The disparagers of culture make its motive curiosity; sometimes, indeed, they make its motive mere exclusiveness and vanity. The culture which is supposed to plume itself on a smattering of Greek and Latin is a culture which is begotten by nothing so intellectual as curiosity; it is valued either out of sheer vanity and ignorance or else as an engine of social and class distinction, separating its holder, like a badge or title, from other people who have not got it. No serious man would call this culture, or attach any value to it, as culture, at all. To find the real ground for the very different estimate which serious people will set upon culture, we must find some motive for culture in the terms of which may lie a real ambiguity; and such a motive the word curiosity gives us.

I have before now pointed out that we English do not, like the foreigners, use this word in a good sense as well as in a bad sense. With us the word is always used in a somewhat disapproving sense. A liberal and intelligent eagerness about the things of the mind may be meant by a foreigner when he speaks of curiosity, but with us the word always conveys a certain notion of frivolous and unedifying activity.

Many objections have been made to a proposition which, in some remarks of mine on translating Homer, I ventured to put forth; a proposition about criticism, and its importance at the present day. I said: “Of the literature of France and Germany, as of the intellect of Europe in general, the main effort, for now many years, has been a critical effort; the endeavour, in all branches of knowledge, theology, philosophy, history, art, science, to see the object as in itself it really is.” I added, that owing to the operation in English literature of certain causes, “almost the last thing for which one would come to English literature is just that very thing which now Europe most desires,–criticism;” and that the power and value of English literature was thereby impaired. More than one rejoinder declared that the importance I here assigned to criticism was excessive, and asserted the inherent superiority of the creative effort of the human spirit over its critical effort. And the other day, having been led by Mr. Shairp's excellent notice of Wordsworth to turn again to his biography, I found, in the words of this great man, whom I, for one, must always listen to with the profoundest respect, a sentence passed on the critic's business, which seems to justify every possible disparagement of it.

And so we bring to an end what we had to say in praise of culture, and in evidence of its special utility for the circumstances in which we find ourselves, and the confusion which environs us. Through culture seems to lie our way, not only to perfection, but even to safety. Resolutely refusing to lend a hand to the imperfect operations of our Liberal friends, disregarding their impatience, taunts, and reproaches, firmly bent on trying to find in the intelligible laws of things a firmer and sounder basis for future practice than any which we have at present, and believing this search and discovery to be, for our generation and circumstances, of yet more vital and pressing importance than practice itself, we nevertheless may do more, perhaps, we poor disparaged followers of culture, to make the actual present, and the frame of society in which we live, solid and seaworthy, than all which our bustling politicians can do.

For we have seen how much of our disorders and perplexities is due to the disbelief, among the classes and combinations of men, Barbarian or Philistine, which have hitherto governed our society, in right reason, in a paramount best self; to the inevitable decay and break-up of the organisations by which, asserting and expressing in these organisations their ordinary self only, they have so long ruled us; and to their irresolution, when the society, which their conscience tells them they have made and still manage not with right reason but with their ordinary self, is rudely shaken, in offering resistance to its subverters.

After the acquisition both of civil and ecclesiastical power, follows the disposition of both, which will take up a great part of this first book. And first of the manner of disposing civil power. This disposition seems to be the same with acquisition, because it cannot be acquired but by a certain subject. Neither can it be said properly to be actually acquired, but at the very same time, and by this very act it's placed in that subject. Yet because power civil may be so communicated and acquired, […] it may be disposed of several ways: and from these several ways of disposing, arise several distinctions and differences of commonwealths. I thought good to make disposition a distinct thing from acquisition, and so handle it for the better understanding of this particular. I will [first] premise some general observations; [then] briefly declare the several ways of disposing majesty, and the several forms of governments. [I shall then] enquire into the constitution of the commonwealth of England; [and finally] deliver some things concerning our condition in these late times.

The observations are these: The [first] which belongs unto that of acquisition, is that no power can be fully acquired, till it be accepted of as well as communicated. For, no man can be bound to be a sovereign against his will.

[Second], that majesty is then disposed, when it is placed and ordered in a certain constant subject, which thereby may be enabled and bound to protect and govern.

After the examination of the several titles of such as challenge the supreme Power of the Keys, and the declaration of mine own judgement, the third thing proposed was the extent of a particular church. That there is a supreme Power of the Keys; that there is a primary subject of this power, that this power is in the church; that it's disposed in this church in a certain order and manner in one or more, purely or mixedly, few, if any, will deny. But that it is disposed in the whole church after the manner of a free state, so that every particular Christian community, is the primary subject of it, is not so easily granted, though I conceive it, as many other worthy and excellent men do, to be truth delivered unto us by Christ and his Apostles. Yet let this be agreed upon, yet there is another difference concerning the bound and extent of this church. This is not the proper place, I confess, to handle this particular, for extent presupposeth a church constituted and in being, and it's an accident of the same. Therefore pars subdita, which is the second integral part, as of a state, so of a church, should first have been spoken of. In this point I find a threefold difference: for some extend this church, which is the primary subject of the Power of the Keys, very far, and make it to be the universal church of all nations.

In the former part I have, according to my poor ability, declared, […] what the act of government is. […] That the subject of it being a commonwealth both civil and ecclesiastical, it hath two parts: […] the constitution [and] the administration of the same. [I have argued] that the matter of a commonwealth is the community, and the form, an order of superiority and subjection; […] that there are two integral parts of a commonwealth, […] pars imperans, the sovereign, [and] pars subdita, the subject. [I have declared] what the power of a sovereign is, how it is acquired, how disposed, and that both in a civil state and church. Now according to order comes in pars subdita, to be considered both in a civil and an ecclesiastical notion. What a subject in a civil state is cannot be known in particular, except we know the nature of subjection in general. The word in Greek, which signifies to be subject is [hypotassesthai] to be subordinate. For subjection presupposeth order, not physical and local, but moral of superior and inferior. That which makes a superior is power, and power over another, which is not invested with it; in which respect he is inferior in relation to him that hath power over him. And so soon as God hath made one superior to another instantly, the party inferior is bound to subjection, which is a thing due unto this superior.

In divers parts of Europe, where episcopacy hath been abolished, presbytery did succeed: and that (as it is asserted by many) upon such grounds, as will prove it as pure an aristocracy, as that of episcopacy was. The parties indeed have been changed, and instead of bishops we have presbyters: and though the former imparity be taken away, yet the form of government, which is aristocratic, remains. I have formerly heard many complain, that the bishops had cast off the presbyters: and now some do not like it well, that the presbyters have cast off the bishops, yet both do seem to agree to exclude the people, as distinct from the clergy, engrossing the whole power to themselves. These pure aristocratic forms have for the most part proved dangerous, especially in the church, because they do so much incline unto oligarchy, and usually degenerate into the same.

But to observe some order; I will [first] examine what these presbyters are; [second] whether these being known, can according to Christ's institution be the primary subject of this power; [and] add something concerning our English presbytery. […] These presbyters are of two sorts, […] some are preaching, [and] some are not preaching, but only ruling presbyters or elders. The former are trusted with the dispensation of the word and sacraments, the latter are not. Both have the same name and are elders, yet differ much in respect of their ecclesiastical being.

Propriety is the ground of power, and power of government; and there are many degrees of propriety, so there are of power. Yet, as there is but one universal and absolute propriety, so there is but one supreme and universal power, which the most glorious, blessed and eternal God can only challenge as his due. For he contrived all things by his wisdom, decreed them by his will, and produced them by his power, and to this day ‘worketh all things according to the counsel of his will’ (Eph. 1.11). In this respect he is ‘worthy to receive glory, and honour, and power, because he hath created all things, and for his pleasure they are and were created’ (Rev. 4.11). By creation he began, by conservation he continued to be actually the proprietary of all things: for he made them of nothing, and gave them being and existence, so that they wholly always depend upon him, and are absolutely his. Therefore he hath power to dispose of them as he pleaseth, and to order them to those ends he created them. This ordination of them, which began immediately upon creation, continueth and shall continue to the end, and is either general of all things, or special of some special, more noble and more excellent creatures: such are men and angels, endued with understanding and free will, and capable of laws, rewards and punishments, both temporal and eternal. The ordination of these is more properly and strictly called government, which is a part of divine providence.

The subject of a commonwealth being a community, which is twofold, civil and ecclesiastical. It remains, and order requireth, that I say something of a commonwealth. You heard before that the subject adequate of politics, was a state or commonwealth, and that the parts of this act are two: […] the constitution [and] the administration. The constitution, as you may remember, is the first part of politics, whereby an order of superiority and subjection is settled in a community; wherein three things were principally to be examined: […] what a community in general, […] what a community civil, [and] what a community ecclesiastical is: and all this is done. Therefore to proceed, observe, that a community is like a matter without form in respect of something that it must receive, yet a matter and a subject disposed and in proximo, potentia to receive a form to perfect it: and this form is that we call a commonwealth, a polity, a state, wherein we may observe four things, i. That it is an order. 2. An order of superiority and subjection: this is the general nature of it. 3. An order of superiority and subjection in a community. 4. Such an order tending to the peace and happiness of a community. [First] it's [taxis] an order, or as some understand the philosopher (an ordination) which is a disposing of things in their proper place.

What the nature of power in general, and majesty civil is, hath been declared. The next thing to be considered, is the subject who from it is denominated a sovereign, and we must enquire first, how this power is acquired; [and then] how disposed in a certain subject. As for the acquisition it's certain, man as man, or as a member of a community, cannot have it from himself, but it must be communicated to him from God, who being the universal sovereign is the fountain and original of it, and derives some part of it unto man, and a greater measure unto mortal sovereigns than other men. Yet he doth not this immediately, but mediately for the most part. It's extrinsical, and comes [from elsewhere], not only unto men but angels. A paternal power, which is more natural, is acquired by generation, though sometimes by adoption. This generation from divine benediction is the seminary of all societies, which as societies and communities may be so disposed and complete, as virtually to contain in them a power of a commonwealth, and by a general consent constitute an actual sovereign. The sovereign before he was made such, was not invested with majesty, but it was extrinsical unto him. And here that distinction between the power itself, the designation of the persons governing, and the form of government is worthy taking notice of.

The former rules may easily be applied to a particular church, for it's a spiritual commonwealth, and must as such, have governors, and them invested with a supreme power, yet such and of the same nature as the church is: that is, spiritual and ecclesiastical. This power, as all other in civil states, is derivative from Heaven, and of a very narrow scantling. And, that I may be more perspicuous and direct the reader by some line or thread of method, I will say something of the power: […] as it is spiritual; […] as supreme; [and] as divisible into several branches.

In the first place it's spiritual, and that in many respects, as the authors of Jus divinum regiminis ecclesiastici have sufficiently demonstrated. For the person's rule, actions and end are to be considered, not under a civil, but a spiritual notion. As styled by divines, and that according to the spirit's language, and the phrase of Holy Writ, to be potestas clavium. And the acts thereof are opening, shutting; or which are the same, binding, loosing. These are metaphorical terms, taken out of the Old into the New Testament. For our Saviour did love to use the spirit's words. The first and chief place where we read these words in a political sense with reference to government, is that of the evangelical prophet. ‘And the key of the house of David will I lay upon his shoulder, so he shall open and none shall shut, and he shall shut and none shall open’ (Isa. 22.22).

Of subjection in general, and subjection to a civil power, I have spoken; and because there is an ecclesiastical power and subjection due unto it, therefore order requires, that I conclude the first part of politics with the explication of the nature of spiritual subjection and subjects. This spiritual relation and duty arising from it presupposeth subjection […] absolute to God as creator and preserver; […] to him as redeemer, [and] to Christ as head and universal administrator of the church. [It is owed] to him [also] as having instituted an ecclesiastical discipline, and promising to every particular church, using the Keys aright in their judicial proceedings, to be with them so, as to make their judgement effectual; and that what they bind on earth shall be bound in Heaven, and what they loose on earth shall be loosed in Heaven. So that this subjection is due to the power of Christ in every particular visible church. For, when a multitude of Christians associate, and according to the rules of Christ erect an independent judicatory, it's the duty of everyone in that association to submit unto it, if he will be a member of the same, and enjoy the benefit of that external government: and by the very institution of Christ, though there be no solemn confederation, they are bound so to do. This subjection is different from that, which is due from the people to their proper pastors.

My first thanks are to the editors of Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought for inviting me to prepare this edition. This was done largely in Cambridge during 1990. Specifically my thanks to Richard Tuck for advice given despite the toils of bringing his edition of Leviathan to its conclusion; to Raymond Geuss; and especially to Quentin Skinner for help and much typical kindness. During my stay in Cambridge, solicited and unsolicited assistance saved hours of time.

Much of this help was given during lunch at Clare Hall and during random, if sometimes subversive, breaks in the University Library Tea Room. My thanks to the denizens of the latter and to the fellows and Anthony Low, President of the former – a college of surpassing friendliness.

In particular I am grateful to Hugh Williamson for transliterating Hebrew, Pascalis Kitromilides for advice on some of the Greek, John Kilcullen for helping with Lawson's non-citation of medieval texts. Additional thanks are due to John Morrill and Mark Goldie, and to Ian Maclean, who made me feel a little less foolish for being unable to trace a reference to Grotius; to Bruce Kaye (for more Hebrew); to Paddy Schreuder for all the hard work on Dr Carr's convoluted and misprinted poem; to Averil Condren for further help, sub-editing and the index; and to Libi Nugent for keyboard skills, intelligent attention to detail and her wry patience.