Most recent literature on military government is extremely skeptical of the possibility of effective military reformism. This scepticism, encouraged by various behavioural hypotheses, has been further strengthened by a number of cross-sectional analyses, which seem to show that most military governments are unstable, conservative, and indifferent at economic management.1 The military government in Peru, therefore, appears to be something of an exception. Its first President, General Velasco, stayed in office for nearly seven years, and his successor, General Morales Bermúdez, has promised that the nature of the regime will not be drastically changed. Even more important, the Government claims to have carried out a comprehensive set of agrarian, industrial and social reforms that were aimed at bringing Peru out of its former underdevelopment. Moreover, the Government has claimed to have achieved all this during a seven-year period in which the conventional criteria of economic success – a substantial growth in real income per capita, a moderate rate of inflation and a reasonably stable exchange rate – also appear to have been met.

The ‘Peronist Left’ has become one of the chief actors in the often violent drama of Argentine politics today. It is the object of this article to place the events of the more recent past, at least since the return of Peronism to power in 1973, within the framework of the development of the ‘Peronist Left’ since the fall of Perón in 1955. Obviously the article makes no claim to be a comprehensive treatment of the subject. Such a treatment could only be part of a much more extensive study of the Argentine working class and the Peronist movement. In particular, the article concentrates on an analysis of the political ideology of the different currents that have made up the ‘Peronist Left’ since 1955, whilst recognizing that this ideology must ultimately be seen in the far wider context of the social and economic development of Argentine society. The first part will highlight the main features of this Left in the 1955–73 period and analyze the main currents within it. In the second part of the paper the events of the last two to three years will be looked at within this context.

Although none of the artisan or small merchant groups in colonial Buenos Aires ever achieved complete legal sanction for a guild organization, the silversmiths were more successful than any other group in creating and sustaining an officially endorsed, self-regulating, corporate structure. This structure was not created and implemented systematically. It was evolved slowly and pragmatically as a response to the changing milieu in which the silversmiths worked.

From 1919 to 1942, Peruvian foreign policy focused on two interrelated issues: the resolution of Peru's territorial disputes with Chile, Colombia and Ecuador, and the reconciliation of an expanding and deepening relationship with the United States government. The two issues were entwined since the Peruvian government and people, for part of the period, expected the support and assistance of the United States government in resolving the three territorial issues. Partially in an attempt to respond to these expectations, the United States government was aggressively and extensively involved, albeit sometimes in a manner contrary to Peruvian desires, in the resolution of all three disputes. On the whole, United States foreign policy seldom equaled Peruvian expectations throughout the period, and its failure to do so precipitated or accelerated the growth of major new tenets in Peruvian foreign policy.