To understand the way in which Saudi Arabia, Iran, and other groups have become involved in the conflict in Yemen, we must understand the complexities of both political life and the conflict itself. The existence of myriad groups with competing agendas reveals the parabolic pressures working broadly within the context of the Yemeni state. Although largely reduced to either a ‘proxy struggle’ between Saudi Arabia and Iran, or a conflict between the Houthi insurgents and the regime of President Hadi, events on the ground are far more complex. While there are aspects of both narratives that ring true, both require contextualization and must be located within the milieu of Yemeni politics.

The following chapter traces the history of Lebanese politics, reflecting on the structural factors that facilitate the involvement of external powers. It suggests that the structural organization of the state allows for external patronage in support of communal interests and, amid times of crisis, this patronage is seen to be a necessity. Moreover, the geopolitical significance of Lebanon means that external actors also seek local allies as a means of countering rivals who already possess influence across the state while local actors also seek to position themselves within broader regional currents. To understand the competition over Lebanon, we must trace the historical development of the Lebanese state which allows for identification of the structural factors conditioning – or limiting – the deployment of capital and foreign policy activities.

This introduction provides an overview of the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Conflict across the Middle East has routinely been framed as a consequence of proxy wars, such as the conflict in Iraq, Libya, Syria, Yemen, albeit playing out in different ways. These proxy wars are often found as features of the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, yet the ways in which Saudi Arabia and Iran develop relationships with local actors points to a more complex set of relationships than the model typically understood within a ‘proxy relationship’. Indeed, as work done by the Sectarianism, Proxies and De-sectarianization (SEPAD) project has observed, perhaps most clearly in a special issue edited by Edward Wastnidge and myself, trans-state relationships between states – in this case Saudi Arabia and Iran – and non-state actors are products of time and space, meaning that a range of factors influence the relationships, producing a number of different outcomes. This includes some local actors possessing far more agency than is often typically assumed, as observed by Amal Saad in the case of Hizbullah. This ability to exert influence independent of the patron actor’s wishes appears to push the borders of the concept. The introduction closes with a discussion of the foreign policies of Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Three Islamist parties (AKP, Muslim Brotherhood, and Ennahda) won elections and came to power in three predominantly Muslim countries – Turkey, Egypt, and Tunisia – in recent decades. After coming to power, these parties followed different trajectories. Ennahda in Tunisia adhered to democratic principles, while the AKP and the Muslim Brotherhood did not. Why? Is Islamism (and Islam) at odds with democracy as skeptics claim? This chapter introduces the central questions of the book and three parties that comprise its subject. It shows that Islamist parties are not monoliths and are comprised of groups with different understandings of democracy. The chapter argues that Islamists often agree on the centrality of elections for ideological and strategic reasons, although they disagree on the norms underpinning electoral politics and what democracy means. It then identifies two main wings within mainstream Islamist parties: electoral Islamists, who carry majoritarian and exclusionary tendencies, and liberal Islamists, who commit to pluralist and inclusionary politics. The chapter concludes with a discussion on data and methods used in the study.

This chapter unpacks internal dynamics of political parties and introduces a factional theory of party behavior. The central assertion is that political parties are factional coalitions with different perspectives on political issues. The aim herein is twofold. First, the chapter traces how individual preferences aggregate into group preferences in the form of factional politics. Second, it explores the conditions under which one faction prevails over others. This chapter thus offers a theory of coalition-building within political parties by identifying different types of incentive structures and organizational resources. Factions strive for control over such resources to capture and control the party. Once they form a dominant coalition, they align the party’s trajectory with their own worldview. This chapter builds on the existing studies of behavioral and ideological change to address the issue of aggregation and fill the gap in the literature. It concludes with a brief discussion of these dynamics in the AKP, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Ennahda.

To understand the ways in which Saudi Arabia and Iran have engaged with Iraqi politics and sought to define the principles of vision within Iraq’s political field, one must understand the structural factors conditioning and curtailing the deployment of capital. Here, tracing the evolution of Iraq’s political field is essential as a means of understanding the actions of Riyadh and Tehran. This tracing involves reflecting on identity politics and the interplay between identity groups and the state. The nature of this interplay, in turn, allows for the development of relations with regional powers, on both an individual and a communal level.

In order to understand the ways in which the Saudi–Iranian rivalry plays out in Syria, it is essential to trace the evolution of the political field and its interaction with the transnational field. In doing so, the chapter critically reflects on the evolution of political life in Syria and the position of the state within broader regional currents, with a focus on Ba’athism, the Axis of Resistance, and the Arab Uprisings. Syria’s importance within such movements meant that it became a state of interest for other regional powers, particularly seen in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings.

What drives Islamists’ democratic commitments? Does modernization turn them into committed democrats? Or do institutions rein in their authoritarian tendencies through political socialization and democratic habituation? This chapter critically reviews three theories that define the scholarly debate surrounding these questions while providing a historical and political context to all three cases. It first explores the history of modernization in Turkey, Egypt, and Tunisia and discusses the role of socioeconomic factors on the democratization of Islamist parties. Then it discusses the impact of institutions on party behavior and ideology, specifically the inclusion–moderation thesis to test its claims against the evidence we now have with the rise of Islamist parties to power. This survey reveals the limits of the institutional and ideational effects of inclusion. The final section turns to the strategic calculations of Islamist actors to discuss the role played by external factors, including regional and international developments. The central claim of the chapter is that existing accounts offer only a partial explanation failing to address diversity of perspectives and internal conflicts within Islamist parties.

This brief overview of the book builds on the Italian partisan song Bella Ciao, a song that has been sung in many Arab streets in recent years. The book echoes the fact that the song can be sung over two tempos, and that the history of citizenship, representation and violence in the Arab worlds can be apprehended over the longue duree of latent citizenship, or the fast-paced events of the 2011 Arab Uprisings. Both tempos are connected in this book, which makes a contribution to democratic theory and to the history of popular politics in the MENA region.