This chapter explains the importance of the phase of pre-conflict mobilisation for insurgent groups subsequent development. The chapter empirically presents the fallout from the 1971 coup and the tumultuous decade that followed. It explains the various violent tendencies in 1970s Turkey: the Right, the Left, Kurdish movements and the state. It tracks the emergence of the PKK from the socialist revolutionary milieu in Ankara, through its return to Kurdistan and its eventual consolidation as one of the region's most dominant revolutionary groups. It gives a substantial empirical overview of the multitude of Kurdish movements’ mobilization in the late 1970s. It lays out how the PKK overcame its weaknesses (lack of local legitimacy and resources) through a patient strategy of recruitment and calculated use of violence against local enemies. It then explains the impact of the 1980 military coup and the brutal repression of the Kurdish region. It discusses the deployment of state torture and terror and how Diyarbakir prison and the resistance by PKK prisoners became a rallying point for the weakened PKK. It finishes by outlining the PKK’s steps to prepare for the 1984 insurgency.

I met Mizgîn on a warm spring afternoon in a refugee camp in Switzerland. Mizgîn had been a member of the PKK for twenty-four years, spending her last years in the party as a top KCK commander. In spring 2017, she left the party and fled to Europe. A mutual friend and fellow former commander had arranged our meeting, and over many cigarettes and cups of tea, we told each other our stories, discussed the state of the world, and the women’s questions that not only plague the four parts of Kurdistan. With great sadness in her eyes and many deep sighs, Mizgîn told me about how she joined the party as a teenager, her time spent in Syria with Öcalan, her many years of struggle, her increasing doubts, and that seeing how things were run at the very top, particularly in relation to the urban wars in 2015–2016, finally gave her the impetus to leave. At a different table on the terrace another asylum seeker was playing sad PKK revolutionary songs on his baglama.1 Mizgîn nodded in his direction and indicated that we should keep our voices down.

This chapter questions the urban/rural distinction, given that in times of conflict and demographic volatility, borders between urban and rural are diminished and events in the countryside shape those of the city and vice versa. Accordingly, it considers the impact of Turkish security forces’ counterinsurgency strategy of mass forced displacement not only on rural areas but also how it reconfigured Kurdish urban centres. It outlines the implementation of the forced evacuation of potentially millions of rural Kurds in order to deprive the PKK of its local support networks. The chapter shows the emotional trauma and the violence of the experiences, which led to the relocation of PKK support from the countryside to the cities. It also addresses the disaggregated strategies of state repression, particularly the so-called deep state that operated outside of any form of democratic accountability. The chapter also covers the state’s relationship with an Islamist movement, Hezbollah, used to target Kurdish intellectuals and politicians and to analyses how the PKK mobilised in Kurdish cities, focusing in particular on Serhildans (Uprisings), Newroz celebrations and guerrilla funerals.

Chapter 2 provides a brief overview of the Kurdish region, its peoples and its historic experience in the Turkish Republic since the 1920s. It describes the multiple peoples of the region, including Kurds, Turks, Alevis, Yezidis and Syriacs before discussing its linguistic heterogeneity. It proceeds to outline the emergence of Kurdish Nationalism in the early twentieth century, and how Kurdish political forces were confronted by the Turkish Nationalism of the early Republic. It discusses the Kurdish rebellions of the 1920s and 1930s and the violent state reaction. It finishes by describing some of the socio-economic and political transformations which changed the country in the 1940s and 1950s such as industrialisation and the installation of a form of electoral democracy. It explains how the unintended consequences of the state presence in Kurdistan led to the formation of an educated class of young Kurds with the social capital required to lead a Kurdish cultural and political rival from the 1950s.

Chapter 2 explores how aid constructs Morocco into an ‘Immigration Nation’, by fostering a hegemonic imaginary of immigration in the country as a predominantly ‘black’, ‘African’, and ‘irregular’ experience. This performance is subsumed by discourses and practices de-historicising immigration in Morocco and normalising the idea of ‘sub-Saharan migrants’ as the main group of foreigners living in the country. This escalates the political attention over Western and Central African migration to levels which are not supported by demographic data. I identify two critical junctures that allowed the migration industry to consolidate narratives of ‘transit’ migration throughout the country, trivialising projects targeting ‘sub-Saharan migrants’ along the major stopovers of migrant routes in Morocco.

Chapter 4 turns to martyr mothers in Maxmûr. This camp, with its violent history, is highly militarised and a place where the boundaries between the armed and civil spheres are non-existent. Almost every week someone from the camp falls at one of the many frontlines in the region, while the families in the camps, and especially the mothers, continue to live life according to the party’s liberation ideology. I show how the militant mothers of the camp play an integral part in continuing not only camp life but the struggle for freedom according to the PKK more broadly. I map out three key sites of daily life for mothers: first, the martyr house and death wakes; second, camp work; and third, the private house. Throughout I discuss how mothers organise and perform rituals of mourning, remembrance and resistance. Hereby, the martyr culture is a key location where a sense of belonging and sacrifice but also a vision and hope for a future nation are negotiated.

This chapter argues that the some of the huge Kurdish population in western Turkey forms an Internal Diaspora. It introduces the concept of the Internal Diaspora by discussing the literature in relation to international diasporas. It then proceeds to discuss the challenges in assessing how many Kurds live outside of their Kurdish homeland in western Turkey. It tracks multiple generations of Kurdish migration, and the issues migrants were confronted with in western cities. It highlights some of the lived experiences for Kurds in the West such as poverty, racist exclusion, diminishing economic opportunities and patterns of informal residential segregation, especially in gecekondu neighbourhoods. It then proceeds to analyse how and why the PKK first mobilised in western Turkey, as well as considering how the mobilisation contrasted with that in Kurdish regions. It demonstrates that Kurdish students became the organisational core of the movement before expanding into marginal neighbours populated by destitute Kurds. It also looks at the decline of the revolutionary Turkish left and takes the case of the Gaziosmanpaşa neighbourhood as an illustrative case study. It finishes with a discussion of the parliamentary Kurdish parties and how it affected the PKK mobilization.

This chapter introduces the book's main theoretical argument: that armed groups are dependent on popular support and accordingly strive to obtain and maintain it, efforts which shape insurgents’ repertoire of contention. It outlines the concept of the 'constituency' (Malthaner 2011) which serves as a relational framework to understand the dynamic relations between insurgent groups and their supporters. It further develops the concept by more explicitly developing its spatial dimensions. It argues for a more nuanced understanding of insurgent movements use of space and how it shapes interactions with their supporters. It embeds this theoretical approach in the broader literatures concerned with insurgent groups’ relations with civilians, ranging from counterinsurgency and social movements to rebel governance. It argues that the paradigm of territorial control (Kalyvas, 2006) is too reductive and cannot account for patterns of support for insurgents in areas they do not control. It also addresses the critical role of the state in shaping insurgent behaviour and how state–insurgent interactions are reciprocally formative. It proceeds to look at issues of insurgent governance, recruitment and civilian agency.

This chapter historically contextualises the Kurdish women’s movement and traces the trajectory of its organisational structures and knowledge production from 1978 to the present. It situates the Kurdistan Freedom Movement and its local political and armed branches in the regional and international matrices of domination: Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran. It zooms in on the main internal rupture points where the women resisted and fought against their male comrades in order to build their autonomous ranks within the larger liberation movement.

Chapter 6 examines the Assistance to Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) programme run by the IOM. I argue that the AVRR elusively expands the deportation capacity of countries of ‘transit’. I label the function played by aid as elusive because the AVRR is not coercively imposed by the IOM or European states on Moroccan authorities, countries of origin, or migrants. Moroccan authorities consider it a cheaper and more diplomatically acceptable alternative to deportations. Embassies of countries of origin see it as an economically advantageous way to outsource assistance to their citizens abroad in distress. Migrants themselves see it as a last resort opportunity in case things go wrong in Morocco – or so argue IOM officers.