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The main concern of the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) in recent years has been to lead and supervise the implementation of the resolutions adopted at its First Congress in 1975. Those resolutions cover a broad range of political, social, and economic issues, so that a full account of the Party's work over the past 5 years would require a complete survey of Cuba's domestic and foreign policies during that period.1 The very breadth of the PCC's work agenda in the latter half of the 1970s indicates how much the role of the Party in Cuba has evolved over the past decade;2 such responsibilities demonstrate a continuation of the process of strengthening the Party begun in the early 1970s.
The 1920s remain a relatively neglected period in Brazilian historiography despite a recent boom in the study of contemporary Brazilian history and despite the intrinsic importance of that era.1 The post-war years constituted a watershed in the evolution of Brazilian culture, for example, as poets, novelists, artists and other pensants rejected further imitation of foreign models.2 The effervescence in the cultural sphere found ample resonance in political life; indeed, during the 1920s republican institutions were perhaps more seriously questioned than at any time since the early 1890s. The establishment of the Communist Party (1922) and the phenomenon of tenentismo were the most obvious manifestations of the erosion of the national consensus.3 The absence of an extensive body of scholarly literature on these subjects notwithstanding, their general configuration is at least familiar. One neglected field of inquiry, however, is foreign policy, the subject of this article. The aim of this exploratory probe is not to survey Brazil's diplomatic relations during the period; rather, the central analytical focus here is on the linkage between elite images and foreign policy strategy, the underlying premise being that policy decisions depend upon how policy-makers view their external environment.4
In Argentina during World War II the US stepped outside the limits of the Good Neighbor policy proclaimed by the Roosevelt administration in 1933 and attempted to overthrow the government of a major Latin American power.1 Between 1941 and 1945 Argentina was not only treated differently from the rest of Latin America by the United States, but was also singled out for harsher treatment than other neutrals, despite its large material contribution to the Allied cause. In 1944 Washington was readier to compromise with Franco's Spain, a country whose Axis connections were notorious, than it was to seek a settlement with the government in Buenos Aires.2 The purpose of this paper is to examine the development of US interference in Argentine affairs after Pearl Harbor and the reasons for US hostility to the rise of Perón following the military coup of June 1943.
The facts are by now sufficiently clear for it to be common ground in any discussion of late nineteenth-century imperialism that the British State was disinclined to interfere on behalf of British capitalists with Latin American interests when these were threatened by local firms or States. Equally it is clear that British capitalists did not invest in Argentina in the belief that, by so doing, they were actively assisting the foreign policy of the British State. The State provided no grounds for this belief and no inducement to invest, and had it done so it is unlikely that the capitalists concerned – a pretty liberal bunch by and large – would have responded to any greater extent than they felt was consistent with their economic advantage. Again, there were not, in Britain, territorially ambitious militarists and aristocrats with their sights set on the South American republics. This element was quite adequately catered for in the Empire. In short, the models of imperialism favoured by Hobson, Schumpeter, and other conspiracy theorists, however appropriate they may be in particular cases, cannot be generalized and have very little relevance to Argentina.
About 80 per cent of the investment in opening new coffee haciendas took place between 1880 and 1895 in Cundinamarca, and between 1890 and 1900 in Antioquia. Although there were coffee-producing peasants, who responded favourably to the opportunities opened by organized buying, the merchants were in the forefront of development, and their participation was decisive for the future of coffee.
Two central aspects that turned the merchant into large-scale coffeegrower and -exporter are analysed in this chapter. In the first part, the social environment and political ties of the merchant families of Bogatá and Medellín are discussed in general terms. There is also an analysis of their tendency to diversify assets, given their fear of excessive specialization.
In the second part of the chapter, the incentives and obstacles facing the merchant-turned-planter are examined. The advantages offered by investment in coffee can be summarized as follows: the high profitability of coffee production when it was linked to exports; the relative security of this investment in an inflationary period; access to external credit with interest rates 50 per cent lower than any available in Bogatá or Medellín; and, finally, the abundance of good lands and the availability of labour. The obstacles to profit must also be recorded: the necessity to invest considerable sums of capital; the slow initial rate of return on investment; the risks of expropriation and disruption of production in periods of political instability; the risk of contracting debts in gold when the rate of devaluation was increasing; and the fact of being subject to an uncontrollable cycle of international prices.
The coffee hacienda was the result of the entry of urban merchants into rural society. On a yet more general plane, it was the product of emphasis on agricultural exporting, of the urge and the need to form links with the world market and ‘bring to the country the civilization that is overflowing in Europe’. Investment in coffee did not penetrate the rural world in order to create new types of social or productive relations. By the end of the century, for all its dynamism, commercial capital had only scratched the rude surface of the older social formations. The traditions, habits, and customs of the little worlds of a few square kilometres in which most lived out their lives showed a persistent rigour, despite the expectation that the old patterns would dissolve in contact with the new economy which the coffee entrepreneur wished to impose. In part it was a problem of quantity: coffee investment was heavily concentrated in relatively few areas. Even there, the phenomenon of specialization that occurred with tobacco in Ambalema was not repeated. Within the old haciendas of colonial origin there was a peasant stratum accustomed to the degree of independence that came from producing its own food. The coffee hacienda of Santander, Cundinamarca, Tolima, and Antioquia was founded within an existing social structure, to which it had to adapt itself, while at the same time it introduced new elements of the monetary economy which, simple and weak at first, would produce effects that disturbed the old order. In Cundinamarca, for example, the coffee municipios were old centres of colonial production and commerce.
Antioquen̄o colonization deserves the attention it has received as a decisive episode in Colombian history. The society which emerged from it on the hillsides, river banks, and valley slopes situated between the Cauca river basin and the peaks of the central cordillera found integration and economic progress in the early years of the twentieth century through the cultivation, processing, packing, and transport of coffee.
Naturally enough, a slow-maturing crop such as coffee did not appeal to colonists who had set themselves, days and even weeks away from the nearest outpost of civilization, the task of carving a living out of the monte. Coffee had to wait until communities had been established, supported by a subsistence agriculture of maize, beans, yuca, and bananas, and until improvements had been made to the bridle-paths used to transport the pigs which were fattened for the distant towns of Medellín and Bogotá. Before the frontier provided a stable economy it offered only the chance of survival to a population which in its land of origin was growing more rapidly than any other in the Republic, in a poor environment of waste lands and steep and eroded terrain. At the same time adventurers arrived to seek buried treasure from previous indigenous civilizations, and search the forests for wild rubber.
The frontier protected its inhabitants from the vicissitudes of politics, and from wars, recruiters, requisitions, and similar outrages, while the struggle against nature and isolation bred unpolished but comradely habits.
Judging from its limited participation in international trade, Colombia during the nineteenth century was one of the poorest countries of Latin America, with a backward and stagnating economy. Nevertheless, the size of Colombia's exports has never really given an indication of the extent of economic activity in the country. Historically, a large section of the economy has been relatively isolated from the international trade and its accompanying cycles of booms and busts. For example, the sharp fall in gold exports between 1600 and 1650 did not lead to a similar depression of the internal market. The latter, on the contrary, showed signs of dynamism. Again, in 1884 during a marked contraction in the export market, Salvador Camacho Roldán (one of the most distinguished economists of the time) calculated that the value of the agricultural produce sold for internal consumption – excluding subsistence agriculture – was 120 million pesos, over twelve times the value of agricultural exports, which then amounted to 10 million pesos. Even adding the figures for gold exports, the coefficient of total Colombian exports was rarely over 10 percent. The one period which seems to have been an exception to the rule was the first half of the 1870s, when the export economy began to expand.
The low export coefficient was certainly the result of the Colombian economy's isolation from the flow of capital, manpower, and technology from Europe to the temperate zones of the world. A straightforward quantitative history of Colombia's exports is still not possible.