In most accounts of the diplomacy of the Arab–Israeli conflict, Jordan has been neglected, ignored, or taken for granted. Perhaps this is the fate of small states, especially those with moderate and reasonable leaders. Politicians understandably pay more attention to big powers with big voices. But scholars have also neglected Jordan. Few serious books exist on either Jordan's internal or foreign policies. This is unfortunate in light of the important role Jordan has played in recent Middle East history.

Jordan deserves attention in its own right. Among Arab states of the Middle East, it has achieved an impressive level of social and economic development without the benefit of rich natural resources. Located in a turbulent part of the world, it has managed to survive as an independent state. Compared to many in the region, Jordan has provided its citizens with a degree of stability, security and well-being.

Jordan is worth studying for another reason. In many ways it provides a microcosm in which one can see most of the currents that affect the wider Middle East. Jordan feels the effects of Arab nationalism, Palestinianism, and Islamism. It is a policy based on a traditional formula for legitimacy, but contains a modern, Westernized sector of impressive dimensions. Jordan's neighbours – Israel, Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia – each confront it with special challenges. Each is more powerful and each puts pressure on its Hashemite neighbour. But Jordan has survived and even prospered in this dangerous environment.

President Carter inherited a foreign policy ‘stalemated on the level of power, and excessively cynical on the level of principles’. Spurred by his proclaimed commitment to human rights, he saw no reasonable hope for a settlement of the Middle Eastern question without a homeland for the Palestinians. In frequent speeches he stressed that the type of settlement he envisaged would require an Israeli withdrawal to approximately the pre-1967 borderlines and the setting up of a Palestinian entity. Thus, at Aswan in Egypt, he declared on 4 January 1978 to the whole people of the Middle East,

The Geneva conference: some working papers

Carter's first initiative was to replace Kissinger's previous step-by-step approach with a comprehensive one. It involved a multilateral peace effort with all the leading protagonists, including the Soviet Union, taking part, in order to deal collectively with the full range of issues on the basis of the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 as a single package. The venue envisaged was Geneva, where the previous attempt at peace-making had been stalled by Kissinger. Leading up to this the US produced three statements. The major one issued in conjunction with the Soviet Union, which had co-chaired the previous Geneva Conference, was published on 1 October 1977.

The first half of this chapter focuses on the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, because of its destabilizing effects on the region as a whole, and therefore on Jordan. Its demonstration of the intrinsic weakness of US Middle East policy and of the dominance of Israeli influence over that policy make it an important factor in the overall US–Arab relationship. The second half of the chapter deals with the attempt to revive the US initiative with the launching of the Reagan Plan.

1982: The Israeli invasion of Lebanon

June 1982 witnessed a major act of war, as Israel embarked on a large-scale invasion of Lebanon. To achieve peace for Galilee by establishing a 25-mile security zone inside Lebanon was the first declared Israeli aim. But Galilee was already enjoying peace as a result of the July 1981 ceasefire negotiated by Philip Habib, the then US special envoy in the Middle East. It became increasingly clear that the declared original aim was a smoke screen for ulterior motives, as General Eitan, the Chief of Staff of the Israeli army, elaborated in Ha'aretzof 9 July:

Question One

Does the US intend to be a full partner in the negotiations on the West Bank, Gaza Strip and the Palestinian question in general? At what stage of the negotiations would the US participate and what role would it play?

Answer

Yes. The US would be a full partner in all stages of the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations, leading to a just, durable and comprehensive peace in the Middle East. The US would use its full influence for a successful conclusion. President Carter would play a personal active role in the negotiations.

Question Two

What does Paragraph (A) of the Framework for Peace – referring to representatives of the Palestinian people – mean?

Answer

There was no attempt to give a comprehensive explanation. The people of the West Bank and Gaza are specified in some cases. On one occasion, the paragraph referring to ‘other Palestinians as would be agreed’ clearly means representatives from outside theWest Bank and Gaza, not necessarily Egyptian or Jordanian representatives. Of course Palestinians who are Egyptian or Jordanian citizens may become members of the negotiating delegations representing Jordan or Egypt. In other cases the Selfgoverning Authority is mentioned.

The US explains the term ‘Representatives of the Palestinian People’ not on the basis of any authority or a single organization representing the Palestinian people, but as including those elected or chosen to participate in the negotiations.

At the outset of this work was posed the question of the advances of thought in the Islamic Renaissance. Was there anything * new’ in the theses elaborated in the Shi'i colleges, in comparison with the Middle Eastern intellectual scene, and beyond, in the longue duree course of the history of ideas? We have discovered in the works of Muhammad Baqer as-Sadr a system.

As in all systems, its strength comes from the avenues it opens, rather than from the specific answers it is able to provide. Sadr was confronted with several challenges, which he tried to address with the tools of the tradition available to him. In economics and banking, he was operating from difficult uncharted territory, and whilst he sometimes erred, the way he proceeded and the seriousness of his work remain unmatched in Islamic literature. As argued in this research, the detour through the shari'a allowed Sadr to elaborate on economic and banking issues with far more depth than his immediate contemporaries. Even in the works of the great reformists of the twentieth century, contributions in the field have been rare and unalluring.

This statement by Prince Hassan of Jordan seems to sum up the Arab governments' attitude towards peace in the 1980s. Listing the essentials for a settlement he stated:

The Fahd and Fez Plans

The first Arab peace plan, which became known as the Fahd Plan, was made public in August 1981. It proposed:

Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied in 1967, including Arab Jerusalem.

The dismantling of Israeli settlements established on Arab lands since 1967.

The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

1. (i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;

2. (ii) Termination of all claims or stages of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. Affirms further the necessity:

1. (a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

2. (b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

3. (c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles of this resolution.

Statement Issued by the Department of State, December 6, 1989

1. The United States understands that because Egypt and Israel have been working hard on the peace process, there is agreement that an Israeli delegation should conduct a dialog with a Palestinian delegation in Cairo.

2. The United States understands that Egypt cannot substitute itself for the Palestinians and Egypt will consult with Palestinians on all aspects of that dialog. Egypt will also consult with Israel and the United States.

3. The United States understands that Israel will attend the dialog only after a satisfactory list of Palestinians has been worked out.

4. The United States understands that the Government of Israel will come to the dialog on the basis of the Israeli Government's May 14 initiative. The United States further understands that Palestinians will come to the dialog prepared to discuss elections and the negotiating process in accordance with Israel's initiative. The United States understands, therefore, that Palestinians would be free to raise issues that relate to their opinions on how to make elections and the negotiating process succeed.

5. In order to facilitate this process, the United States proposes that the Foreign Ministers of Israel, Egypt, and the United States meet in Washington within 2 weeks.

One can find a large body of literature on ‘Islamic economics’, in Arabic as well as in English. But many of the works tend to dabble in generalities and to err in a lack of rigour which prevents the emergence of a serious and systematic literature. The recent ‘fad’ of ‘Islamic economics’ has impressed the production with an urgency that has kept the literature produced so far to a superficial and repetitive standard.

More serious undertakings have exploited the formidable legacy of Ibn Khaldun. Thus an Egyptian scholar writing an Encyclopaedia of Islamic Economics would dwell heavily on the Muqaddima. His effort is not unique, nor is it new. The legal tradition had early in the century exploited the famous historian in no less important a scholar than Subhi al-Mahmasani, who wrote his thesis in the 1920s on The Economic Ideas of Ibn Khaldun.

The reliance on Ibn Khaldun is the sign of the apparent dearth of material from which to draw an Islamic theory of economics. In contrast to the riches of constitutional law, economics appears as a non-subject in the faqih tradition: there is simply no general theory of economics, let alone a basis for such theory in a specialised subject like banking.

This is why the works of Muhammad Baqer as-Sadr in economics and banking are significant. Against a classical background where the discipline of economics did not exist, and an Islamic world which by 1960 had produced no consistent reflection in the field, Sadr wrote two serious and lengthy works on the subject, Iqtisaduna and al-Bank al-la Ribawi fil-Islam.

Phase one: selling the idea to Washington

King Fahd of Saudi Arabia was reported to have received a telephone call from King Hussain on 11 February 1985, informing him of the details of the Jordanian–PLO Accord, while he was on a state visit to Washington. It was also reported that he already had a copy of the document in his possession. This was the first direct contact between an Arab leader and the second Reagan Administration, and it took place in the wake of two developments which the Arabs regarded as hostile. First, the proposed increase in US military aid to Israel from $1.4 bn in 1985 to $1.8 bn for the following year. Second, the parallel decision to halt arms sales to the Arabs for the foreseeable future.

The latter decision, which was made public on 30 January 1985, was clearly an attempt to pre-empt the King, who had a multi-billion dollar request pending. The White House statement was toned down, however, and accompanied by an assurance that it reflected nothing significant, but rather heralded a breathing space for a reassessment of US policy. Since Prime Minister Peres had just received assurances of a huge increase in US military aid, which, it had already been made clear, would not be affected by this latest decision, the arms embargo against the Arabs, however temporary, appeared to be a deliberate snub to the very man the Reagan Administration was supposedly trying to court, if only because of his country's special relationship with the US and its huge petrodollar reserves in US banks.

Such was King Hussain's summary of his long working relationship with US Presidents who have dealt, each in his own way and time, with Middle Eastern problems. Ronald Reagan proved to be no exception. As a presidential candidate he started to promote, in what might have been a vote-catching exercise, the view that ‘Israel is the only strategic asset in the area that the US can rely on.’ But in his first presidential press conference, he expressed what now seemed to be a conviction, that ‘Israel's combat-ready and even combat-experienced military is a force in the Middle East that actually is of benefit to us. If there was no Israel with that force, we'd have to supply that with our own. So, this isn't just altrusim on our part.’ Pressed at one point as to whether he had ‘any sympathy for the Palestinians’, his answer was a flat ‘no’, unlike his predecessor at the beginning of his term of office.

After extensive consultations with Palestinians, Arab states and Israel, the United States and the Soviet Union believe that an historic opportunity exists to advance the prospects for genuine peace throughout the region. The United States and the Soviet Union are prepared to assist the parties to achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement, through direct negotiations along two tracks, between Israel and the Arab states, and between Israel and the Palestinians, based on United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The objective of this process is real peace.

Toward that end, the President of the United States and the President of the USSR invite you to a peace conference, which their countries will co-sponsor, followed immediately by direct negotiations. The conference will be convened in Madrid on October 30, 1991. President Bush and President Gorbachev request your acceptance of this invitation no later than 6:00 p.m. Washington time, October 23, 1991, in order to ensure proper organization and preparation of the conference.

Direct bilateral negotiations will begin four days after the opening of the conference. Those parties who wish to attend multilateral negotiations will convene two weeks after the opening of the conference to organize those negotiations. The co-sponsors believe that those negotiations should focus on region-wide issues such as arms control and regional security, water, refugee issues, environment, economic development, and other subjects of mutual interest.