Authoritarian regimes vary with respect to regime–opposition relations, along a continuum of more open to more closed, focusing on the degree of competition the regime permits during elections. The particular political opportunity structure facing any individual opposition group varies according to the strategies that the regime uses in dealing with that particular group: inclusion, co-optation, or exclusion. The microfoundations of both party formation and political mobilization do not operate in isolation or in the same way as they do in established democracies, but in fact interact with the effects of the political opportunity structure that existed during the prior authoritarian era. An examination of the common competing explanations for party formation and political mobilization show that, while each explanation arguably does play a role in shaping these outcomes, they are limited in their comparative utility and frequently fail to explain the actual variation observed in these cases. Instead, mechanisms link the structure of state–opposition relations and the political opportunity structure facing different groups to their relative decisions around party formation as well as to the tactics and effectiveness of political mobilization in founding elections. Finally, the common causes of opposition group dissolution interact with the opportunity structure of the authoritarian era.

Chapter 5 expands the tracing of the theorized causal mechanisms beyond Egypt to see how far these mechanisms travel and if they operate in the same way across other cases of founding elections. Each case comparison begins with an analysis of the processes of party formation, linking the political opportunity structure of the authoritarian era to the contours of the ideological landscape and the strategic incentives facing different groups at this juncture. Each case then examines the evidence for the mechanisms linking the authoritarian era political opportunity structure to the organizational and persuasive resources available to each political group and their ability to use different mobilization tactics. As in Egypt, opposition groups that were excluded from electoral participation possess similar organizational and symbolic resources and thus are able to use more effective voter mobilization tactics than other political groups, resulting in their electoral success. The accounts find evidence for this causal chain in Tunisia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Zambia, but the mechanism operates differently in the case of Brazil, offering useful insight into the scope conditions under which the mechanisms theorized in the Egypt case operate elsewhere.

In Chapter 6, we find evidence that opposition successor parties from more closed opportunity structures experience centrifugal strains caused by the amalgamation of ideological orientations and perspectives that they represent. These strains lead to elite polarization that cause movement fracture and collapse. Conversely, opposition successor parties from more open opportunity structures are ideologically more coherent and thus do not suffer the same centrifugal tensions. Second, we see that nearly all opposition successor parties experience a dramatic decline in popularity after founding elections, due the ephemerality of symbolic resources in general (oppositional credibility, in this context). The positive reputations that helped opposition groups persuade citizens to vote for them in founding elections break down under economic strain and political disfunction that so frequently plague new democracies. Finally, we see that in contexts in which authoritarian state institutions persist beyond the transition, the resurgence of state repression against opposition successor parties becomes more likely, while authoritarian successor parties, in contrast, can integrate former regime members into the new democratic political system.

Chapter 7 concludes the book by revisiting key claims and discussing the implications of the research for broader debates in the fields of comparative politics, social movements, and democracy-promotion activities. Here we see that much of the focus of democracy promotion institutions and programs may be misplaced. Rather than focusing on existing political parties in hybrid regimes, as many democracy-promotion programs do, it is repressed societal actors that are more likely to mobilize supporters, win elections, and form the first government after an authoritarian ouster. These are the individuals and groups most in need of skills-building and governance training. Furthermore, much of the programmatic emphasis of democracy-promotion work falls on enhancing the “liberal” qualities of democracy: freedom of speech, human rights, inclusion of women and minorities, and the protection of civil liberties. However, what the cases here show is that democratic consolidation is most threatened by unmet benchmarks in economic and physical security after the fall of an authoritarian regime. When these benchmarks are not met, the support for democracy declines and a wedge is opened for the return of authoritarian actors. The chapter offers suggestions for future research based upon the findings.

Chapter 3 examines the political opportunity structure in Tunisia, followed by three more closed regimes (Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Zambia), and ending with Brazil. In each comparative case, we trace the effect of the political opposition structure to the adaptations and strategies adopted by different political groups within the constraints the state placed upon them.

This chapter presents the theoretical framework for understanding the evolution of postcolonial liberation wars. The book uses theory as a lens through which to examine postcolonial liberation struggles. It employs ideas from theories of practices and roles in international politics to shed new light about the evolution of postcolonial separatist violence, and about our understanding of colonialism and decolonisation.

The formation of postcolonial states in Asia, Africa and the Middle East gave birth to prolonged separatist wars between separatist groups in the periphery and the new, still insecure central governments. This book explores these liberation wars, aiming to provide new insights into their roots and evolution. Rather than focusing on the causes of conflict, the book focuses on the governments’ and insurgents’ strategies and policies. The book’s central argument is that we could best understand these strategies as having been shaped by the struggle against European colonialism. The practices and roles that emerged during that period survived into the postcolonial era, moulding the identities, aims and strategies of both governments and rebels. Therefore, the book suggests that theories of practice and roles in international politics serve as a sound theoretical framework for the empirical analysis of the case studies. The book examines two cases of postcolonial separatist wars: the conflict in Northern Iraq between the government and Kurdish separatists and in Southern Sudan between black separatists and the government in Khartoum. The analysis of these two cases relies on extensive field and archival research. Thus, the book sheds new light on the history and nature of these separatist conflicts.

The third chapter examines how the incumbents in Iraq and Sudan reacted to the uprisings in their peripheries. It begins by establishing that the future post-colonial elites had been exposed to colonial practices of control, through their constant interaction with the colonial authorities. It then moves to demonstrate how these practices resurfaced when these governments faced dissent in their peripheries.

The secessionist wars in Iraq and Sudan, both of them protracted conflicts that shed the blood of hundreds of thousands of people, have transformed throughout the years. During their first decades, the secessionist insurgents conducted anti-colonial liberation movements, combining guerrilla tactics and popular mobilisation along with public diplomacy that emphasised their position as the oppressed colonies of the imperialists in Baghdad and Khartoum. And in a sense, they were not far from the truth. The postcolonial governments in Baghdad and Khartoum did not perceive themselves as new colonisers. These elites, who gained much of their training, experience in and understanding of governance under colonial rule or from colonial instructors, claimed legitimacy for their rule by distancing themselves from colonial traditions.

This chapter presents the historical and ideational background to the eruption of postcolonial violence. It reviews the unfolding of the first-generation liberation wars, the response of the colonial authorities to the challenges and the birth of norms, ideas and practices of liberation, insurgency and counter-insurgency. It also provides a brief background to the wars in Iraqi Kurdistan and Southern Sudan.

The last chapter focuses on the gradual transition that both the Iraqi Kurdish and Southern Sudanese liberation movements experienced, from relying solely on armed resistance to adopting other forms of liberation strategies. It shows that while guerrilla fighting continued throughout most of the 1980s, in the early 1990s, the second-generation liberation movements began shifting their strategic emphasis from guerrilla warfare to institution building and governance as forms of resistance. The Kurdish and Southern Sudanese leaders were exposed during that period to changing trends in liberation and self-determination struggles in the former Soviet and Yugoslav republics. Once again, they internalized these lessons and applied them to their cases. They did so by taking advantage of the opportunities brought by changing geopolitical circumstances. By showing that these transitions were the outcome of continued dialogue and interaction, the book further establishes them as essential sources of strategy and policymaking.