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Since the return of democracy in the 1980s, observers have lamented the extreme fragmentation of Brazil's party system and the weakness of parties in Brazilian voters’ minds. A new party emerged in the 1980s – the Partido dos Trabalhadores – and the number of petistas in the electorate quickly grew from 0% in 1980 to about 30% just one generation later. The PT also enjoyed increasing electoral success: between 1994 and 2014, candidates from the PT and its main rival, the PSDB, finished first or second in every presidential election, and the PT–PSDB rivalry imbued the chaotic party system with something of a bipartisan dynamic.
The PT scrapped for power with Brazil's other parties for more than thirty years. Yet competition among parties does not always reflect masslevel understandings of politics. As noted in Chapter 1, Brazil's political, cultural, and institutional context makes it an unlikely case to expect partisanship to impact voter attitudes and behavior. To what extent can the concept of party ID travel to “unlikely” cases like Brazil?
In this chapter, we first elaborate on the concepts of positive and negative partisanship and explore their spread among Brazilian voters since the 1980s. With evidence from national surveys going back to 1989, we confirm that to the extent that a party system in the electorate has existed in Brazil since redemocratization, it has largely revolved around attitudes about the PT. Not only do petistas and antipetistas comprise a large proportion of the electorate, but most positive partisans in Brazil are petistas and most negative partisans are antipetistas. This is not to say that partisanship for other parties does not matter at all – in fact, as we show in Chapter 3, particularly for those expressing an affinity for the PSDB, partisanship does appear to matter in the same way as petismo.However, despite the PSDB's prominent role in the party system since the late 1980s, no more than 5% of voters have ever declared themselves partisans of the PSDB. For the most part, support for the PSDB – or any other Brazilian party – has been based not on partisanship but on candidates’ personal qualities or their performance in office.
How does mass partisanship develop where it does not already exist – particularly in countries like Brazil that lack deep socioeconomic or cultural cleavages? And why in some cases does identification with a particular party subsequently weaken? In this chapter we explain the spread of petismo, and examine its recent decline.
As suggested, explaining the rise of petismo is not easy, given Brazil's cultural and institutional context. It might seem easier to explain petismo's decline – after all, the PT was in power during a deep political and economic crises in 2013. However, we just noted in Chapter 3 that because partisanship can be a relatively “sticky” psychological attachment, it can shape perceptions of government performance. If this is true, how then to explain the weakening of partisan attachments?
Petismo's growth from none to about one in four voters in a relatively short time period is a remarkable achievement – for any party, in any country. It is also theoretically puzzling. Scholars believe Brazil is infertile terrain for planting the seeds of partisanship, given its comparatively shallow social cleavages (Mainwaring & Scully 1995a). Its political institutions also work against the emergence of mass partisanship: the electoral rules foster high party-system fragmentation and intraparty competition, which enhance the importance of individual candidates’ reputations, complicate voters’ efforts to understand where parties stand on the issues, and limit the relevance of party labels as “cues” (e.g., Mainwaring 1999; Samuels 1999; Ames 2001).
When social cleavages cannot explain the emergence of mass partisanship from the “bottom up,” scholars turn to political elites’ efforts from the “top down.” At first glance this approach also appears to explain less rather than more. After all, leaders of all of Brazil's main parties – including the PT – chose to converge on the political center since 2000, diluting the coherence of their programmatic positions. Lupu (2013) predicts that diluting a party's “brand” can lead to a collapse of party ID, but that only makes the PT's success up through 2013 even more puzzling.
To understand the rise of petismo we focus on the PT's organizational strategy,which differed from other parties’. Scholars taking a “top-down” approach to explaining the emergence of partisanship have considered variation in national-level party organizations, comparing and contrasting “elite” and “mass” parties, for example. We show that local-level party institutions should be included in the story of how parties cultivate affective ties.
Presidents rely on their trusted advisers to collect, analyze, coordinate, and present information in a timely fashion. However, Latin American presidents often fail to form majority governments and must use cabinet appointments to secure legislative coalitions to pursue their policies. This article suggests that presidents strategically redesign their executive offices to address the ministry drift. Presidents who can transform the organizations attached to their executive office have additional tools to monitor their ministers’ flexibility. The article argues that the greater the number of ministers in the cabinet from parties different from the president’s, the greater the transformations to the presidential office. Using time-series analysis, hypotheses are tested with an original dataset of organizational changes to the presidential center in Colombia, 1967–2015. The findings indicate that the percentage of ministers from other parties is a good predictor of the transformations undertaken in the executive office of the president.
This article studies the intersections between race and regional identity in the 1940s and 1950s in Salvador, Bahia, a critical site for the African diaspora. It examines how tourist guides produced for domestic consumption, first by Jorge Amado and later by intellectuals Odorico Tavares and José Valladares, sought to frame the city in new ways around blackness. Grounding the production of such guides in national trends for mobility and travel, the article proposes that they provided a foundational site for the crafting of a regional identity. Critically, these texts established early links between a commodified black culture and tourism in ways that would prove exceptionally long-lasting.
The literature studying the behavioral effects of political corruption is rapidly growing. While some studies explore the contextual and institutional factors that can neutralize the effects of corruption, this article addresses a different mechanism for weak electoral accountability for corruption: citizen (de)mobilization. It uses a vignette experiment embedded in a nationally representative AmericasBarometer survey in Colombia to isolate the causal effect of political corruption on electoral participation. The results suggest that receiving credible information about the corrupt behavior of politicians running for office decreases the likelihood of participation in elections. It also shows that corruption demobilizes voters even when corrupt politicians are able to provide public works to their constituencies, which casts doubt on the idea that citizens exchange integrity for favorable policy outcomes.
This article analyzes the uneven expansion of social policy, using evidence from Chile. It explicates the Chilean case to understand differences between two specific areas of social policy: pensions and healthcare. Most macroexplanatory factors, which the literature proves are crucial for cross-country analysis, are left constant. Instead, it focuses on accounting for differences in the scope of expansion across sectors. It carries out a hypothesis-generating type of case study and relies on inductive process tracing. The goal is to generate hypotheses that may be useful for theory building in the realm of intersectoral dynamics of social policy expansion. The findings suggest that three explanatory factors combine to account for such differences: policymakers’ perceptions of the budgetary constraints and fiscal costs of producing (or failing to produce) a reform; the composition, cohesion, and ideas of technical teams; and the relative power of nongovernmental, prowelfare actors in relation to market stakeholders.
Conventional wisdom suggests that partisanship has little impact on voter behavior in Brazil; what matters most is pork-barreling, incumbent performance, and candidates' charisma. This book shows that soon after redemocratization in the 1980s, over half of Brazilian voters expressed either a strong affinity or antipathy for or against a particular political party. In particular, that the contours of positive and negative partisanship in Brazil have mainly been shaped by how people feel about one party - the Workers' Party (PT). Voter behavior in Brazil has largely been structured around sentiment for or against this one party, and not any of Brazil's many others. The authors show how the PT managed to successfully cultivate widespread partisanship in a difficult environment, and also explain the emergence of anti-PT attitudes. They then reveal how positive and negative partisanship shape voters' attitudes about politics and policy, and how they shape their choices in the ballot booth.
When and why did Brazilian cotton become important to the Industrial Revolution in Britain? Between 1791 and 1801, Brazilian cotton represented 40 per cent of raw cotton imports in Liverpool, rivalling those from the West Indies. Using archival data between 1760 and 1808, this paper shows that Brazil benefitted from increasing British demand for a new variety of cotton staple that emerged with mechanised textile production. Previous explanations for the rise of Brazilian cotton trade attributed it to the revolutions in the Caribbean in the 1790s, and the American War of Independence, which ended in 1783. Evidence, however, suggests that these explanations are incomplete or incorrect. The United States did not export cotton to Britain before 1790, and British imports from the West Indies did not fall after the revolutions.
This paper explores the meanings that youth crime and policing acquire in the context of their mediated representation on the televised news in Nicaragua. In particular, it explores this question by juxtaposing the televised imagery of the apprehended juvenile delinquent with the discursive treatment of his person by both police and reporters on Nicaragua's most watched news shows, Acción 10 and Crónica TN8. The police are presented as heroic protagonists who serve and protect the barrio through ‘communitarian policing’ whilst the juvenile delinquent – the ‘pinta’ – is excluded and stigmatised. This turns such youths into socially expendable and ‘tainted, discounted’ outsiders who can be treated as such. In this way, through the news, pintas are targeted for ‘removal’ from the barrio, and their mediated arrests become ‘spectacular performances’ of community. A discrepancy appears, then, between the police's communitarian discourse and its reactionary practice.
In recent times there has been a dramatic change in the nature and scope of constitutional justice systems in the global south. New or reformed constitutions have proliferated, protecting social, economic, and political rights. While constitutional courts in Latin America have traditionally been used as ways to limit power and preserve the status quo, the evidence shows that they are evolving into a functioning part of contemporary politics and a central component of a system of constitutional justice. This book lays bare the political roots of this transformation, outlining a new way to understand judicial design and the very purpose of constitutional justice. Authors Daniel M. Brinks and Abby Blass use case studies drawn from nineteen Latin American countries over forty years to reveal the ideas behind the new systems of constitutional justice. They show how constitutional designers entrust their hopes and fears to dynamic governance systems, in hopes of directing the development of constitutional meaning over time.