The first task in explaining parliamentary emergence is accounting for the regularity of the institution. The chapter advances a theory of functional fusion and institutional layering to explain why England developed a robust parliament, while France, which began with a very similar institution, did not. It begins by discussing some key necessary conditions, that of state power and related concepts, and by specifying the dependent variable, polity-wide representative institutions. The chapter then examines alternative explanations to show how they don't satisfactorily answer the three main questions regarding origins (regularity, the collective action problem, and territorial anchoring). The last part addresses the problem of regularity. It first presents data showing that taxation was too irregular to generate a robust institution and then presents the incentives that led especially more powerful groups, namely the nobility, to attend the institution regularly. Parliament dispensed legislation and justice and was the main forum for the submission of petitions, the universal medium of grievance that was at the core of parliamentary procedures.

Chapter 5 conducts a comparative case study analysis across ten presidential administrations in six countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Jamaica, and Venezuela) using national-level government policies as the unit of analysis. By varying exposure to Chinese state-to-state ?nancing over time, it compares periods of large-scale Chinese bilateral ?nancing to periods of extensive multilateral ?nancing (i.e. where countries have IMF and World Bank programs). Chapter 5 finds that governments that directly contract Chinese financing bilaterally are more likely to use these credit lines to cover budgetary shortfalls in exchange for future oil delivery or nontendered concessions to Chinese ?rms and machinery suppliers. Notably, it also finds that extensive Chinese state-to-state financing frameworks that replace public procurement laws, such as those used in Ecuador and Venezuela, are more likely to yield expansive fiscal expansions than project-level financing that is legally exempt fromexisting public procurement frameworks.

A superior bargaining capacity, especially of urban and commercial groups, is considered to be the foundation of representative institutions. However, in large polities like France and Castile, the pre-eminence of urban groups in representative institutions was causally related to the ultimate decline of those institutions and the devolution of the two regimes into "absolutism." The chapter first shows how the French Estates-General lapsed due to the greater weakness of the French crown; "divide et impera" is the preferred strategy of weak kings. "Absolutism" is the outcome, not the goal. French kings could not secure representatives armed with full powers, as local assemblies retained the right of tax approval. It is not that the demands of representation were weaker in France; urban groups often articulated even more radical claims. Absent the nobility, however, they failed to retain bargaining powers. Similar conditions operated in Castile. However, I show that greater early strength of the Castilian crown allowed some institutional layering and functional fusion to occur, which explains why the Castilian Cortes was more long-lasting and continuous than its French counterpart, a puzzle not hitherto explained.

Chapter 6 conducts a comparative case study analysis across ?ve presidential administrations in two countries (Argentina and Brazil) using national-level government policies as the unit of analysis. By varying exposure to market-oriented ?nancing over time, it examines how Chinese state-backed ?nancing compares with private-market ?nancing when it is channeled to corporate enterprises through public tender.A robust private sector and strong constitutional commitment to public procurement tend to increase the resiliency and efficacy of public procurement laws . Under these conditions,public procurements laws compel Chinese policy banks to operate through government concessions rather than direct state-to-state lending, leaving national governments with little additional fiscal space. They instead pursue policy conditionality (i.e. fiscal discipline) to improve their sovereign credit standing and ultimately to lower their project financing costs.

The question whether conditionality is sufficient for representation is answered in this chapter in the negative through the Ottoman case . The striking and unnoted similarities between the Ottoman land regime and that of England are examined here in detail. They show that a central feature of the Ottoman regime--that all land "belonged" to the sultan--has not received the appropriate comparative treatment. The chapter highlights the similarities between the understanding of private property and conditional state control of land in the Hanafi and Ottoman legal systems and that of England. It contrasts the western patrimonial concept of a fief to that of the Ottoman bureaucratic timar, to show that they are different types of rights. It analyzes the similarities in peasant rights over land. It also shows the strikingly similar responses to state control of land in the two systems, uses and vakifs, as well as the state responses to their expansion. The comparison shows that the two regimes do not differ so much in the type of property rights they secured--and certainly not in their absence in the Ottoman case--but in the capacity of the state to enforce them and to create centralized institutions that regulated them.

What are the Chinese government’s motivations behind promoting overseas ?nancing, trade, and investment? To what extent are these motivations geopolitical, geoeconomic, domestically driven, or purely commercial? Compared to private creditors, how does the "visible hand" of the Chinese government affect China’s policy bank lending terms? What are the strengths and weaknesses of state-led capital, and how persistent might this creditor approach be over the long run? Understanding China’s goals as an international creditor helps us evaluate the sustainability of these investment ?ows over time, and ultimately the potential costs and bene?ts for Latin American debtors. Given that ?ve of the top ten international borrowers from China are in Latin America we can simultaneously evaluate China’s global banking strategy and examine questions about its policy banks’ lending behavior outside of the Asian region. For example, are their operations more commercially oriented outside of East Asia, or equally geopolitical beyond regional borders? To what extent is a state-led approach to global capital formation, focusing on market rather than profit maxmization, sustainable outside of China?

Every city lives in the present between its past and future. Melaka stands today in between an image of its past as the ‘Venice of the East’ and projections of a future Dubai in the Straits of Malacca. By retracing the workings of local heritage affairs, the aim of this chapter is twofold. On the one hand, I will trace chronologically the normative evolution of historic conservation and heritage management in Melaka and Malaysia. On the other hand, I will introduce the major actors who will appear from time to time throughout this book. Rather than choosing simplistic divisions between the state, society, and the private sector, I present a more permeable combination of social actors through three metaphors: mouse-deer, white elephants, and watchdogs. I feel these metaphors offer a finer view of the way government institutions, civil society, and real estate developers interact, offering three peculiar visions of Melaka's cityscape: one that privileges a glorified Malaycentric past, another which envisions a futuristic spectacle, and yet another, which lobbies for a conscious preservation of urban heirlooms.

As shown in the previous chapter, Melaka's origin myth concerns the brave mouse-deer that outwitted Parameswara's hunting dogs. The mousedeer is retained as a symbol on the logos of local authorities, but also of the glorious past they want to revive. Replicas of the legendary mouse-deer stand in a roundabout between the Stadthuys and the river.

On a hot day in December 2012 I was sitting on the walkway of the Melaka River with Mr. Christopher and Mr. Nicholas. Of all the people I have met, these two Melakans were among those who were the most fond of heritage and history. On the other side of the river, the leaning church of St. Francis Xavier was towering above Padang Nyiru where, some months earlier, excavations had led to the discovery of the ruins of Bastion Victoria, part of the old fort. A couple of metres away, the logo of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) stood beside a big sign on an old wall: ‘Welcome to Melaka World Heritage City’. Early that year the construction of a multistorey car park on that piece of land was announced, but the Malaysian Department of National Heritage was able to persuade Melaka's authorities to stop the construction project to preserve the ruins. For months there were no clear plans, except for a couple of informative banners showing the logo of the Department of National Heritage. Rainwater was filling in parts of the excavation site.

Mr. Christopher and Mr. Nicholas were discussing the future of the bastion: Was the government going to rebuild it like Bastion Middleburg? For how long would the ruins be left in that state of neglect? Where was UNESCO? Was the car park going to be built there anyway?

Vernacular architecture, particularly in the form of shophouses and townhouses, played a crucial role in the justification of criterion iv for inclusion on the World Heritage List. While the International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) noted that similar buildings are present in other Asian countries, the justification was considered pertinent because Melaka and George Town displayed a number of different architectural types from distinct periods. Furthermore, ICOMOS pointed out that ‘they are also preserved in great numbers, forming large coherent areas, and still keep their functions, which make them an outstanding example of an architectural ensemble’.

Shophouses and townhouses – mostly two-storey – form the silhouette of Melaka's World Heritage site. A familiar part of the urban fabric all over Southeast Asia (especially in port cities), there are hundreds of such buildings in Melaka (from the pre-war period as well as the post-war one). Approximately 600 historical buildings located in the site are mentioned in the nomination dossier (see Malaysia 2008: 32), but many more are located outside it. At the beginning of the 1990s, as specified in an inventory, there were a total of 2177 buildings recognized as ‘historical’ (built before 1948) in the state of Melaka, 10.5 per cent of Malaysian historic buildings (Idid 1995).