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14233 results in Political economy

Page 156 of 712

  • 7 - Private Groups in Comparative Perspective

  • Shelby Grossman, Stanford University, California
  • Book:
    The Politics of Order in Informal Markets
    Published online:
    09 July 2021
    Print publication:
    24 June 2021, pp 110-124

  • Summary

    Chapter 7 first summarizes the book and assesses the conditions under which government threats will motivate private good governance. The second half of the chapter considers the policy implications of the book’s findings. It proposes that private governance – and, in turn, economic development – is best supported not by an absentee state or by massive state intervention in trade. Rather, a middle ground is ideal. It argues that regardless of one’s assumptions about how economic growth in private groups shapes the broader economy, since private groups control a massive portion of most economies, growth within these groups is important for its own sake.

  • 3 - Conducting a Representative Survey of Informal Traders

  • Shelby Grossman, Stanford University, California
  • Book:
    The Politics of Order in Informal Markets
    Published online:
    09 July 2021
    Print publication:
    24 June 2021, pp 34-48

  • Summary

    Chapter 3 describes how high quality and representative data was collected from traders, with an emphasis on sampling and survey strategies that could apply broadly to surveys of informal populations.It describes a trader census of tens of thousands of shops, how traders were sampled from this census, and strategies to reduce the likelihood that – for example – an enumerator avoids a shop where a trader is busy and picks the shop without customers. Next the chapter introduces strategies to increase trust with skeptical respondents, and strategies to enforce sampling and survey protocols. Last, the chapter discusses the brute-force approach to defining market association membership, and discusses implications for future researchers who aim to identify associational membership in a population.

  • 1 - Introduction

  • Shelby Grossman, Stanford University, California
  • Book:
    The Politics of Order in Informal Markets
    Published online:
    09 July 2021
    Print publication:
    24 June 2021, pp 1-16

  • Summary

    In many parts of the world property rights are not publicly guaranteed. Private market associations can fill this gap by providing an institutional structure to enforce agreements, but with this power comes the ability to extort from group members. Chapter 1 introduces the book’s motivating puzzle: Despite shared need for private good governance, not all private group leaders provide pro-trade policies. Under what circumstances do private associations provide a stable environment for economic activity? The chapter introduces the book’s main argument, that threats from the government can motivate group leaders to provide trade-promoting policies, but that within-group competition matters as well. The chapter then overviews the book’s key theoretical contributions to the political economy of development and private governance literatures. Next, it introduces theoretical expectations for additional variables, besides government threats and competition, that could shape private good governance. It then provides an overview of Lagos, Nigeria, the context in which the research takes place. Last, it overviews the book’s methods, and provides a road map for the rest of the book.

Kings as Judges
  • Power, Justice, and the Origins of Parliaments
  • Deborah Boucoyannis
  • Published online:
    18 June 2021
    Print publication:
    15 July 2021
  • How did representative institutions become the central organs of governance in Western Europe? What enabled this distinctive form of political organization and collective action that has proved so durable and influential? The answer has typically been sought either in the realm of ideas, in the Western tradition of individual rights, or in material change, especially the complex interaction of war, taxes, and economic growth. Common to these strands is the belief that representation resulted from weak ruling powers needing to concede rights to powerful social groups. Boucoyannis argues instead that representative institutions were a product of state strength, specifically the capacity to deliver justice across social groups. Enduring and inclusive representative parliaments formed when rulers could exercise power over the most powerful actors in the land and compel them to serve and, especially, to tax them. The language of rights deemed distinctive to the West emerged in response to more effectively imposed collective obligations, especially on those with most power.

Page 156 of 712