Propriety is the ground of power, and power of government; and there are many degrees of propriety, so there are of power. Yet, as there is but one universal and absolute propriety, so there is but one supreme and universal power, which the most glorious, blessed and eternal God can only challenge as his due. For he contrived all things by his wisdom, decreed them by his will, and produced them by his power, and to this day ‘worketh all things according to the counsel of his will’ (Eph. 1.11). In this respect he is ‘worthy to receive glory, and honour, and power, because he hath created all things, and for his pleasure they are and were created’ (Rev. 4.11). By creation he began, by conservation he continued to be actually the proprietary of all things: for he made them of nothing, and gave them being and existence, so that they wholly always depend upon him, and are absolutely his. Therefore he hath power to dispose of them as he pleaseth, and to order them to those ends he created them. This ordination of them, which began immediately upon creation, continueth and shall continue to the end, and is either general of all things, or special of some special, more noble and more excellent creatures: such are men and angels, endued with understanding and free will, and capable of laws, rewards and punishments, both temporal and eternal. The ordination of these is more properly and strictly called government, which is a part of divine providence.

The subject of a commonwealth being a community, which is twofold, civil and ecclesiastical. It remains, and order requireth, that I say something of a commonwealth. You heard before that the subject adequate of politics, was a state or commonwealth, and that the parts of this act are two: […] the constitution [and] the administration. The constitution, as you may remember, is the first part of politics, whereby an order of superiority and subjection is settled in a community; wherein three things were principally to be examined: […] what a community in general, […] what a community civil, [and] what a community ecclesiastical is: and all this is done. Therefore to proceed, observe, that a community is like a matter without form in respect of something that it must receive, yet a matter and a subject disposed and in proximo, potentia to receive a form to perfect it: and this form is that we call a commonwealth, a polity, a state, wherein we may observe four things, i. That it is an order. 2. An order of superiority and subjection: this is the general nature of it. 3. An order of superiority and subjection in a community. 4. Such an order tending to the peace and happiness of a community. [First] it's [taxis] an order, or as some understand the philosopher (an ordination) which is a disposing of things in their proper place.

What the nature of power in general, and majesty civil is, hath been declared. The next thing to be considered, is the subject who from it is denominated a sovereign, and we must enquire first, how this power is acquired; [and then] how disposed in a certain subject. As for the acquisition it's certain, man as man, or as a member of a community, cannot have it from himself, but it must be communicated to him from God, who being the universal sovereign is the fountain and original of it, and derives some part of it unto man, and a greater measure unto mortal sovereigns than other men. Yet he doth not this immediately, but mediately for the most part. It's extrinsical, and comes [from elsewhere], not only unto men but angels. A paternal power, which is more natural, is acquired by generation, though sometimes by adoption. This generation from divine benediction is the seminary of all societies, which as societies and communities may be so disposed and complete, as virtually to contain in them a power of a commonwealth, and by a general consent constitute an actual sovereign. The sovereign before he was made such, was not invested with majesty, but it was extrinsical unto him. And here that distinction between the power itself, the designation of the persons governing, and the form of government is worthy taking notice of.

The former rules may easily be applied to a particular church, for it's a spiritual commonwealth, and must as such, have governors, and them invested with a supreme power, yet such and of the same nature as the church is: that is, spiritual and ecclesiastical. This power, as all other in civil states, is derivative from Heaven, and of a very narrow scantling. And, that I may be more perspicuous and direct the reader by some line or thread of method, I will say something of the power: […] as it is spiritual; […] as supreme; [and] as divisible into several branches.

In the first place it's spiritual, and that in many respects, as the authors of Jus divinum regiminis ecclesiastici have sufficiently demonstrated. For the person's rule, actions and end are to be considered, not under a civil, but a spiritual notion. As styled by divines, and that according to the spirit's language, and the phrase of Holy Writ, to be potestas clavium. And the acts thereof are opening, shutting; or which are the same, binding, loosing. These are metaphorical terms, taken out of the Old into the New Testament. For our Saviour did love to use the spirit's words. The first and chief place where we read these words in a political sense with reference to government, is that of the evangelical prophet. ‘And the key of the house of David will I lay upon his shoulder, so he shall open and none shall shut, and he shall shut and none shall open’ (Isa. 22.22).

Of subjection in general, and subjection to a civil power, I have spoken; and because there is an ecclesiastical power and subjection due unto it, therefore order requires, that I conclude the first part of politics with the explication of the nature of spiritual subjection and subjects. This spiritual relation and duty arising from it presupposeth subjection […] absolute to God as creator and preserver; […] to him as redeemer, [and] to Christ as head and universal administrator of the church. [It is owed] to him [also] as having instituted an ecclesiastical discipline, and promising to every particular church, using the Keys aright in their judicial proceedings, to be with them so, as to make their judgement effectual; and that what they bind on earth shall be bound in Heaven, and what they loose on earth shall be loosed in Heaven. So that this subjection is due to the power of Christ in every particular visible church. For, when a multitude of Christians associate, and according to the rules of Christ erect an independent judicatory, it's the duty of everyone in that association to submit unto it, if he will be a member of the same, and enjoy the benefit of that external government: and by the very institution of Christ, though there be no solemn confederation, they are bound so to do. This subjection is different from that, which is due from the people to their proper pastors.

My first thanks are to the editors of Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought for inviting me to prepare this edition. This was done largely in Cambridge during 1990. Specifically my thanks to Richard Tuck for advice given despite the toils of bringing his edition of Leviathan to its conclusion; to Raymond Geuss; and especially to Quentin Skinner for help and much typical kindness. During my stay in Cambridge, solicited and unsolicited assistance saved hours of time.

Much of this help was given during lunch at Clare Hall and during random, if sometimes subversive, breaks in the University Library Tea Room. My thanks to the denizens of the latter and to the fellows and Anthony Low, President of the former – a college of surpassing friendliness.

In particular I am grateful to Hugh Williamson for transliterating Hebrew, Pascalis Kitromilides for advice on some of the Greek, John Kilcullen for helping with Lawson's non-citation of medieval texts. Additional thanks are due to John Morrill and Mark Goldie, and to Ian Maclean, who made me feel a little less foolish for being unable to trace a reference to Grotius; to Bruce Kaye (for more Hebrew); to Paddy Schreuder for all the hard work on Dr Carr's convoluted and misprinted poem; to Averil Condren for further help, sub-editing and the index; and to Libi Nugent for keyboard skills, intelligent attention to detail and her wry patience.

Reader,

In the time of our divisions, and the execution of God's judgements upon the three nations, I set my self to enquire into the causes of our sad and woeful condition, and to think of some remedies to prevent our ruin. Whilst I was busy in this search, I easily understood, that the subject of our differences was, not only the state but the church. This gave occasion to peruse such authors as write of government, and to study the political part of the holy Scriptures, wherein I found many things concerning the constitution, the adminstration, the corruption, the conversion and subversion of civil states and kingdoms, with much of church-discipline. There I observed certain rules of government in general, and some special, and proper to civil, or else to ecclesiastical polities. All these, accourding to my poor ability I reduced to method, and applied them to our own church and state severally. I further took notice of our principal differences both civil and ecclesiastical, and did freely deliver mine own judgement concerning the particular parties, and their opinions, yet so that I endeavoured to be of no party, as a party. And though in some things I differ from them, yet it was not out of singularity, or a humour of opposition, but out of an unfeigned desire of truth; which in many things I found so evident, that whatsoever should not acknowledge it, must needs be willful, and blinded with partiality or prejudice.

Yet if the pope cannot have and hold this power, yet the princes, sovereigns and civil states, especially Christian, will assume it, and they have the strongest, and the surest way of all others, if they once get possession for to keep it, and that's the Sword. King Henry VIII did not only refuse to submit unto the Roman supremacy, but took it to himself and became within his own dominions, over all persons, in all causes, as well ecclesiastical as civil supreme head and governor. So the priest by the prince was divested of a considerable part both of his power and also his revenue. But whether he could be the proper subject of his spiritual power, or make good his title to it, was much doubted, and that by many. As king, he was but caput regni non ecclesia: and as such, he might have some civil, but no ecclesiastical power at all. Yet though it was called ecclesiastical, yet it was not such [grammatically but rhetorically], not properly but by a trope, a metonymy of the adjunct for the subject circa quod. For the power of a state temporal is only civil, if properly and formally considered; yet the civil sovereign had always something to do in matters of religion, concerning which it may make laws, pass judgement, and execute the same. Yet, the laws, the judgements, the execution were civil, not strictly ecclesiastical.

George Lawson's Politica sacra et civilis is a systematic treatise which traverses much of the conceptual terrain of seventeenth-century political discourse, and provides a critical accompaniment to many of the loudest catch-cries that echoed over it. Lawson's stated purpose is to facilitate a lasting civil and religious settlement. He conceives the church and the state as two broadly parallel and mutually informing structures of political, sovereign power and argues that an understanding of either requires an understanding of both. As Lawson provides an accessible synopsis of the volume in ‘The arguments of the several chapters’ (pp. 8–13), only the briefest outline of the work's theoretical structure is needed here.

Lawson begins by sketching in what he takes to be the nature of all forms of government under a supreme being, the very existence of whom is taken to limit all modes of human allegiance. From the outset, then, Lawson prefigures the central importance to him of authority and its limitations. In chapters two and three he introduces his notions of community and citizenship in civil and ecclesiological society respectively. Communities are divinely sanctioned, pre-political associations; they are comprised of citizens who, in a Ciceronian sense, are naturally free and equal fellows. A community of citizens, however, is not a mere aggregation of isolated individuals; it is a complex, incorporated society under natural law, whose full members represent the disfranchised. The community may lack nothing but the security afforded by the laws of a formal political hierarchy.

Hitherto of a community in general, and of a community civil, that which we call ecclesiastical follows. This in opposition to that which we call temporal and civil is spiritual, and is such in respect of religion; for as there are matters of this life, which concern us as mortals with relation one unto another, so there are matters of God, spiritual, divine, and of a far higher allay [alloy]; there is no nation or people, though rude and barbarous, but profess some religion, by the observation whereof they acknowledge their dependence upon a superior power and providence far above that of mortal man; yet many, contrary to the very light of nature, either worshipped that which was not truly God, or with the true God a false deity; or the true God alone, without any certain rule and direction from Heaven, after the invention of men, or the suggestion of the devil. Of these there have been many communities, which I will no further mention; for these were never called churches, or the people of the living God; for the true church is a community of such as worship the true and living God, according to certain rules of truth revealed from Heaven, and now contained in the holy Scriptures. And these direct us to worship God, not only as creator, but as redeemer by Christ.

The most difficult point in politics is that of the Jura Majestatis, and the right disposal of them in a fit subject. And concerning the nature of civil power, the manner of acquiring and disposing of it, I have already spoken; and also of ecclesiastical power and the acquisition thereof. Now it remains, [that] I say something of the manner of disposing the Power of the Keys in the right subjects. This is a matter of great dispute in these our times. Therefore, when I expected to find all clear, because a Jus divinum, grounded on the Scriptures, was pretended on all hands, I found it otherwise. As, when one of our worthies had disemboked the Magellanick Straits, and was entered into that sea, they call Pacificum, he found the word Pacifick really contradicted by violent storms. So it falls out here; I hoped to have landed in a region of perpetual peace, but I was found in a Terra del Fuego, a land of fire and smoke; like unto Palma, one of the seven Canary Islands, where, in September 1646, or thereabouts, a fire first raged fearfully in the bowels of the earth, and at length brake out, and ran in five several fiery, sulphurious streams into the main. In like manner, this Power of the Keys runs in five several channels, but very turbulently and impetuously. For the pope, the prince, the prelate, the presbyter, the plebeian rank, do every one of them severally challenge it; and nothing under a Jus divinum will serve the turn.

That the Power of the Keys is not primarily in the pope, nor in the civil sovereign; nor in the prelate; nor in the presbyter; nor in both jointly as in a pure aristocracy, hath been formerly declared. It remains, we examine the people's title as distinct from that of the bishop and the presbyter, as they are [pre-eminent citizens of the church], parts of a Christian community. The people and number of believers thus considered, are rather plebs, than populus. To understand this it's to be considered that in a Christian community there are neither optimates properly, nor plebs. There may be and are, as you heard before, such as are incomplete and virtual members, as women, children and other weak Christians, who are not fit to have any vote in the public affairs of the church, much more unfit to exercise and manage the Power of the Keys. There are also complete members, and amongst these some more eminent than the rest. To place the power in the inferior rank, or to make that party predominant, is to make the government democratic. And this opinion is not worth the confutation, because it's not only disagreeing with plain Scripture, but with the rules of right reason. In this regard they are generally rejected. Some charge Morellius and the Brownists with this error, but I have not seen their books.

Church government presupposeth the rules of government in general, therefore he that will know the latter, must understand the former: for he that is ignorant of government, must needs be ignorant of church government; and this is the very case of many in our days, and this is one cause of many differences amongst us at this time. To give some light in this particular, I will say something of government in general. The government of God, whereby he more immediately orders man to his final and immortal estate, I have according to my poor ability declared in my Theo-politica, or divine politics, therefore I will confine my discourse to the government of man by man, or rather the government of God by men set over men. For God communicates some measure of his power to mortal men; and such as are entrusted with it, become his vicegerents and bear his name according to that of the psalmist, ‘I have said ye are Gods’ (Ps. 82.6). My design in this treatise is not to deliver an exact system of politics, yet I will make use of those rules I find in political writers of better rank, but with a reservation of a liberty to myself to vary from them, as I shall see just cause. To pass by the distinction of government monastical and economical; I will pitch upon that which is political. The subject whereof is a community and society larger than that of a family, and may be sufficient to receive the form of a commonwealth.