Virtually no one in the United States raised objections to the 1964 military takeover of the Brazilian civilian government. In the early 1970s, however, the Brazilian regime had become associated with torture and the arbitrary rule of law. By the end of that decade, compliance with human rights standards had developed into a yardstick for measuring U.S. foreign policy initiatives in Latin America. This paper argues that between 1969 and 1974, a small group of dedicated church activists, exiled Brazilians, and academics introduced the issue of human rights in Latin America into the U.S. national body politic. A network of concerned activists fashioned a systematic campaign to educate journalists, government officials, and the public about the abuses taking place under the generals' rule. Their activities helped isolate the military regime and laid the groundwork for a broader solidarity movement with Latin American popular struggles in the late 1970s and 1980s.

In the last 20 years, two broadly defined theories have sought to explain the relationship between economic inequality and redistribution. The well-known hypothesis set forth by Meltzer and Richard (1981) states that larger income differences between the median voter and the average income earner should increase redistributive pressures in democratic regimes. Power Resource Theory (PRT), by contrast, argues that income inequality breeds power inequality and should dampen redistribution. Critical to both theories is the translation of redistributive interest into policy signals. This article considers protests as signals that increase the salience of inequality among voters. Results provide evidence that protests facilitate more progressive cash transfers in highly unequal environments but have modest effects in more egalitarian ones.

This study of Uruguay's Frente Amplio explores four central questions for the analysis of the “new Latin American left.” How did a leftist alternative emerge and grow inside an institutionalized party system? How do the socioeconomic and political factors that enabled the rise of the left in Uruguay differ from those observed in other Latin American cases? How did Frente Amplio adapt itself to profit from the opportunities that arose during the 1990s? What are the implications of the previous factors for governmental action by the FA? In answering these questions, this study integrates an analysis of the sociological and political-institutional opportunity structures consolidated during the 1990s with one of strategic partisan adaptation processes. This perspective is useful for explaining how, by 2004, Frente Amplio had built a dual support base from its historical constituency and a socially heterogeneous group alienated from traditional parties due to economic and political discontent.

Why do armed groups fighting in civil wars establish different institutions in territories where they operate? This article tests the mechanisms of a theory that posits that different forms of wartime social order are the outcome of a process in which an aspiring ruler—an armed group—expands the scope of its rule as much as possible unless civilians push back. Instead of being always at the mercy of armed actors, civilians arguably have bargaining power if they can credibly threaten combatants with collective resistance. Such resistance, in turn, is a function of the quality of preexisting local institutions. Using a process-driven natural experiment in three villages in Central Colombia, this article traces the effects of institutional quality on wartime social order.

Democracy affords citizens the ability to influence policy through participation in elections and through direct political action. Though previous scholarship evaluates the impact each strategy has on outcomes, little if any work exists that examines how one strategy, direct action, affects success in the other, elections. This study analyzes the relationship between land occupations and the electoral success of the Workers' Party in Brazil between 1996 and 2006. It finds that the relationship varies in presidential and mayoral elections depending on income inequality and incumbency. Once the PT captures the presidential office in 2002, these effects disappear, suggesting that the effect of political protest also depends on who is in office.

Latin America's “left turn” expanded cash transfers and public services, contributing to lower poverty and inequality. Recently, right-leaning candidates and parties have begun to win back seats in the legislature, and in some cases have captured the executive branch. This shift has sparked debate about the future of Latin America's welfare states. This article analyzes social policy reforms enacted by two recent right-leaning governments: that of Sebastián Piñera in Chile (2010–14) and Mauricio Macri in Argentina (2015–). It finds that contrary to neoliberal adjustment policies of the past, neither Macri nor Piñera engaged in privatization or deep spending cuts. Instead, both administrations facilitated a process of policy drift in some sectors and marginal expansion in others. Policy legacies and the strength of the opposition help to explain these outcomes, suggesting that Latin America's political context has been transformed by the consolidation of democracy and the experience of left party rule.

This article argues that Spain has been the driving external force in the advancement of LGBT rights in Latin America, from marriage in Argentina to the regional recognition of “sexual diversity rights” as human rights. Acting as “norm entrepreneurs,” Spanish activists and organizations, relying on development aid, have promoted their perspectives through two approaches: strategic consulting and resource transfer. Their diffusion is illustrated primarily by the Argentine case. There, activists underwritten by Spanish resources have borrowed Spanish strategies to achieve “the same rights with the same names.” Besides broadening our understanding of the struggle for LGBT equality in Latin America, this article deepens the explanation of norm diffusion, focusing on emergence. In this stage, specific individuals and organizations deliberately select appropriate “targets” for and moments of intervention. But norm “receptors” must also be ready for action.

This article seeks to explain the highly interventionist Brazilian automobile policy of 1995, which drastically departed from the neoliberal principles guiding Brazilian economic policy at the time. This seemingly inconsistent policy stemmed from two overlapping bargains. The first, between the private sector and the government's developmentalist, and hence more permeable elements, shaped the policy's content and design. A second, more crucial intrastate bargain pitted the defenders of the previous development model against the team of neoliberal, technocratic economists who had centralized economic decisionmaking authority since mid-1993. These economists' support for the automobile policy must be understood as a response to the macroeconomic and political challenges they faced in 1995. This study highlights the importance of examining the undisclosed actions of the state and the role of intrastate cleavages in political economy outcomes.

As indigenous movements around the world seek to strengthen their collective voice in their respective political systems, efforts continue to design political institutions that offer both sufficient local autonomy and incentives to participate in the broader political system. The state of Oaxaca, Mexico, offers a test case of one such effort at indigenous-based institutional design. This article argues that such reforms often fail to confront the tension between local autonomy and citizen engagement in politics outside the borders of the community. Testing this theory through a comparative analysis of voter turnout rates in municipalities across the state of Oaxaca and the neighboring state of Guerrero, this study finds that the adoption of indigenous institutions at the local level is associated with significantly lower voter turnout rates for national elections.