This chapter elaborates on the theoretical framework that serves as a guide for the analysis and briefly discusses the trajectory of Indonesia’s democracy over the last twenty years. It starts by presenting Indonesia as a “hard place” for democracy and by noting that substantive representation is an issue that is largely overlooked in research on democracy in this country, as existing studies have focused on describing the pathologies of citizen-politician linkages. It then develops the argument, first by reviewing research on the role of ordinary people and public opinion in democracy, then by discussing the relationship between representation and satisfaction with democracy, and finally by exploring the role of polarization and populism in evaluations of democratic performance. The chapter then returns to the Indonesian case to engage more closely with the literature on political Islam, participation and democratic erosion to discuss in greater detail the contributions of this analysis.

This chapter introduces the Indonesian case and the empirical puzzle, outlines the argument, discusses the book’s contributions to the study of Indonesian politics and representation in young democracies, presents data sources and methods, and introduces the structure of the book.

This chapter analyzes the relationship between political Islam and democratic attitudes, especially the link between ideology, public understandings of democracy and evaluations of democratic performance. It shows that the structure of conceptions of democracy in Indonesia is more complex than assumed. While most Indonesians think of democracy in liberal-egalitarian terms, others appear to subscribe to a participatory view of democracy. It further demonstrates that such conceptions of democracy are related both with political Islam and with evaluations of democratic performance. First, Islamists are systematically less likely to endorse a liberal understanding of democracy, and those who hold a liberal-egalitarian view of democracy are more likely to be dissatisfied with democracy. Second, respondents who understand participation as being an essential aspect of democracy are more, not less, satisfied with democracy in Indonesia. This chapter therefore shows that political Islam informs how ordinary people understand democracy and evaluate its performance in Indonesia.

This chapter concludes the book. It summarizes the findings and discusses their implications for democracy in Indonesia and elsewhere. In addition, it addresses some open questions that intersect with the argument, most importantly with regard to democratic representation, participation and accountability.

This chapter jointly studies elite and mass survey data to probe whether political Islam functions as the main avenue for representation in Indonesia. It analyzes patterns of substantive representation both on economic and social-religious issues, first by looking at how the distribution of preferences among the political elite corresponds with the mass public, and then more specifically at the role played by political parties as avenues of democratic representation. The findings show that, while a substantial degree of ideological congruence between politicians and voters can be observed on political Islam, the opposite is true for economic policy. By leveraging a survey experiment, I further probe the extent to which public preferences about political Islam are pliable to partisan considerations, as I find that partisan individuals may change their position on political-religious issues in response to elite cues. This chapter thus documents that democracy in Indonesia has provided a substantial degree of ideological representation, and that political parties, while deficient in other respects, have performed an essential (if imperfect) democratic function in this domain.

This chapter examines aggregate electoral returns to measure the influence of the political Islam cleavage on voting behavior in contemporary Indonesia. Existing research suggests that electoral behavior is driven primarily by patronage, candidate traits and evaluations of government performance rather than ideological and partisan considerations. Yet existing studies do not analyze the full spectrum of available electoral returns (both over time and across district) to reach such conclusions. As a result, our understanding of how deep-seated partisan affiliations rooted in political Islam have shaped voting behavior since democratization is incomplete. A quantitative analysis of district-level electoral returns from five legislative elections indicates that electoral geography today presents important continuities with the first democratic election of 1955, when politics was highly ideological and polarized. Furthermore, a longitudinal analysis indicates that the importance of historical partisan affiliations as a driver of voting behavior, after plummeting in the 2009 elections, has increased significantly in recent years.

This chapter moves to public opinion with an analysis of various surveys specifically designed to investigate perceptions of political Islam among ordinary citizens. First, it leverages the Indonesia National Survey Program dataset to show that ordinary people, like politicians, are divided in their views of political Islam, and it investigates various sociodemographic factors that are associated with this cleavage. Drawing from the same data, it further shows that political Islam is associated with participation and partisanship. It then analyzes a more focused survey conducted with an online sample to first explore the relationship between political Islam and national identity and, second, between Islam and populism, a key feature of contemporary Indonesian politics. The data analyzed in this chapter portrays a comprehensive figure of political Islam as perceived by the mass public, and to show that this cleavage is associated with a specific conception of national identity. To a certain extent, political Islam is also associated with policy preferences in important policy domains such as fiscal policy and decentralization, and with populist understandings of politics.

This chapter leverages micro-level data to ascertain if, and to what extent, political Islam indeed functions as an ideological cleavage that structures political competition in Indonesia. More specifically, it analyzes a survey of about 500 Indonesian legislators. While scholars of Indonesian politics acknowledge that ideological competition in this country is grounded in the political Islam cleavage, the degree to which politicians and political parties are differentiated on the issue of state-Islam relations is an open question. This study is the first attempt to systematically measure party positions on political Islam with a survey of political elites, and it shows that, while party positions are barely distinguishable on fiscal and economic policy, Indonesian parties are indeed clearly differentiated in their views of the role of Islam in public affairs. This evidence corroborates the foundations of the book’s argument, as it shows that party ideological differentiation on political Islam is sufficient to allow for meaningful representation.

Abstract: As a geopolitical unit, Taiwan encompasses the island of Taiwan and the Penghu (Pescadores) Islands, as well as the Mazu (Matsu) and Jinmen (Kinmen) islands off the coast of mainland China. Its official name is the Republic of China. From an international legal standpoint, it is not at all clear whether Taiwan, as it has just been described, is a sovereign state, part of a state, or a completely distinct entity. An array of opinions on this topic has emerged among scholars of international law. The following article presents some of the critical issues surrounding the legal status of Taiwan.

Keywords: legal status, international recognition

Introduction: The Taiwanese Problem during and after World War II

Taiwan came under Japanese rule through the Treaty of Shimonoseki of April 17, 1895 under the island's erstwhile name – Formosa. Under the terms of the Treaty, Imperial China ceded sovereignty over the island to Japan perpetually, along with the Pescadores Islands and all of their fortifications, their arsenal, and publicly owned property (Article II).

As part of the Cairo Declaration of November 26, 1943, the heads of state of the Republic of China, the United States, and Great Britain announced their intention to return all territories that had formerly belonged to the Republic of China and that Japan had taken by force. Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores Islands were named explicitly in the Declaration. The subsequent Potsdam Declaration defined the circumstances of unconditional surrender of the Japanese forces to the Allies; henceforth, the sovereignty of Japan would be circumscribed to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and minor islands determined at a later date. Japan accepted these conditions of surrender without question on September 2, 1945.

In accordance with the Supreme Allied Commander's order, the Japanese forces that remained in mainland China and Taiwan surrendered to the Chinese army following the Potsdam Declaration. In October of 1945, Taiwan was already under restored Chinese rule and promptly became a province of China. On January 12, 1946, a decree was passed that reinstated Chinese citizenship for all inhabitants of Taiwan.

Abstract: This chapter aims to address the question of the extent to which Taiwan's transformation and practice of democracy is exceptional. It is argued that in terms of the sources, process and outcomes of its political transformation and democratic development to date, Taiwan is indeed unique. In terms of sources, there are three major traditions supporting the claim that Taiwan's democracy is uniquely constructed. In addition, Taiwan's diplomatic isolation propelled it in various ways to pursue deeper democratization so as to maintain or strengthen its support and legitimacy. For the process dimension, in a Taiwanese-versus-mainlander bi-communal context, until the early 1990s, there was a transformation from a control model toward consociationalism. There is also a growing tendency to move further toward Lijphart's Majoritarian model of democracy. Coupled with the disconnection of the external dimensions of state-building from the internal ones, the overall process is exceptional. Insofar as the outcome or ‘end condition’ of democratic development is concerned, Taiwan has had certain achievements. Among them, the realization of an international review of its national human rights report as well as extending protection for LGBT rights are pioneering steps that testify further to Taiwan's exceptionalism. Nevertheless, there are also challenges ahead. These challenges include strengthening rule of law on the institutional side, ‘blackgold politics’ (political corruption), polarization of party politics, media and over-politicization in some policy areas, an increasing disaffection toward democracy, vested interests and monopolization of power resources in several sectors, incomplete protection of rights, the China factor, the Trump factor, and the reconcilability of Confucianism and Western individualism. These problems, if unaddressed, might constrain Taiwanese democracy from developing further to its full extent. Specifically, the status quo or exceptional ‘sovereignty deficit’ condition in which Taiwan is embroiled means that the exercise of self-determination by the Taiwanese would be virtually prohibited to such an extent that there is a ‘glass ceiling’ capping Taiwan's practice of democracy.

Keywords: exceptionalism in Taiwanese democracy, control, consociationalism, Majoritarianism, sovereignty deficit

Abstract: This chapter introduces readers to the book. It first elucidates a belief shared by all of its authors concerning Taiwan's exceptionalism in two areas – external and internal affairs. Second, it looks at the literature on the unique situation of Taiwan in the landscape of international affairs and its consequences for the island, with particular attention to the state of research on this topic in Poland. Finally, it presents the structure and content of this volume.

Keywords: Taiwan, China, international recognition, international status, sovereignty, South China Sea, UNCLOS, United States, cross-Strait relations, soft power, diplomacy, democratization, Sunflower Movement, civil society, indigenous tourism, sustainable tourism, ecotourism, environmental awareness

Introduction

Take a look at the political map of the world and you will see that almost every piece of land belongs to a state. This division – in contrast, for example to the split created by a valley between two mountains – is man-made, imaginary and arbitrary, and therefore can be easily questioned. Indeed, in addition to the multiple disputed borders that permeate the world map, some countries are not recognized or partially recognized. Other states decide whether a certain political unit can be recognized as sovereign. Again, even though their decision concerns imaginary divisions created by borders, accepting or rejecting them has far-reaching consequences in real life. The unrecognized country remains excluded from a club of sovereign states, which makes cooperation with its members very difficult or even impossible. It has no choice but to invent novel ways to conduct external relations. Moreover, this specific international situation has a major impact on its politics, people's lifestyles, culture, etc.

This book is about such an exceptional entity in the international community of states – Taiwan. Taiwan is a small island that covers an area of 35,883 km2 and lies nearly 180 km off the southeastern coast of mainland China across the Taiwan Strait. Its surface is approximately 395 km long from north to south and 145 km across at its widest point. Its landscapes are captivating. No wonder the Portuguese sailor navigating towards Japan in 1542 called this land Ilha Formosa – “beautiful island.”