of the common character and condition of mankind, the laws on which man's security rests will easily become clear.

    2. In common with all living things which have a sense of themselves, man holds nothing more dear than himself, he studies in every way to preserve himself, he strives to acquire what seems good to him and to repel what seems bad to him. This passion is usually so strong that all other passions give way before it. And if anyone attempts to attack a man's safety, he cannot fail to repel him, and to repel him so vigorously that hatred and desire for revenge usually last long after he has beaten off the attack.

    3. On the other hand man now seems to be in a worse condition than the beasts in that scarcely any other animal is attended from birth with such weakness [imbecillitas]. It would be something of a miracle, if he came through to maturity without the help of other men, since even now when so many things have been discovered to relieve men's needs, a careful training of several years is required to enable a person to get his food and clothing by his own efforts. Let us imagine a man coming to adult years without any care and fostering from other men. He would have no knowledge except what has sprang by a kind of spontaneous generation from his own intelligence. He would be in solitude, destitute of all the help and Company of others.

  • Editor's introduction

  • Samuel Pufendorf
  • Edited by James Tully, McGill University, Montréal
  • Translated by Michael Silverthorne, McGill University, Montréal
  • Book:
    Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen according to Natural Law
    Published online:
    14 September 2019
    Print publication:
    26 July 1991, pp xiv-xxxvii

  • Summary

    Overview

    As the preceding Chronology indicates, Pufendorf's writings fall into three groups. The first is his attempt to construct a comprehensive political and moral philosophy appropriate to the conditions of modem Europe and based on a set of universal principles or natural laws. He began this project at the University of Jena and worked it out from 1658 to 1677 in the three texts on natural law (EFU, DFN, DOH), the analysis of the German imperial constitution (DSI), and the three collections of clarifications and replies to his critics (DAS, SC, ES). This enterprise is surveyed in the following four sections of the Introduction.

    When Pufendorf moved from the University of Lund to Stockhohn in 1677 as political adviser to the Swedish king Charles XI, he set aside the juristic analysis of politics in terms of universal law and obligation and turned to the major competing approach to the understanding of politics in the seventeenth Century. This method consists in analysing the relations within and among contemporary European states by means of comparative and historical analyses of their interests and relative powers with a view to predictions and recommendations to State builders. From the Reason of state (1598) by Giovanni Botero (1540-1617) and the early Spanish and French raison d'état writers, this form of analysis was rapidly developed into pan- European sciences of comparative politics and international relations. The object domain of these sciences is the modern System of independent states locked into a military and commercial rivalry which emerged after the Thirty Years’ War (1618-48) and the Peace of Westphalia (1648). Pufendorf's contributions include the earlier history of Philip of Macedon (DRGP), the political history of the Catholic Church (HUP), the contemporary political histories he wrote for Charles XI (CRS, DRC) and, after 1688, for Frederick William I and Frederick III of Prussia (DRF, DRGF), and especially his monumental introduction to the history of the principal states of Europe (EZDH). The EZDH with its rigorous concepts of State interest and relative powers and its comprehensive design, was republished throughout the eighteenth Century. The editors of the French éditions added more chapters, making it a prototype of Enlightenment encyclopaedias of comparative politics.

  • 16 - On war and peace

  • from BOOK II
  • Samuel Pufendorf
  • Edited by James Tully, McGill University, Montréal
  • Translated by Michael Silverthorne, McGill University, Montréal
  • Book:
    Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen according to Natural Law
    Published online:
    14 September 2019
    Print publication:
    26 July 1991, pp 168-172

  • Summary

    1. It is most agreeable to natural law that men should live in peace with each other by doing of their own accord what their duty requires; indeed peace itself is a State peculiar to man, insofar as he is distinct from the beasts. Nevertheless, for man too war is sometimes permitted, and occasionally necessary, namely when by the ill will of another we cannot preserve our property or obtain our right without the use of force. In this Situation, however, good sense and humanity counsel us not to resort to arms when more evil than good is likely to overtake us and ours by the prosecution of our wrongs.

    2. The just causes of engaging in war come down to the preservation and protection of our lives and property against unjust attack, or the collection of what is due to us from others but has been denied, or the procurement of reparations for wrong inflicted and of assurance for the future. Wars waged for the first of these causes are said to be defensive, for the other causes, offensive.

    3. One should not have immediate recourse to arms as soon as one thinks oneself wronged, particularly so long as there remains some doubt about right or fact. One should explore the possibility of amicable settlement of the matter by various means, for example by initiating dialogue between the parties, by appealing to an arbitrator, or by submitting the question to lot. The claimant particularly is obliged to try this method, since there is in any case a predisposition to favour possession with some title.

    4. Unjust causes of war are either openly such or have some plausible pretext, however weak. Open causes come down to two main types: avarice and ambition, namely lust for wealth and lust for power. Those covered by pretexts are various: they include fear of the wealth and power of a neighbour, unjustified aggrandizement, desire for better territory, refusal of something which is simply and straightforwardly owed, stupidity on the part of a possessor, a desire to extinguish another's legitimately acquired right which the aggressor finds rather inconvenient, and others of this kind.

  • 10 - On the ways of acquiring authority, particularly monarchical

  • from BOOK II
  • Samuel Pufendorf
  • Edited by James Tully, McGill University, Montréal
  • Translated by Michael Silverthorne, McGill University, Montréal
  • Book:
    Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen according to Natural Law
    Published online:
    14 September 2019
    Print publication:
    26 July 1991, pp 148-150

  • Summary

    1. Consent of subjects is required to constitute any legitimate government, but it is not always and everywhere elicited in the same way. Sometimes men are compelled by military force to consent to a conqueror's rule; sometimes Citizens acquiesce of their own accord in the appointment of their prince.

    2. Acquisition of authority by military force, which is usually called conquest [occupatio], occurs when a man relying upon a just cause for going to war and having been successful by force of arms and fortune reduces a people to the point that they are compelled thenceforth to submit to his authority. The legitimate title of his power is partly drawn from the fact that if he had wished as victor to take advantage of the strict rights of war, he might simply have taken the lives of the vanquished; and thus, by allowing them to get off with a lesser misfortune, he also earns a reputation for clemency. But it is also drawn from the fact that his enemy in going to war with one whom he had previously wronged, and to whom he has refused reasonable satisfaction, has placed all his fortunes on the gaming tables of Mars; he has thus already given tacit consent to whatever condition the event of war may assign him.

    3. A kingdom is acquired by the free consent of a people when an election takes place by which a people (whether in process of formation or already formed) freely designates a specific man as in their opinion capable of holding power. The decision [decretum] of the people is signified to him; he accepts; the people promise obedience; power is conferred.

    4. An election in a State already formed occurring after the death of the previous king is usuaJly preceded by an Interregnum. During this time the State recedes into an imperfect form, as the Citizens are then bound together only by the first contract. But a high degree of stability is provided by the love of their common country and its name, and by the fact that for most of the Citizens their fortunes are settled there. These motives constrain good Citizens to maintain peace with each other of their own accord and to make every effort to restore perfect government as soon as possible.

  • 8 - On the common duties of humanity

  • from BOOK I
  • Samuel Pufendorf
  • Edited by James Tully, McGill University, Montréal
  • Translated by Michael Silverthorne, McGill University, Montréal
  • Book:
    Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen according to Natural Law
    Published online:
    14 September 2019
    Print publication:
    26 July 1991, pp 64-67

  • Summary

    1. The third of the duties owed by every man to every man, to be performed for the sake of common sociality, is: everyone should be useful to others, so far as he conveniently can. For nature has established a kind of kinship among men. It is not enough not to have harmed, or not to have slighted, others. We must also give, or at least share, such things as will encourage mutual goodwill.

    We are useful to others, either in an indefinite way or in a definite way; and it either costs us something, or it costs us nothing.

    2. Someone is being useful to others in an indefinite way when he develops his mind and body to be a source of actions useful to others, or if he makes discoveries by the acuteness of his intellect for the betterment of human life. Hence they are thought to sin against this duty who learn no honest skill but passing their lives in silence, regard their mind as no more than salt to preserve them from decay, mere numbers ‘born to consume the fruits of the earth'. So do they who are content with their ancestral wealth, and believe they are justified in devoting themselves to idleness, because the industry of others has already assured their livelihood. So too do they ‘who hoard the wealth they have won not setting aside a portion for their kin\ Likewise those who, like pigs, give no one pleasure except by dying, and others of that sort, useless burdens on the earth.

    3. To those who set themselves to do good to the human race, others owe duty not to be grudging nor to put obstacles in the way of their splendid endeavours. Then, even if they have no other way of repaying them, they will at least be extolling their memory and advancing their fame, which is the chief reward of toil.

    4. It is thought to be a particularly odious act of ill will and inhumanity not to make freely available to others those good things which we can offer them without loss, labour or trouble to ourselves. Such things are normally recognized as beneficial and harmless; that is, things that help the recipient without burdening the giver.

  • 13 - On the duties arising from ownership in itself

  • from BOOK I
  • Samuel Pufendorf
  • Edited by James Tully, McGill University, Montréal
  • Translated by Michael Silverthorne, McGill University, Montréal
  • Book:
    Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen according to Natural Law
    Published online:
    14 September 2019
    Print publication:
    26 July 1991, pp 90-92

  • Summary

    1. The following are the duties which have arisen from the introduction of ownership in things:

  • (i) Every man is obliged to allow everyone (except an enemy) quietly to enjoy his own property, and neither by force nor fraud to attempt to spoil, steal or misappropriate it. This is why theft, robbery and similar crimes against others’ property are forbidden.

    • 2. (2) When without crime or breach of good faith on our part another man's property comes into our hands, and we have it under our control, we are bound to do all we can to return it to the control of its legitimate owner. However, we are not bound to restore it at our own expense, and if we do spend anything on maintaining it, we may rightly recover our expense or keep the property until we are paid. The Obligation of restitution begins when we become clearly aware that the property belongs to someone else. At that time we should make it known that we have the thing in question and do nothing to hinder the owner in recovering what is his [suum], If, however, we have acquired something with good title, we are not obliged to cast doubt on the title ourselves, or make a kind of public announcement whether anyone wishes to claim it for himself. The duty of restitution takes precedence over particular contracts and is a ground for a counter-claim: for example, if a thief deposits stolen goods with me and the real owner subsequentiy turns up, they must be restored to the owner, not the thief.

    3. (3) If in good faith we have acquired something of another's and consumed it, our duty is limited to restoring to the owner the amount by which we have been enriched, so that we do not gain from another's undeserved loss.

    4. The following duties are derived from the above:

  • (i) A bona fide possessor is not obliged to make any restitution if the thing has perished, because he has neither the thing itself nor any gain from it.

  • 4 - On man's duty to God, or on natural religion

  • from BOOK I
  • Samuel Pufendorf
  • Edited by James Tully, McGill University, Montréal
  • Translated by Michael Silverthorne, McGill University, Montréal
  • Book:
    Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen according to Natural Law
    Published online:
    14 September 2019
    Print publication:
    26 July 1991, pp 39-45

  • Summary

    1. So far as man's duty to God can be traced out on the basis of natural reason, it has no more than two articles: first, to have right notions of God, and secondly, to conform our actions to His will. Hence natural religion consists of theoretical propositions and practical propositions.

    2. Of all the notions which everyone must hold about God, the first is a settled conviction that God exists, that is, that there really is a supreme and first being on whom this universe depends. This has been most plainly demonstrated by philosophers from the Subordination of causes which must find an end in some first thing, from motion, from reflection on the fabric of the universe, and by similar arguments. Claiming not to understand these arguments is no excuse for atheism. For since this conviction has been a constant possession of the whole human race, anyone who wished to overthrow it would not only have to produce a solid refutation of all the arguments which prove God's existence, but also come forward with more convincing reasons for his own position. At the same time, since the salvation of the human race has been believed hitherto to depend on this conviction, he would also have to show that atheism would be better for the human race than to maintain a sound worship of God. Since this cannot be done, we must heartily detest and severely punish the impiety of all who make any attempt whatever to shatter that conviction.

    3. The second notion is that God is the Creator of this universe. For since it is self-evident that all this world did not come into existence of itself, it must have a cause and that cause is what we call God.

    It follows from this that it is an error to prattle about nature (as people do from time to time) as the final cause of all things and all effects. For if the word ‘nature’ is meant to be taken as the causal efiicacy and power of action which is observed in things, it surely gives evidence itself of its author, God; so far is nature's power from lending support to any argument in denial of God. If, however, by ‘nature’ is meant the supreme cause of all things, it is a kind of fastidious profanity to avoid the plain, accepted term, God.

  • Author's preface

  • from ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN ACCORDING TO NATURAL LAW
  • Samuel Pufendorf
  • Edited by James Tully, McGill University, Montréal
  • Translated by Michael Silverthorne, McGill University, Montréal
  • Book:
    Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen according to Natural Law
    Published online:
    14 September 2019
    Print publication:
    26 July 1991, pp 6-14

  • Summary

    To the benevolent reader - greetings.

    It would seem superfluous, if the practice of so many learned men had not made it almost mandatory, to write a preface explaining the purpose of this work. It is immediately clear that I have done no more than expound to beginners the principal topics of natural law in a short and, I hope, lucid compendium. I would not want students to be put off at the beginning by a massive accumulation of difficult questions, as would happen if they were to set out on the wide expanses of this subject without a knowledge of what one might call the elements. I also believe it to be in the public interest to steep their minds in a moral doctrine whose usefulness in civil life is accepted as obvious. In any other case I would naturally take it to be too trivial a task to reduce an extensive work to the form of a compendium, particularly a work of my own; but I think that in this case no sensible person will blame me for spending so much labour on a task which is uniquely useful to young people, particularly as I undertook it at the behest of my superiors. One's Obligation to the young is such that no work undertaken for their benefit should be thought to be below anyone's dignity even if it gives no opportunity for brilliant or profound thought. Besides, no one with even a grain of sense will deny that such basic principles are better suited to the universal discipline of law than are the elements of any particular System of civil law.

    So much might have seemed sufficient, but certain people have advised me that it would be pertinent to make some remarks directed towards understanding the character of natural law in general and towards a careful delineation of its boundaries. I am the more happy to do this as I may in this way remove the excuse for men of misplaced subtlety to apply their feverish criticism to the discipline of natural law. It is quite distinct from their province; there is a line of demarcation between them.

  • 1 - On men's natural state

  • from BOOK II
  • Samuel Pufendorf
  • Edited by James Tully, McGill University, Montréal
  • Translated by Michael Silverthorne, McGill University, Montréal
  • Book:
    Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen according to Natural Law
    Published online:
    14 September 2019
    Print publication:
    26 July 1991, pp 115-119

  • Summary

    1. We must next inquire into the duties which fall to man to perform as a result of the different states in which we find him existing in social life. By ‘state’ [status] in general, we mean a condition in which men are understood to be set for the purpose of performing a certain class of actions. Each State also has its own distinctive laws [jura].

    2. Men's State is either natural or adventitious. Natural State may be considered, in the light of reason alone, in three ways: in relation to God the Creator; or in the relation of each individual man to himself; or in relation to other men.

    3. Considered from the first point of view, the natural State of man is the condition in which he was placed by his Creator with the intention that he be an animal excelling other animals. It follows from this State that man should recognize and worship his Creator, admire His works, and lead his life in a manner utterly different from that of the animals. Hence this State is in complete contrast with the life and condition of the animals.

    4. From the second point of view, we may consider the natural State of man, by an imaginative effort, as the condition man would have been in if he had been left to himself alone, without any support from other men, given the condition of human nature as we now perceive it. It would have been, it seems, more miserable than that of any beast, if we reflect on the great weakness of man as he comes into this world, when he would straight away die without help from others, and on the primitive life he would lead if he had no other resources than he owes to his own strength and intelligence. One may put it more strongly: the fact that we have been able to grow out of such weakness, the fact that we now enjoy innumerable good things, the fact that we have cultivated our minds and bodies for our own and others’ benefit - all this is the result of help from others. In this sense the natural State is opposed to life improved by human industry.

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