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4046 results in Texts in political thought

Page 184 of 203

  • 8 - Anonymous, To the Assembly of the Common Peasantry

  • Edited by Michael G. Baylor, Lehigh University, Pennsylvania
  • Book:
    The Radical Reformation
    Published online:
    05 June 2012
    Print publication:
    25 October 1991, pp 101-129

  • Summary

    To the Assembly of the Common Peasantry which has come together in revolt and insurrection in the high German nation and many other places. Concerning whether their rebellion takes place justly or unjustly, and what they owe or do not owe the authorities etc., based on holy divine Scripture. Issued and discussed with good intention by your brothers in upper Germany, etc.

    Now is the hour and time of the wheel of fortune. God knows who will remain on top.

    “What increases the Swiss? The greed of the lords.”

    Grace be with you and the eternal peace of God, from the father and our lord, Jesus Christ, who gave himself for our sins to save us from this present evil age according to the will of God, our lord. May he be praised for ever and ever. Amen.

    Dear brothers in Christ, you know that the Lord says, “Render unto Caesar diat which is Caesar's, ” etc. Cling to this saying in Matthew chapter 23 [rather, Mt. 22:21], just as Christ himself also gave the tax money to the emperor, Matthew 17 [:24–27]. Look now, my dear brothers, the lord of heaven and earth, the true God, subjected himself to worldly authority, and voluntarily made himself liable to taxation, to give us an example to imitate. “The servant should never be above his lord.” Because of this commandment, we cannot excuse ourselves from die terrible punishment, as St. Paul said to die Romans in chapter 13[:2–6], “He who resists the authorities opposes die order of God … and he will incur judgment … For die authorities do not bear die sword in vain.

  • c - The Memmingen Federal Constitution

  • Edited by Michael G. Baylor, Lehigh University, Pennsylvania
  • Book:
    The Radical Reformation
    Published online:
    05 June 2012
    Print publication:
    25 October 1991, pp 239-242

  • Summary

    This Christian union and association has been founded in order to praise and honor eternal, almighty God, and, by appealing to the holy gospel and the divine word, also to contribute to justice and divine law. It has not been founded in contempt of anyone or to deprive him of his rights, be he a spiritual or a secular lord. And it has been founded especially to increase brotherly love.

    [1] First, the honorable territorial community of this Christian association insists that the spiritual and temporal authorities are responsible for acting according to divine law, and for not violating this law in any way, but obediently maintaining it.

    [2] Again, it is the honorable territorial community's will and conviction that the common peace should be maintained and that no one should violate the rights of another. But if it should occur that someone causes another to take up arms and rebel, others should not in any way assemble and form factions. And the nearest person, regardless of his social standing, should have authority to make peace among them and to request that from now on one bid the other to make peace and restrain themselves, etc. And if this peace that has been requested is not maintained, the one responsible for violating it should be punished accordingly.

  • Part One - Abstract Right

  • Georg Wilhelm Fredrich Hegel
  • Edited by Allen W. Wood
  • Translated by H. B. Nisbet
  • Book:
    Hegel: Elements of the Philosophy of Right
    Published online:
    11 May 2019
    Print publication:
    25 October 1991, pp 65-72

  • Summary

    The will which is free in and for itself, as it is in its abstract concept, is in the determinate condition of immediacy. Accordingly, in contrast with reality, it is its own negative actuality, whose reference to itself is purely abstract – the inherently individual [in sich einzelner] will of a subject. In accordance with the moment of particularity of the will, it has in addition a content consisting of determinate ends, and as exclusive individuality [Einzelheit], it simultaneously encounters this content as an external world immediately confronting it.

    Addition (H). When I say that the will which is free in and for itself, as it is in its abstract concept, is in the determinate condition of immediacy, this should be understood as follows. The completed Idea of the will is that condition in which the concept has fully realized itself and in which its existence [Dasein] is nothing but the concept's own development. Initially, however, the concept is abstract – that is, although all its determinations are contained within it, they are no more than contained in it: they have being only in themselves and have not yet developed into a totality in their own right. If I say that I am free, ‘I’ is still this being-within-itself [Insichsein] without any opposition. In morality, on the other hand, there is already an opposition; for in this sphere, I am present as an individual will, whereas the good is the universal, even though it is within me.

  • Section 1 - The Family

  • from Part Three - Ethical Life
  • Georg Wilhelm Fredrich Hegel
  • Edited by Allen W. Wood
  • Translated by H. B. Nisbet
  • Book:
    Hegel: Elements of the Philosophy of Right
    Published online:
    11 May 2019
    Print publication:
    25 October 1991, pp 199-219

  • Summary

    The family, as the immediate substantiality of spirit, has as its determination the spirit's feeling [Empfindung] of its own unity, which is love. Thus, the disposition [appropriate to the family] is to have self-consciousness of one's individuality within this unity as essentiality which has being in and for itself, so that one is present in it not as an independent person [eine Person für sich] but as a member.

    Addition (H,G). Love means in general the consciousness of my unity with another, so that I am not isolated on my own [für mich], but gain my self-consciousness only through the renunciation of my independent existence [meines Fürsichseins] and through knowing myself as the unity of myself with another and of the other with me. But love is a feeling [Empfindung], that is, ethical life in its natural form. In the state, it is no longer present. There, one is conscious of unity as law; there, the content must be rational, and I must know it. The first moment in love is that I do not wish to be an independent person in my own right [für mich] and that, if I were, I would feel deficient and incomplete. The second moment is that I find myself in another person, that I gain recognition in this person [daß ich in ihr gelte], who in turn gains recognition in me. Love is therefore the most immense contradiction; the understanding cannot resolve it, because there is nothing more intractable than this punctiliousness of the self-consciousness which is negated and which I ought nevertheless to possess as affirmative.

  • a - The Eleven Mühlhausen Articles

  • Edited by Michael G. Baylor, Lehigh University, Pennsylvania
  • Book:
    The Radical Reformation
    Published online:
    05 June 2012
    Print publication:
    25 October 1991, pp 227-230

  • Summary

    Mid-September 1524

    In the name of Jesus. In order to praise God, the community of Mühlhausen, [including the congregations] of St. Nicholas, St. George, St. Margaret, the linen weavers of St. Jacob, and many other craftsmen of the city, have taken action themselves and derived their decisions from the word of God. Where this resolution contradicts God's word, however, it should be changed and improved.

    [1] An entirely new council should be established. The reasons for this are so that it will act according to the fear of God, so that old hatreds and despotism are ended, and in order to insure that those who do evil, and those who allow and approve it, receive the same punishment- Romans 1[:32], Luke 19[:20–27] on the willful servant – so that there is no confusion in the community about those who are outside it and those who are inside it. From this [confusion], harm to the community can result, for it is difficult to accept as judges those who are themselves guilty.

    [2] Judgments should be made according to the [standard of] justice in the Bible or holy word of God. This is so that the poor man is treated like the rich, as in Zechariah 17 [rather, Zech. 7:10], Leviticus 19.[:15] and 26[:3], John 7[:24], Matthew 5[:19], and Luke 18[:2–8].

  • Section 1 - Purpose and Responsibility

  • from Part Two - Morality
  • Georg Wilhelm Fredrich Hegel
  • Edited by Allen W. Wood
  • Translated by H. B. Nisbet
  • Book:
    Hegel: Elements of the Philosophy of Right
    Published online:
    11 May 2019
    Print publication:
    25 October 1991, pp 143-146

  • Summary

    The finitude of the subjective will in the immediacy of action consists immediately in the fact that the action of the will presupposes an external object [Gegenstand] with various attendant circumstances. The deed posits an alteration to this given existence [Dasein], and the will is entirely responsible for it in so far as the abstract predicate ‘mine’ attaches to the existence so altered.

    An event, or a situation which has arisen, is a concrete external actuality which accordingly has an indeterminable number of attendant circumstances. Every individual moment which is shown to have been a condition, ground, or cause of some such circumstance and has thereby contributed its share to it may be regarded as being wholly, or at least partly, responsible for it. In the case of a complex event (such as the French Revolution), the formal understanding can therefore choose which of a countless number of circumstances it wishes to make responsible for the event.

    Addition (H). I can be made responsible for whatever was contained in my purpose, and this is the chief consideration as far as crime is concerned. But responsibility involves only the wholly external judgement as to whether I have done something or not; and the fact that I am responsible for something does not mean that the thing [Sache] can be imputed to me.

  • f - Michael Gaismair's Territorial Constitution for Tyrol

  • Edited by Michael G. Baylor, Lehigh University, Pennsylvania
  • Book:
    The Radical Reformation
    Published online:
    05 June 2012
    Print publication:
    25 October 1991, pp 254-260

  • Summary

    First, you will swear to bring together body and goods, not to separate from one another, but to work and live with one another, though at all times acting after consultation with, and being obedient to your superior authorities. And in all matters you swear not to pursue selfish interests, but radier to pursue first of all the honor of God and then the common good, so that almighty God will be gracious and assist us (as he has often promised all who are obedient to his commandments). We should rely completely on God, for he is entirely truthful and deceives no one.

    Second, you swear to expel all godless people, who persecute the eternal word of God, burden me poor commoner, and impede the common good.

    Third, you swear to establish, and then live completely according to, laws which are wholly Christian, and which in all matters are founded only on die holy word of God.

    Fourth, all privileges should be eliminated, for they are contrary to the word of God and falsify justice, in that no one should have an advantage over others.

    Fifth, all the encircling walls around cities, castles, and fortifications in the territory should be torn down. And thereafter there should no longer be cities but only villages, so that there are no differences among people in the sense that one is higher than another or able to do wrong to another.

  • Introduction

  • Georg Wilhelm Fredrich Hegel
  • Edited by Allen W. Wood
  • Translated by H. B. Nisbet
  • Book:
    Hegel: Elements of the Philosophy of Right
    Published online:
    11 May 2019
    Print publication:
    25 October 1991, pp 25-64

  • Summary

    The subject-matter of the philosophical science of right is the Idea of right – the concept of right and its actualization.

    Philosophy has to do with Ideas and therefore not with what are commonly described as mere concepts. On the contrary, it shows that the latter are one-sided and lacking in truth, and that it is the concept alone (not what is so often called by that name, but which is merely an abstract determination of the understanding) which has actuality, and in such a way that it gives actuality to itself. Everything other than this actuality which is posited by the concept itself is transitory existence [Dasein], external contingency, opinion, appearance without essence, untruth, deception, etc. The shape which the concept assumes in its actualization, and which is essential for cognition of the concept itself, is different from its form of being purely as concept, and is the other essential moment of the Idea.

    Addition (H). The concept and its existence [Existenz] are two aspects [of the same thing], separate and united, like soul and body. The body is the same life as the soul, and yet the two can be said to lie outside one another. A soul without a body would not be a living thing, and vice versa. Thus the existence [Dasein] of the concept is its body, just as the latter obeys the soul which produced it.

  • 5 - Andreas Karlstadt, Whether One Should Proceed Slowly

  • Edited by Michael G. Baylor, Lehigh University, Pennsylvania
  • Book:
    The Radical Reformation
    Published online:
    05 June 2012
    Print publication:
    25 October 1991, pp 49-73

  • Summary

    Whether one should proceed slowly, and avoid offending the weak in matters that concern God's will

    Andreas Karlstadt 1524

    I, Andreas Karlstadt, wish my especially beloved brother in Christ, Bartel Bach, city secretary of Joachimstal, the art of knowing God through our lord Jesus Christ.

    Dear brother, in reply to my description of some changes that have taken place here [i.e. Orlamünde], you wrote me that, as far as you are concerned, you would like to proceed slowly. And through this writing you gave me to understand, without saying it, that one should not proceed quickly or suddenly but slowly in order to avoid offending the weak. You are simply doing what the whole world does now, which is to cry, “The weak, die weak! The sick, the sick! Not so fast! Slowly, slowly!” For this reason I am not angry with you. Nevertheless in this matter you are saying, “Slowly! The sick!,” with a great many people. Only you are saying it more politely and with greater sophistication. Accordingly I must tell you that neither in this case nor in other matters concerning God should you regard how the great masses speak or judge. Rather, you should look straight at God's word [i.e. Scripture]. For it has long been clear that die princes, for whom the scribes write, and die great mass of the people have erred formerly and are capable of error.

  • 12 - Balthasar Hubmaier, On the Sword

  • Edited by Michael G. Baylor, Lehigh University, Pennsylvania
  • Book:
    The Radical Reformation
    Published online:
    05 June 2012
    Print publication:
    25 October 1991, pp 181-209

  • Summary

    On the sword. A Christian explanation of the Scriptures which are cited very earnestly by some brothers against government – that is, that Christians should not occupy positions of power or wield the sword.

    Dr. Balthasar Hubmaier of Friedberg. 1527

    To the noble and Christian lord, Sir Arkleb of Bozkowic and Tzernehor at Trebitz, Chancellor of the Margravate of Moravia, my merciful lord. I wish you grace and peace in God.

    Noble, merciful lord, your grace probably knows well that all those who accept, love and preach the holy gospel in these last and dangerous times must not only be deprived of goods and tortured in body (Matthew 5[:11f.]); even their honor, which people regard as the most precious jewel on earth, must also be wounded and violated by the godless. Precisely these things are the weapons of hellish Satan, through which he unceasingly tries to suppress, root out and hinder evangelical teaching and truth. But he will not succeed. His head must be crushed because of that. Especially now, the servants of the devil must call all Christian preachers rebels, demagogues, and heretics on the grounds that they repudiate authority and teach disobedience. But this is not a cause for wonder. The same thing also happened to Christ (Luke 23,[:2], Jeremiah 38[:4], 1 Kings 18), although he publicly taught that one should “render to Caesar that which is Caesar's” (Matthew 22[:21]), just as he paid the tax for himself and for Peter (Matthew 17[:24]).

  • 7 - On recognizing men's natural equality

  • from BOOK I
  • Samuel Pufendorf
  • Edited by James Tully, McGill University, Montréal
  • Translated by Michael Silverthorne, McGill University, Montréal
  • Book:
    Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen according to Natural Law
    Published online:
    14 September 2019
    Print publication:
    26 July 1991, pp 61-63

  • Summary

    1. Man is an animal which is not only intensely interested in its own preservation but also possesses a native and delicate sense of its own value. To detract from that causes no less alarm than härm to body or goods. In the very name of man a certain dignity is feit to lie, so that the ultimate and most effective rebuttal of insolence and insults from others is ‘Look, I am not a dog, but a man as well as yourself.’ Human nature therefore belongs equally to all and no one would or could gladly associate with anyone who does not value him as a man as well as himself and a partner in the same nature. Hence, the second of the duties of every man to every man is held to be: that each man value and treat the other as naturally his equal, or as equally a man.

    2. This equality among men consists not only in the fact that the physical strength of adult men is nearly equal to the extent that even a relatively weak man can kill a stronger man by taking him by surprise or by use of cunning and skill in arms, but also in that one must practise the precepts of natural law towards another and one expects the same in return, even though he may be better provided by nature with various gifts of mind and body; his superiority does not give him licence to inflict injuries on others. On the other hand neither the scanty provision of nature nor the niggardliness of fortune in themselves condemn one to have less access to the enjoyment of the common law than others. But what one may require or expect from others, the same, other things being equal, they should have from him; and any law [jus] that a man has made for others, it is particularly fitting that he follow himself. For the Obligation to cultivate social life with others lies on all men equally; and it is not allowed to one more than any other to violate natural laws where another person is concerned.

  • 13 - On the right of life and death

  • from BOOK II
  • Samuel Pufendorf
  • Edited by James Tully, McGill University, Montréal
  • Translated by Michael Silverthorne, McGill University, Montréal
  • Book:
    Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen according to Natural Law
    Published online:
    14 September 2019
    Print publication:
    26 July 1991, pp 158-162

  • Summary

    1. The sovereign civil authority has a twofold right over the Citizens’ lives: a direct right in the suppression of crime, and an indirect right in the defence of the State.

    2. Force on the part of an external enemy has often to be met by force; or we may need to use violence in claiming our right. In either case the sovereign authority may compel the Citizens to perform this kind of service, where it is not a question of deliberately sending them to death but only of exposing them to the danger of death. The sovereign authority has the duty to give them training and preparation to conduct themselves with vigour and skill in such dangers. No Citizen through fear of this danger may render himself unfit for military service. Once inducted, he will in no circumstances desert his post through fear but will fight rather to the last breath, unless he believes it to be the will of his Commander that he should save his life rather than hold his position, or that the position is less important to the State than the lives of the Citizens involved.

    3. Executing its right directly the sovereign power may take away Citizens’ lives for atrocious crimes and as a punishment (though punishment also falls upon a man's other possessions). At this point a few general explanatory remarks on the nature of punishment are necessary.

    4. A punishment is an evil one suffers, inflicted in return for an evil one has done; in other words, some painful evil imposed by authority as a means of coercion in view of a past offence.

  • For although punishment often takes the form of action, yet these actions are designed to be laborious and painful to die doer and so to inflict on him a kind of suffering.

  • Punishment is to be inflicted on men against their will. Otherwise it would not achieve its goal, which is to deter men from wrongdoing by its harshness. Nothing a man gladly accepts has this effect.

  • Evils inflicted in war or in self-defence in fighting are not punishments, because they are not by authority.

  • Nor is what one suffers when wronged a punishment, because it is not inflicted in view of a past offence.

  • 12 - On civil laws in particular

  • from BOOK II
  • Samuel Pufendorf
  • Edited by James Tully, McGill University, Montréal
  • Translated by Michael Silverthorne, McGill University, Montréal
  • Book:
    Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen according to Natural Law
    Published online:
    14 September 2019
    Print publication:
    26 July 1991, pp 155-157

  • Summary

    1. It remains to discern the specific functions of sovereign power and their noteworthy features. Most important here are the civil laws, which are the decrees of the sovereign civil authority [summi imperantis civilis], which enjoin upon the Citizens what they should do or not do in civil life.

    2. There are two particular senses in which the word ‘civil’ is applied to law: with respect to authority and with respect to origin. In the former sense, all laws are called civil which are the bases for the giving of justice in the civil courts, whatever their origin. In the latter sense, those laws are called civil which proceed from the will of the sovereign and deal with matters which are undefined by natural and divine law but deeply affect the private interests of individual Citizens.

    3. Though nothing should be regulated by the authority of the civil laws unless it has a bearing on the public interest, it is of the highest importance for the dignity and peace of civil life that Citizens should properly observe the natural law; and therefore it is a duty of sovereigns to lend it the force and effectiveness of civil law. For there is so much wickedness in the greater part of mankind that neither the obvious benefits of natural law nor fear of divine power is adequate to check it. The sovereign, therefore, may ensure preservation of the moral integrity of civil life by lending to natural laws the force of the civil laws.

    4. The force of the civil laws consists in the addition of a penal sanction to precepts to do or not to do, or in defining the penalty in the courts that awaits one who has done what he ought not or not done what he ought. Violations of natural law which have no penal sanctions attached are beyond the reach of human justice, though the divine tribunal still Stands ready to punish.

    5. Since civil life is too fragile to allow each man to exact what he believes to be his due by violent self-help, civil laws come to the aid of natural law in providing actions for the obligations of natural law.

  • 17 - On treaties

  • from BOOK II
  • Samuel Pufendorf
  • Edited by James Tully, McGill University, Montréal
  • Translated by Michael Silverthorne, McGill University, Montréal
  • Book:
    Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen according to Natural Law
    Published online:
    14 September 2019
    Print publication:
    26 July 1991, pp 173-174

  • Summary

    1. Treaties which are agreements made between independent sovereign rulers have a function both in wartime and in peacetime. They may be divided, on the basis of their content, into those which define the terms of reciprocal Performance of some duty already enjoined by natural law, and those which go beyond the duties of natural law, or at least put into specific terms what seems indefinite in natural law.

    2. Treaties of the first type are those which form an agreement merely about practising simple humanity or refraining from doing harm. To this category belong also treaties which simply give formal expression to friendly relations without any requirements or which confirm the right of diplomacy and commerce insofar as it is laid down by natural law.

    3. Treaties of the second type are either equal or unequal. An equal treaty is the same for both parties. It involves equality in the content of the promises made on each side, either simply or with due regard to differences of strength, and equality in the manner of the promises, so that neither party may be in an inferior position to the other or subject to him.

    4. Treaties are unequal when the Performances promised by the parties are unequal or when one party is in an inferior position to the other. Unequal promises are made either by the more powerful party to the treaty or by the less powerful. The first is the case if the greater power promises help to the other party without a stipulation in return, or if it makes promises on a larger scale than the other. The second is the case if the weaker party is obliged to give more than it gets back.

    5. Some of the obligations of a weaker party to a treaty involve some loss of sovereignty, for example if it is agreed that the weaker ally may not exercise some part of his sovereign power without the consent of the more powerful.

  • 15 - On the power of sovereign authority over property within the state

  • from BOOK II
  • Samuel Pufendorf
  • Edited by James Tully, McGill University, Montréal
  • Translated by Michael Silverthorne, McGill University, Montréal
  • Book:
    Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen according to Natural Law
    Published online:
    14 September 2019
    Print publication:
    26 July 1991, pp 166-167

  • Summary

    1. When property has come to Citizens from sovereigns, the right by which they hold it depends on the discretion of the sovereign. By contrast, property of which Citizens have obtained full ownership by their own industry or in any other way is subject to three principal rights which, by the nature of states and as necessary to their purpose, belong to sovereigns.

    2. The first right is that sovereigns may make laws obliging the Citizens to accommodate their use of their property to the interest of the State; or defining the extent and nature of possessions, and the method of transferring property to others, and other matters of this kind.

    3. The second right is that the sovereign may collect a fraction of the Citizens’ property as tribute or tax. For since their lives and fortunes are to be defended by the State, it is appropriate that they contribute to meeting the expenses necessary to this end. It is totally unscrupulous to attempt to enjoy the protection and convenience the State affords while refusing to contribute either Service or property to its preservation. And yet prudent rulers would be wise to take into consideration the resentment felt by ordinary people, and to make an effort to give as little offence as possible in collecting taxes, observing fairness above all and imposing taxes that are moderate and flexible rather than massive and uniform.

    4. The third right is eminent domain, which means that in a national emergency sovereigns may seize and apply to public use the property of any subject which the crisis particularly requires, even if the property seized far exceeds the amount which had been fixed as his normal obligatory contribution to his country's expenses. For this reason, however, as much of the excess as possible should be refunded to him from the public treasury or by a levy on the rest of the Citizens.

    5. Besides these three rights, there is in many states a distinct public property, which usually goes under the name of the country's or the kingdom's patrimony. This is again divided in various places into the patrimony of the prince and that of the country, or into the privy purse and the treasury.

Page 184 of 203