The mutual impact of violence and religious transformation in the recent experience of Latin America has reshaped the public presence of churches (both Catholic and Protestant) and altered their discourse and appeal. Many churches turned to promotion of human rights, protection of victims, and opposition to authoritarian rule. Others allied with repressive regimes in the name of a kind of Christian nationalism. The violence at issue ranges from the massive violence of repression, torture, and revolutionary struggle to the institutionalized violence of poverty, disease, and injustice, which is often accompanied by the violence of daily life and linked with migration, drugs, gangs, and domestic abuse. Religion itself has changed: the Catholic monopoly has been replaced by pluralism, as Protestant and Pentecostal churches reach new populations and offer potential converts a way of opting out of the violence of daily life through rebirth in a new religious community.

Established with the reform of 1993, Argentina’s private pension funds became crucial sources of credit for the national government. They purchased large amounts of sovereign bonds defaulted on in 2001 and hence were key to the success of the debt restructuring of 2005. The private pillar was always vulnerable to political maneuvering; the nationalization of private pension funds in 2008 was only the last stage in an iterated process of state intervention, a function of public debt dynamics. This article argues that the financial pressures associated with Argentina’s sovereign debt burden systematically shortened the temporality of pension policy decisions, taking those away from long-term concerns about the stability of the social security system and toward the immediacy of debt-financing imperatives. Therefore, the politics of pension reform reversal in Argentina were determined by the increasingly strong and inextricable link between debt and pensions.

Fifty years after the creation of the OAS, political power is not centralized in that organization but variously diffused throughout the interamerican system. Meanwhile, the Summit of the Americas process has slowly acquired its own institutionality outside the OAS, and is sometimes perceived as challenging the primacy of the ideal of the OAS as the principal institution of interamerican relations. Even with its own weaknesses, the Summit of the Americas has become the most important force for reform of the OAS. As the hemisphere prepares for the third full summit in Quebec, this essay assesses the relationship of these two institutions and their future prospects.

As an instrument for governance, summitry is a novel structure for the management of contemporary hemispheric regionalism in the Americas. Such regionalism is a clear case of the “structuralist paradox” of international cooperation. This article attempts to explain the particular asymmetric regionalism in the Americas by using the concept of cooperative hegemony. The underlying hypothesis is that the U.S. government, since 1994, has pursued a strategy of cooperative behavior, at least in regard to power sharing, in two specific phases of hemispheric regionalism: agenda setting and institutionalization. This study tests the hypothesis through a content analysis of the main documents produced at the Miami, Santiago, and Québec summits, then relates these findings to the progress of institutionalization from 1994 to 2003.

This article explains why Costa Rica, by the mid-twentieth century, began to depart from the all-too-common mixture of political instability and economic stagnation characteristic of much of the developing world. The article argues that this country has benefited from better-than-average public policies, a conclusion based on a major comparative ranking of state policies. It further argues that interminable political stalemates gradually democratized the struggle for power and laid the groundwork for an innovative constitutional framework, one that allocates the technical functions of government to a set of autonomous institutions. A central implication of this argument is that institutional design is the backdrop for development-enhancing public policies.

This essay explores the possibility that Latin America may deploy new strategic options in its relations with Washington at the beginning of the twenty-first century. It starts by evaluating what have been the five major foreign policy models of the region with regard to Washington since the end of the Cold War. It proceeds by evaluating the recent dynamics of Latin American insertion into world affairs. Then it introduces three new alternatives for handling U.S. Latin American relations in the coming years. It concludes by pointing out the importance of understanding the scope of the hemispheric challenges for both the region and Washington.

The government of Bolivia led by President Evo Morales and the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party claims to be constructing a new postliberal or plurinational state. However, this alleged experiment in plurinationalism conflicts with two central elements of government and MAS party strategy: the expansion of the economic development model based on the extraction of non-renewable natural resources, and the MAS's efforts to control political space, including indigenous territories. This article analyzes these contradictions by examining how Bolivia's constitution and legal framework appear to support indigenous autonomy while simultaneously constraining it. Specifically, it explores how political and bureaucratic processes have seriously limited opportunities to exercise indigenous rights to autonomy. The article makes a comparative analysis of the implications of Bolivia's experience for indigenous autonomy and plurinationalism for other resource extraction–dependent states.