The Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts (‘ARSIWA’) constitute an experiment in international law-making. Unlike other successful projects of the International Law Commission (‘ILC’), such as its work on the law of treaties and diplomatic and consular relations, the ARSIWA have not yet led to the adoption of a multilateral treaty. Yet, their text is cited commonly as the authoritative statement of the law on state responsibility with investment tribunals being by far their most frequent users. This well-recorded paradox calls for a reflection on the ways in which investment tribunals make use of the ARSIWA. This chapter examines the methods which investment tribunals explicitly or implicitly employ when using the ARSIWA in order to determine the content of rules of general international law on state responsibility. The chapter then proceeds to critically assess these findings from two perspectives: the overarching aims of the law of state responsibility and the doctrine of sources of international law. The chapter synthesises these empirical and doctrinal insights into a proposal for a common framework for the use of ARSIWA.

Despite the undeniable ‘treatification’ of international investment law, that should not lead one to the erroneous assumption that, as a direct consequence of this, other sources of law and custom in particular, become gradually and increasingly more irrelevant in this particular filed of international law. Contrarily, customary rules remain of fundamental importance in what has been called ‘the age of treatification of international investment law’. Furthermore, custom, both in its primary rule and secondary rule incarnation, potentially will even further grow in its importance to international investment law and arbitration, considering the seemingly increasing trend of what may be dubbed if not a ‘de-treatification’ then at least a decrease in the number of treaties (or treaty ratifications) relating to international investment law. Even with the justified criticisms about false narratives and the creation of custom being a reflection of prior and current power structures, the study of custom and its function across all stages of its life-cycle has a lot to yield. Both these criticisms and the general academic inquiries into the lacunae of custom (at the identification as well as the interpretation/content-determination stages) contribute to the gradual refinement of our understanding of how custom works, how it is used, what gaps it has and how it can adapt to modern challenges and new circumstances.

The Precautionary Principle has primarily found a place within the international environmental law regime, and to some extent, the international human rights regime. It is also, arguably, considered to be a principle of customary international law. While the international investment law regime has traditionally resisted (and still does) incorporating principles from other regimes, a few innovative International Investment Agreements (IIA) have gone against the grain and expressly incorporated principles of international environmental and human rights law. This chapter draws upon a clause in the Nigeria-Morocco Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) of 2016 which mandates that both the investor and the host state shall apply the precautionary principle to their investments. It will enquire whether the precautionary principle has achieved that normative status of customary international law which allows it to be binding on host states by virtue of inclusion in a BIT. Second, it will enquire whether the precautionary principle can be binding on foreign investors as non-state actors.

This chapter argues that the systemic integration of customary international law in the interpretation of investment treaties should equip vulnerable polities with principled arguments for why a high degree of deference is warranted in their adoption of regulatory measures to address the health, economic and social dimensions of chronic crises. The chapter reviews the recent demand for governments to protect their right to regulate by imposing a moratorium on investment treaty claims. This critical discourse has overlooked the deeper roots of the State’s presumptive right to regulate without compensation, an expression of its territorial sovereignty under customary international law. Evident across landmark decisions such as the Oscar Chinn Case, the Iron Rhine Arbitration and Philip Morris v. Uruguay, the regulatory dimension of territorial sovereignty both preceded and endured the mid-century debate over the standard of compensation for nationalisation and the subsequent rise of investment arbitration. In contemporary practice, the customary rule that there is no State responsibility for reasonable regulation may be integrated through arbitral practice to ensure each claimant bears the burden to prove that regulatory measures were unreasonable, discriminatory, or adopted in bad faith.

Managerial justice continues apace with the recent Independent Expert Review of 2020. Yet such an exercise – managerial in its assumptions, diagnoses, and techniques – sounds a familiar tune once we observe the court’s managerial present and its macro, micro, and meso scales of managerial governance. This concluding chapter therefore asks how this institutional terrain, saturated with management thought and practices, might be navigated by those concerned about its relationship to global justice efforts. Rather than posing a series of policy prescriptions, this chapter instead suggests a professional posture or strategy of discomfort that experts and others might assume in resisting managerial justice. Drawing on Vergès’s strategy of rupture, Weber’s ethic of responsibility, and the decolonial movement, a strategy of discomfort resists the urge to look for solutions in either the complete removal or partial renovation of management. Rather, it proposes that experts admit to their politics, experience the force of such managerial politics as violence, and experience the responsibility of justice-seeking beyond efficiency savings and the strategic plan.

This chapter focuses on some of the Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL)s criticism of investment law and the CIL rules contained therein, and proposes an engagement with this criticism at the stage of interpretation. Based on an examination of the interpretation of the customary minimum standard of treatment, it argues that interpretation plays two roles in relation to CIL – a constructive and an evolutive role. In light of these two roles, interpretative arguments may be deployed strategically so as to flag problematic rationales in the rules and argue for their re-interpretation. In particular, I propose three interpretive strategies which may achieve this goal, which are differentially suited to the different actors who may wish to deploy them. These strategies are limited by the actors who deploy them, the forum where they are deployed, as well as the rules of procedure in which the dispute takes place. Nevertheless, they present an opportunity for a constructive TWAIL engagement with international investment law which does not summarily dismiss the existing system.

This chapter commences by analyzing the relevance the Permanent Court of International Justice’s judgment in the Chorzów Factory case and the prevailing position that it reflects customary international law on the remedies available for treaty breaches. The analysis then focuses on why references to remedies other than compensation (available under customary international law) are rare in investor-state arbitrations and whether there is a place for restitution and/or declaratory awards in international investment law. If claimants choose to seek restitution, tribunals are empowered to make such an award, unless this is explicitly excluded by the underlying treaty or is practically impossible (or at least inadequate) on the facts of the particular case. The ‘Spanish saga’ cases on renewable energy confirm this approach. Satisfaction, a third type of remedy available under customary international law, a declaratory award, is considered as a ‘paper victory’ which, in practice, is tantamount to losing a case. The final part of this chapter analyzes various issues related to compensation itself, in practice the most important remedy in international investment law.

In 2019, ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II decided not to open an investigation into potential Taliban and US crimes in Afghanistan on the grounds that it would not be in the ‘interests of justice’. In arriving at this conclusion, the judges relied upon management concerns about organisational sustainability and the proposed use of resources to justify their position. While heavily criticised by scholars at the time, the judges’ reasoning alludes to the pervasiveness of management ideas and reasoning throughout the court, even in the realm of legal argumentation. This chapter takes the Afghanistan decision as the starting point for a discussion on management’s relationship to core argumentative dilemmas comprising the ICC legal field. Whether in framing case selection as a matter of court capacity or fashioning past obstacles to victim participation as ‘lessons learnt’, management ideas and practices enact a flight from the dilemmas and complexities of ICC-style justice by experts, deferring critique and sustaining the institutional project of global justice.

Chapter 5 asks why the public continues to support restrictive policies given their considerable economic and rights costs. It identifies the predominant values informing and facilitating the liberal state’s governance of contemporary immigration and its implications for restricting human mobility by focusing on the effects of a threat environment in sustaining the onerous policies of the migration policy playing field. It argues that the persistence of these policies can largely be explained by the continued negative framing of these events by political elites and the mass media. In particular, their conflation of public safety and national security with immigration makes the issue more salient for the public, and the popular legitimacy of restrictive policies is sustained and endorsed by center and extreme Right politicians and political parties. The chapter concludes that the predominance of a security paradigm has shifted the baseline of values salience and realigned popular values and attitudes regarding immigration.